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A NEW REMEDY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE CASE FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
INTERVENTION IN AN INTERNAL CONFLICT
ROGER MYERS *

It is a proverb of Old date,
that the pride of France, the treason of England,
and the war of Ireland, shall never have end.
Which proverb, touching the war of Ireland,
is like always to continue, without God set it in men 's breast
to find some new remedy that was never found before.
-English civil servant, 16th Century
I. INTRODUCTION
August 1990 marked the twenty-first anniversary of the inception of
1
England's most recent effort to end the War of Ireland. On August 14,

* Associate, Steinhart & Falconer (San Francisco); B.A., 1980, San Jose State
University; J.D., 1988, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley. I thank David D.
Caron, Acting Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, for his insightful suggestions, Frank C.
Newman, Jackson H. Ralston Professor of InternationalLaw, Emeritus, Boalt Hall, for his
belief in this project and the potential of the United Nations and international law to protect
human rights and civil liberties regardless of national boundaries, and Wiltrud Harms, Boalt
Hall International Document Specialist, without whom the research on this project might
never have been completed. I also thank Professor D.S. Greer of the Queen's University
of Belfast for his valuable criticisms. I have taken the liberty of addressing Professor
Greer's primary concerns in the body of this Article. A special word of thanks to the
editors and staff of the New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative
Law for their patience and assistance. I am deeply indebted to Tanya Smith of the
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights for her invaluable aid and insights. Of course, the
views expressed herein are solely my own.
A word on methodology. To quote a recent chronicler of the conflict in Northern
Ireland, "[t]here is a persistent problem, given the nature of this war, in ensuring accuracy
[T]here are usually, at the very least, two
of detail for each incident described here ....
different versions of events that occur in the Six Counties." K. KELLEY, THE LONGEST
WAR: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE I.R.A. at xvi (2d ed. 1988). Although I cannot
guarantee this Article to be free of factual error, I have endeavored to avoid uncorroborated
interpretations of events in Northern Ireland, except where necessary to illustrate various
partisan viewpoints.
I. The genesis of the modem Irish "troubles" is generally set at August 12, 1969, the
culmination of two years of Protestant violence against Catholic civil rights advocates. On
that date, Protestants staged their annual march through Catholic sections of Derry to

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. I11

1969, British troops, bayonets fixed, marched into the Bogside to protect
the Catholic ghetto outside the ancient walls of Derry2 from marauding
armed Protestant police forces incensed by a two-year civil rights
campaign challenging a half-century of Protestant economic and political
domination in the North of Ireland. 3 There is some evidence that at least
one of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's motivations in dispatching soldiers
to the besieged Catholic quarter was to preempt international intervention.
The previous day, the taoiseach4 of the predominately Catholic Republic
celebrate the siege of that city in 1689, a march which quickly disintegrated into the
cataclysmic Battle of the Bogside that led to the introduction of British troops two days
later. During the battle, eight died and at least 189 police and nearly 1,000 total were
injured. Two of the most exhaustive examinations of this turning point in Ulster's modem
history are the government's own two-volume TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY, VIOLENCE AND CIVIL
DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN 1969, REPORT TO PARLIAMENT, 1972, CMND.
566 [hereinafter SCARMAN REPORT] and R. STETLER, THE BATTLE OF BOGSIDE (1970).
2. Derry is the Catholic name for the town, Londonderry the Protestant. Since a
majority of the town is Catholic, its Catholic name will be used throughout this report. Cf.
Thomas, Bloody Ireland, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May-June 1988, at 31, 37.
3. Northern Ireland had been building to the August 1969 conflagration for months.
The previous October, a march by more than 2,000 unarmed Catholics to protest
discrimination in employment and public housing was attacked by the Protestant police
force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which charged without warning and, in the
words of a governmental committee of inquiry, "used their batons indiscriminately" and
"wholly without justification or excuse." See DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND,
1969, CMND. 532, at 24-29 [hereinafter CAMERON REPORT]. Hospital officials treated 96
casualties, R. STETLER, supra note 1,at 40, including two policemen. CAMERON REPORT,
supra, at 30. In January, more than 200 armed Protestant extremists and police, led by the
Reverend Ian Paisley, ambushed unarmed Catholic civil rights marchers on the Bumtollet
Bridge outside Derry, sending 13 marchers to the hospital. Id. at 45-48; R. ROSE,
GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE (1971); R. STETLER, supra,
at 47. The next 48 hours witnessed violent clashes in the Bogside, as Catholic men,
women and children were batoned on the streets and inside their homes. R. ROSE, supra,
at 104; R. STETLER, supra, at 48-49. In April, a civil rights gathering in Derry was
pummelled by Paisleyites and police, erupting into a full-scale battle when police again
invaded the Bogside, beating Catholics "without mercy." J. CONROY, BELFAST DIARY:
WAR AS A WAY OF LIFE 27 (1987); see CAMERON REPORT, supra, at 53; T. HADDEN &
P. HILLYARD, JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CONFIDENCE 21-23
(1973); R. STETLER, supra, at 50-58. Despite guarantees of certain violence, Protestant
authorities refused to ban the annual Protestant marches commemorating Protestant victories
at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 (July 12) and in the siege of Derry in 1689 (August 12).
The first led to severe rioting in Belfast and Derry, leaving more than 100 injured and an
elderly Catholic man dead. I SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 45; R. STETLER, supra,
at 59. The second resulted in the aforementioned Battle of the Bogside. See 1 SCARMAN
REPORT, supra, at 68-69.
4.

"Taoiseach"-pronounced

"Tee-shock"-is Gaelic for leader or prime minister.
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of Ireland, Jack Lynch, had broadcast his plea that "the British Government. . apply immediately to the United Nations for the urgent dispatch
of a peace-keeping force to the six counties of Northern Ireland." 5
As violence subsequently spread throughout Ulster, 6 especially
Belfast, 7 C.C. Cremin, the permanent representative of Ireland, on
August 17 sent a letter to the president of the United Nation's Security
Council, requesting an urgent meeting of the Council. 8 At the debate that
followed, the British representative, Lord Caradon, announced, "A United
Nations force is unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because
my Government is already taking action. It is inappropriate because
United Nations intervention against our wishes would be in violation of
Article 2(7) of the [United Nations] Charter."' On the crucial issue of
whether British soldiers, for eight centuries considered by Irish Catholics
to be the representatives of a government bent on colonial conquest, could
fulfill the role of neutral peace keepers, Caradon informed the Council
that "British troops were discharging their duties with absolute impartiality; no better peace-keeping force could be there." 10
DWELLY'S GAEIC-ENGUSH DICTIONARY 932 (5th ed. 1949).
5. 24 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1969) at 159, U.N. Doc. S/9394 (1969). Unable
to remain idle while Catholics in the North were "injured and perhaps worse," Lynch also
ordered Irish troops to the border, ostensibly to erect field hospitals and refugee camps, but
with the potential to invade if the Protestant police overcame the Bogside defenders. J.
CONROY, supra note 3, at 28.
6. As news of the battle spread through the Catholic ghettos of Ulster, fighting erupted
in the towns of Lurgan, Armagh, Dungiven, Enniskillen and Dungannon. See I SCARMAN
REPORT, supra note I, at 1-2.
7. The battle raged longest in Belfast. By the evening of the 14th, a fitful calm had
descended on Derry, but that night and the next day heavy rioting ripped West Belfast.
Catholics stoned police stations and Protestants, led by members of the B-Specials auxiliary
police, undertook incendiary attacks on Catholic enclaves, burning somewhere between 48
and 200 families out of their homes. See J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 29; K. KELLEY,
supra note *, at 118; see also I SCARMAN REPORT, supra note I, at 244. Members of the
RUC entered the Falls Road ghetto in armored cars equipped with Browning machine guns,
firing the Brownings into a row of homes and killing a nine-year-old boy and an off-duty
British soldier visiting his Catholic parents. Id. at 172; J. CONROY, supra, at 29; J.
HOLLAND, TOO LONG A SACRIFICE: LIFE AND DEATH IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE
1969, at 35 (1982). In all, six Catholics and two Protestants were killed. Id. Afterwards,
Northern Ireland's prime minister and other Protestant officials blamed a group of Catholic
republicans for the deaths. R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 107. London disagreed; within days
6,000 British soldiers were deployed within the province to prevent further attacks on
Catholic areas. Id. They were only partially successful. See J. CONROY, supra, at 32-33.
8.

24 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1969) at 159, U.N. Doc. S/9394 (1969).

9. 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1503 (1969); see Note, Northern
Ireland and the United Nations, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 483, 484 (1970).

10. Questions Relating to Europe: The Situation in Northern Ireland, 1969 U.N.Y.B.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. I I

This Article will illustrate how history, the development of international law and United Nations practice have proven Caradon wrong on
both counts. A United Nations peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland is
necessary, for Caradon's appraisal of the ability and neutrality of the
British army proved overly optimistic. More accurate was the prediction
by Taoiseach Lynch that the British-backed "Royal Ulster Constabulary
[(RUC) would] no longer [be] accepted as an impartial police force, and
that the employment of British troops would not be acceptable and would
not be likely to restore peaceful conditions, and certainly not in the long
term."" In the intervening two decades, approximately 3,000 have died
and 30,000 have been maimed and injured in the latest renewal of the War
of Ireland. 2 "[Tioday the division between the Catholic minority and
the Protestant minority seems as wide as ever."13 In 1988, the Six
Counties suffered their bloodiest year since 1981,4 the year of the
181, U.N. Sales No. E.71.1.1.
11. 24 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1969) at 159, U.N. Doe. S/9394 (1969); Note,
supra note 9, at 483.
12. IRA Bomb Kills 4 Soldiers in Ulster, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 10, 1990, at A17,
col. 2 [hereinafter IRA Bomb]. Exact figures for the number killed since the current
incarnation of the War of Ireland first flared in 1969 are difficult to ascertain. Official
figures list 2,849 dead through the end of 1990. Violence in Ulster Claims 76 Victims, The
Independent (London), Jan. 2, 1991, at 3, col. I [hereinafter Violence in Ulster]. These
See IR. INFORMATION
figures, however, only include deaths in Northern Ireland.
PARTNERSHIP, SUMMARY OF CONFLICT-RELATED FATAL CASUALTIES IN 1988, at 13
(1990). Thus, the many political killings in the Republic of Ireland, in Britain and in
Western Europe are not reflected in official statistics. id. In addition, as Associated Press
reporter Ed Blance pointed out in an article on the 15th anniversary of the Battle of the
Bogside, official figures "do[) not include 10 guerrilla hunger strikers who starved
themselves to death in 1981, [nor the scores of] paramilitary fighters secretly buried by
their comrades or soldiers mistakenly shot by their own men." Blance, Irish Eyes Are Still
Crying in Belfast, Daily Ledger-Post Dispatch (Antioch-Pittsburgh, Calif.), Aug. 12, 1984,
at 9, col. 1. Thus international observers estimate the total death toll at roughly 3,000.
See IRA Bomb, supra, at A17, col. 2.
13. Clark, 'Troubles' Turn 20 in Ireland-Still at War, San Francisco Exam., Oct. 6,
1988, at A28, col. 5.
14. Political violence reportedly claimed at least 105 lives in 1988, the second-highest
total for any year since 1979. See I.R.A. Bomb Meant for Police Kills Two Civilians, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1988 at A6, col. 3; Whitney, Curb Is Ordered on Ulster Broadcasts,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1988, at A5, col. 4; Lohr, I.R.A. Says 3 Slain Were on Mission,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1988 at A3, col. I [hereinafter Lohr, 3 I.R.A. Slain]. In 1981, the
deaths of the 10 hunger strikers sparked a new round of violence that claimed 108 lives.
See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, IRELAND: A POSITIVE PROPOSAL 14 (1985). Forty-four
British servicemen were killed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1988. See IRA
Bomb Damages 100 Homes, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 19, 1988, at A16, col. 1. This
represents more British fatalities than any year since .1973. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN,
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hunger strike deaths, prompting one of Britain's leading political
publications to opine that the "holy grail [of a political solution] seems as
elusive as ever." 15 Things have improved little since then. 6
As Section II of this Article explains, Britain's political and military
strategies, coupled with the historic context of the Irish conflict, have
brought British troops into the cross hairs of Northern Catholic animosity,
ensuring sufficient communal support for the Irish Republican Army's
(IRA) guerilla campaign to rid Ireland of the British and to unite the island
under Irish rule."7 It was, for example, the army's ambush and killing
of three unarmed IRA suspects in March 1988 that ignited the violence to
follow that year." Because the British army-both of itself and as a
symbol of Britain's control-has evolved into one of the primary causes
of continued violence, its withdrawal has become a necessary condition
precedent to the creation of a political climate in which the Northern Irish
can initiate the process that might lead to negotiations between the
antagonists and to eventual peace.
But while the British cannot achieve peace by remaining in Northern
Ireland, neither can they, alone, ensure it by leaving. Violent Protestant
reaction to threats against its control in the North led to armed British
military intervention, and British withdrawal would remove the only
current safeguard, however imperfect, against a conflagration that could
dwarf the guerrilla war of the past twenty-one years. 9 A British military
pullout can only succeed in reducing the climate of violence if accompanied by some strategy to keep the peace without provoking the population
into full-blown civil war.
supra, at 14. In contrast, during all of 1987, the IRA killed only three British soldiers.
Lohr, I.R.A. Blast Prompts Security Review, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1988, at A3, col. 1
[hereinafter Lohr, I.R.A. Blast].
15. A Battle of Gestures, Symbols and Bombs, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1988, at 45-46,
[hereinafter A Battle of Gestures].
16. Although the number of deaths declined in 1989, see Violence in Ulster, supra note
12, at 3, col. 1; 2 British Soldiers Killed in Raid, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at A14, col.
1 (reporting 61 deaths in 1989, 21 of them security personnel), the intensity of the IRA's
bombing campaign has declined little, if at all. See Prokesch, 7 Killed as LR.A. Forces
3 Men to Drive Bombs to Security Posts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al, col. 2
(reporting three separate attacks on one day); Rule, London Stock Exchange Is Rocked by
a Bombing, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1990, at A3, col. 1 (reporting 10 IRA bomb attacks
between February and July 1990). Consequently, the number of war-related deaths rose
by 25% in 1990, when 76 persons were killed in the conflict, 27 of whom were security
personnel. Killings in Ulster Rose Sharply in 1990, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 3, 1991,
at A16, col. 2; Violence in Ulster, supra, at 3, col. 1.
17. See infra notes 29-285 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 271-83 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 286-315 and accompanying text.
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The recent renaissance of the United Nations, highlighted by the 1988
Nobel Peace prize for the United Nations peacekeeping forces, is an
overdue recognition that, in the words of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, "'the [United Nations] forces have, by their presence, made a decisive
A
contribution toward the initiation of actual peace negotiations."'"
peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland could not itself remedy the War
of Ireland, but that is not its function. As the United Nations has
explained, the purpose of peacekeeping operations is to "create the
climate, buy the time, and promote the minimum goodwill necessary for
settlement [of conflicts] through negotiations or other peaceful
means"2 1-in short, to "creat[e] conditions conducive to negotiations. " '
With the British army unable to do so, despite twenty-one years' effort,
it is difficult to imagine that even Lord Caradon would not concede the
necessity of experimenting with the new remedy of United Nations
intervention.
Sections III through VI address Lord Caradon's second contention,
that United Nation's intervention into what Caradon described as "an
internal matter" was "inappropriate." Section III of this Article describes
how the United Nations, forged in the wake of World War II, was
designed to prevent the historic mode of warfare between sovereigns; it
thus has been slow to build a consensus on how best to keep the peace
when it is threatened by modern, largely internal conflict, such as in
Northern Ireland.' The organization's reluctance to intrude on what its
member states have perceived to be predominantly internal affairs has
rendered the United Nations largely impotent to prevent the widespread
deprivation of life and basic human rights created by internal conflicts. 24
As internal conflicts now represent by far the most frequent threats to
international peace and to human rights, it is imperative that the United
Nations recognize them as such. As United States ambassador to the
United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, said shortly before his death, "[The
issue] is, in essence, whether or not we intend to preserve the effective
capacity of this Organization to keep the peace. It is whether to continue
the difficult but practical and hopeful process of realizing in action the
potential of the Charter for growth through collective responsibility, or
turn toward a weaker concept and a different system."2
20. See Rule, U.N. Peacekeeping Forces Named Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at At, col. I (quoting Nobel Committee).
21. U.N. DEP'T PUB. INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING 7, U.N. Sales No. E.85.1.18 (1985) [hereinafter BLUE HELMETS].

22. Id.
23. See infra notes 326-38 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 339 & 413 and accompanying text.

25. 19 U.N. GAOR (1323d mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1323 (1965).
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Section IV details both the threats to international peace and the
abuses of human rights created by the Ulster crisis and determines that
United Nations' peacekeeping is warranted by the exigencies of the
situation to prevent further escalation of hostilities and to promote a
Section V traces the mechanisms by
climate suitable for negotiation.'
which the United Nations may introduce a peacekeeping mission into an
internal disturbance and concludes that, despite considerable political
obstacles, such a force could be authorized to patrol Northern Ireland.27
Section VI answers a more difficult question-whether United Nations
peacekeeping could succeed in Northern Ireland-by analyzing previous
deployments of United Nations troops. 28 This Article concludes that the
judicious use of peacekeeping forces would not only offer the best and
perhaps only opportunity to create the potential for peace in Northern
Ireland, but also would signify a substantial step by the United Nations
toward finally fulfilling its fundamental tenets.
II.

THE WAR OF NORTHERN IRELAND

When Francis Bradley died in the Northern Ireland town of Toomebridge on February 18, 1986, the world did not note his passing.29 The
killing of the twenty-year-old Catholic was newsworthy, however, for
Bradley became at least the thirty-fifth person in little more than three
years to be shot dead by undercover units of the British army in Ulster'
26. See infra notes 475-602 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 603-741 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 742-902 and accompanying text.
29. The circumstances of Bradley's death were set forth briefly a month later in an
article examining allegations of a British "shoot-to-kill" policy in Northern Ireland.
Thomas, In Ulster, the 'Shoot to Kill' Rumors Will Not Die, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986,
at A2, col. 3.
30. "There is no neutral name for the place." S. BELFRAGE, LIVING WITH WAR at viii
(1987). Protestants-descended either from Presbyterian Scots brought to the island in the
"Ulster Plantation" of 1609-10 to farm land taken from the native Irish, or from the British
land-owning aristocracy that ruled the isle, and generally supportive of continued union
with Britain "at all costs"-prefer to refer to the north as "Ulster," which indicates a
Conversely, to
separate area of the island unaffiliated with the Republic of Ireland.
Catholics-of Celtic stock native to the island and generally favoring a break from Britain
and unification with the sovereign Republic to the south-it is "the North of Ireland" or
"the Six Counties," an incomplete part of a greater whole. Catholics bristle at the use, or
misuse, of the term "Ulster" because the current boundaries include only six of the nine
counties of "true Ulster," one of the island's four historic provinces. See id. at viii; M.
O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, A CONCISE HISTORY OF IRELAND 61 (3d ed. rev. 1985); Thomas,
supra note 2, at 34-35. Thus, neither community calls the province by its official name,
"Northern Ireland." I use these terms interchangeably throughout this Article.
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under circumstances where the shooting appeared to violate domestic"
and international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,32 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,33 and
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
31. British criminal law restricts police to the use of reasonable force in the prevention
of crime. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 117; Criminal Law Act, § 3 (N. Ir.
1967). While the state of emergency-type legislation in effect in Ulster broadens police
powers of search, arrest, detention and questioning, it does not give security forces a
license to kill. Cf Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, §§ 11-20. Thus,
any injury inflicted by a soldier or policeman deliberately and without lawful justification
constitutes a criminal offense. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 36. Indeed,
none of the martial laws in place in Northern Ireland lessen the restriction on the use of
force in effecting an arrest, which remains the same as under British law; i.e., that the
force be "reasonable." B. DICKSON, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND 87
(1984). While the definitions of "reasonable force" and "lawful justification" are vague
and dependant largely on the circumstances in which the force was used, Criminal Law
Act, § 3(1) (N. Ir. 1967); Farrell v. Secretary of State for Defence, [19801 1 All E.R. 166,
172, 70 Crim. App. 224, 230 (per McGonigal, L.J.), the "yellow cards" issued to every
British soldier clearly circumscribe the circumstances in which a soldier may with lawful
justification open fire:
1. In all situations you are to use the minimum force necessary.
FIREARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT.
3. A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless:
a. to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any
other person.
b. you or others in the immediate vicinity are being engaged
by terrorists.
5. You may only open fire against a person:
a. if he is committing or about to commit an act LIKELY
TO ENDANGER LIFE AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY
TO PREVENT THE DANGER ...
b. if you know that he has just killed or injured any person
by such means and he does not surrender if challenged and
THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO MAKE AN ARREST.
Instructions for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland, Army Code No. 70771 (restricted)
(1980), reprinted in Jennings, Shoot to Kill: The Final Courts of Justice, in JUSTICE UNDER
FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES INNORTHERN IRELAND 104, 127 (A. Jennings ed.
1990) [hereinafter JUSTICE UNDER FIRE] (emphasis in original). It appears that the RUC
instructions on the use of firearms are almost identical. Id.
32. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3, 6, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N.
GAOR at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
33. "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, in force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 5, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter International Covenant].,
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Fundamental Freedoms,14 all of which Britain has ratified.35 The vast
majority of those killed were members of the minority Catholic community,' unarmed and shot where an arrest "could probably have been safely
effected." 37 By late 1988, the number of "suspicious shootings" by
police or army undercover units since 1982 had climbed to at least fiftythree38 and by the end of 1990 the total killed during alleged shoot-to-kill
34. "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of
European Convention for the
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law."
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, inforce Sept. 3, 1953, art. 2, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. Although paragraph 2 limits the scope
of the protection to where force is "absolutely necessary" to defend others, effect arrest,
prevent escape or quell insurrection, the use of such force must be lawful under domestic
law to qualify as an exception to article 2. Id. art. 2, para. 2. Since shoot-to-kill is illegal
under British law, it is not a valid exception.
35.

See infra note 424.

36. Thomas, supra note 2, at 33; Thomas, supra note 29, at A2, col. 2.
37. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 69-70; accord Thomas, supra note 29,
at A2, col. 3. Jo Thomas, who covered Northern Ireland for the New York Times, reports
that police statistics listed 21 of the victims as unarmed. Thomas, supra note 2, at 33.
Moreover, "[o]n the basis of the available evidence, it's doubtful that those who were
carrying weapons were given any opportunity to surrender before they were killed or-in
the cases of three who lived-seriously wounded." Id.
38. Reports list at least 47 such killings through 1987. Thomas, supra note 2, at 33.
Army ambushes killed at least six more IRA suspects in 1988. See generally Lohr, 3
LR.A. Slain, supra note 14, at A3, col. i; Gibraltar'sSecret, EcONOMIST, July 23, 1988,
at 15; Raines, 3 British Servicemen Are Killed by LR.A. Attacks in Netherlands, N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1988, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter 3 British Servicemen Killed]. Three of
these were highly controversial. On March 6, an ambush by troopers of the British army's
anti-terrorist unit, the Special Air Services (SAS), killed three IRA members on the island
of Gibraltar. See Lawlessness in Ulster, NATION, Apr. 2, 1988, at 445; Raines, supra, at
A18, col. 1. All three, one of whom was a woman, were unarmed. See Gibraltar's
Secret, supra, at 15; Lawlessness in Ulster, supra, at 445. The IRA "volunteers" were
apparently on Gibraltar to detonate a bomb during a British military parade. Gibraltar's
Secret, supra, at 15. The ambush occurred in an area 30 miles from where the explosives
were stored, however, and the unarmed suspects apparently presented no threat to the
commandoes when they were killed. See id.; Lawlessness in Ulster, supra, at 445. All
three were reportedly shot at close range. Gibraltar Duo Shot While Surrendering, IR.
AM., June 1988, at II [hereinafter Gibraltar Duo Shot]. A British Independent News
(ITN) documentary quoted eyewitnesses who asserted that two of the IRA members killed
on Gibraltar had their hands in the air and were apparently attempting to surrender when
shot. Id.; Raines, supra, at A18, col. 1. According to a Gibraltar resident, the soldiers,
who were not in uniform, shot the unarmed suspects "in cold blood" and without warning.
Clines, Killing of LR.A. Suspects Angers Thatcher Critics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988,
at A7, col. 1. One of the three was shot as he lay on the ground. Gibraltar'sSecret,
supra, at 15; GibraltarDuo Shot, supra, at I1. By a 9-2 vote, a coroner's inquest later
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operations neared 80." Through 1988 well more than half the 326
individuals killed by security forces in Northern Ireland since 1969 had
been civilians.' ° The British attitude toward these questionable methods
was summarized by a leading London publication. Regarding a May 1987
British army ambush that killed eight IRA suspects, it commented that
trials "are a casualty of civil wars." 4 1
These victims of an alleged shoot-to-kill policy employed by certain

exonerated the soldiers of any wrongdoing. Jury Says.Killings of IRA Trio Lawful, San
Francisco Exam., Oct. 1, 1988, A9, col. 6 [hereinafter Jury Says Killings Lawful].
In a report released April 1989, Amnesty International concluded the coroner's inquest
was "inadequate" and had failed to establish that the Gibraltar killings were not
"extrajudicial executions."
AMNESTY INT'L, INVESTIGATING LETHAL SHOOTINGS: THE
GIBRALTAR INQUEST 1 (1989) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, GIBRALTAR INQUEST].
Amnesty International uses this term to "describe unlawful and deliberate killings which
can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy, at any level of government, to
eliminate or to permit the elimination of specific individuals rather than to arrest them."
Id. To date, Amnesty's call for "a full judicial inquiry" to review "not only the
effectiveness of the Gibraltar inquest in investigating all the circumstances surrounding the
Gibraltar killings, but also the government's overall response to the Gibraltar killings" has
not been accepted. Id. at 32.
39. The preceding figure includes only those shoot-to-kill incidents after 1981. "This
is not when the shootings began-there had been some particularly infamous cases in earlier
years ....
" Thomas, supra, at 32. For example, at least nine men and a teenaged boy
were the victims of alleged shoot-to-kill operations between December 1977 and November
1978. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 28-29 (1980). Between March and August
1980, army and police patrols recorded another seven such killings. Id. at 33. Nor did
shoot-to-kill end in 1988. In 1990, the British army ambushed at least six individuals in
circumstances typical of shoot-to-kill operations: three robbery suspects shot 28 times; two
joyriding teenagers shot dead; the unarmed 20-year-old father of a 12-month-old son killed
when his car was hitby at least a dozen bullets at an army checkpoint in South Armagh.
Violence in Ulster, supra note 12, at 3, col. 1. Thus, the total killed during alleged shootto-kill operations is at least 78. The latest killing, of the unarmed father on the penultimate
day of 1990, resurrected the shoot-to-kill controversy both within and without Northern

Ireland.

See McKittrick, Archbishop Joins Call for Inquiry into Army Killing, The

Independent (London), Jan. 2, 1991, at 3, col. 1; Victor, Dublin Government Concerned
Over Checkpoint Death, The Times (London), Jan. 1, 1991, at 3, col. 1. The soldiers
involved were not suspended. Id.
40. IR. INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP, supra note 12, at 14 (table I) (listing 178 of the
326 security force victims-or 54.6%-as civilians); cf.Jennings, Preface to 1990 Edition,
in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE, supra note 31, at xix-xx. Of the 178 civilians killed by security
forces, more than 83%-148- were known to be Catholic. IR. INFORMATION PARTNER-

SHIP, supra, at 14 (table 1).
41. Northern Ireland: What's the Point?, ECONOMIST, Aug.
[hereinafter What's the Point.j.

13,

1988,

at 48
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elements of the British army"2 constitute only one chapter in Europe's
42. British authorities deny the existence of an official shoot-to-kill policy under which
the security forces in Northern Ireland shoot suspected IRA volunteers rather than arrest
them. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2, at 37; Thomas, supra note 29, at A2, col. 3. If
such a strategy exists, it directly contradicts London's assertions regarding its neutral,
peacekeeping role in Ulster. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. According to the
United States Department of State, the British government neither practices nor condones
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
political killings.
PRACTICES FOR 1985, at 1137 (Joint Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP'T
REPORT]. Britain has no death penalty. See Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act,
1965.
Nevertheless, the evidence strongly suggests that during 1977-78 the army developed
a policy of ambushing and killing suspected terrorists about whom it would be difficult to
obtain evidence sufficient for convictions. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 69;
K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 28-39; Jennings, supra note 31,
at 104-05. In unusually strong language, Amnesty International in 1988 concluded that:
[S]ome of the killings by the security forces may have resulted from
a deliberate policy at some official level to eliminate, or permit
elimination of, rather than to arrest individuals whom they identified
The existing investigative
as members of armed opposition groups ....
procedures have failed to eliminate the possibility that they were killed
with premeditation as a result of operations deliberately planned to this
end.
AMNESTY INT'L, NORTHERN IRELAND: KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES AND "SUPERGRASS"
TRIALS 59 (1988) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES]. The
existence of this policy was all but confirmed by one of the two soldiers charged with and
eventually acquitted of the murder of a Catholic man. When asked during his July 1979
trial if he had heard of any patrol with a main objective of capturing, rather than killing,
Cpl. Michael Alan Bohan reportedly replied, "I have read of such patrols in World War
Two literature." E. MCCANN, WAR AND AN IRISH TOWN 164 (rev. ed. 1980). Before he
was removed from his investigation into whether the RUC was the European equivalent of
"a Central American assassination squad-truly of a policy force out of control," mainland
British police investigator John Stalker had amassed sufficient evidence to conclude that,
at the least, "[t]he circumstances of those shootings pointed to a police inclination, if not
a policy, to shoot suspects dead without warning rather than to arrest them. Coming, as
these incidents did, so close together, the suspicion of deliberate assassinations was not
unreasonable." J. STALKER, STALKER 67, 253 (1988) (published as The Stalker Affair in
the United States). For more on the Stalker investigation, see infra notes 169-75 and
accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of shoot-to-kill, see INT'L LAWYERS'
INQUIRY INTO THE LETHAL USE OF FIREARMS BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN N. IR., SHOOT
TO KILL? (1985); Greer, Crown Snub Fails to Impair Impartiality, FORTNIGHT, July 1985,
at 10-11; Jennings, supra note 31, at 104-30.
This practice has certain shortcomings. On February 21, 1988, a young Catholic
named Aidan McAnespie was shot to death without warning by British soldiers as he
walked past an army checkpoint. He was not a member of the IRA. The army admitted
its mistake and expressed its regrets. Thomas, supra note 2, at 37. The army's apology
neglected to mention, however, that McAnespie's sister had run for office as a candidate
for Sinn Fdin, the republican political party; that he had been frequently interrogated and

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. I I

longest conflict since World War II, the ongoing sectarian guerrilla war
in Northern Ireland, known euphemistically as "the troubles." In turn,
these troubles constitute only the latest chapter in a 800-year tragedy. As
it is impossible to understand the need for international intervention absent
some knowledge of the context of the long-running Anglo-Irish conflict,
I trace first the historical roots of the troubles. 3 I then turn to England's
policy these past two decades to examine the tension between Westminster's avowed end, peaceful reconciliation of the Protestant and Catholic
communities, and its contradictory means. I conclude the latter have in
fact broadened the sectarian divide by driving a significant minority of the
Catholic community to support armed republican" revolution against
occasionally beaten by soldiers when he passed the checkpoint each day on his way to
work; and that he came from several generations of Irish nationalists. Id. The killing of
innocent Irish is not unusual. Of the 10 killed in alleged shoot-to-kill operations between
December 1977 and November 1978, three, including a teenaged boy, were admitted by
the army to have been killed in error. K. BOYLE, T. -IADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra, at
28-29. Charges were filed in only one of these cases; the soldiers were acquitted. Id. at
28.
43. The historical and political context of the war largely goes unreported. See Thomas,
supra note 2, at 32 ("[Tlhe silence about what is going on in Northern Ireland troubles me,
and it should worry people who care . . . about justice-or the lack of it-in that place.").
Most reports out of Northern Ireland highlight the often-spectacular atrocities of the IRA.
See, e.g., Lohr, LR.A. Claims Killing of 8 Soldiers as It Steps up Attacks on British, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; LR.A. Ambush Kills 2 Ulster Policemen, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1986, at A3, col. 4; IRA Bombards Police Base, L.A. Times, Mar. 1,
1985, at 1, col. 5. Conversely, Protestants have wielded their political power in an
"unspectacular but effective" manner against the Catholic minority. M. O'BRIEN & C.
O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 167. In addition, reporters are not encouraged to dig deeply
into allegations of institutional violence. When New York Times reporter Thomas began
investigating the shoot-to-kill allegations, she was "abruptly ordered home." Thomas,
supra note 2, at 32.
44. Republicans are Catholics who favor unification with the Republic of Ireland. They
are also referred to as nationalists. Conversely, those who wish to preserve partition of the
island and the north's link with Britain are almost exclusively Protestant, and are called
unionists or loyalists. The principal armed segment of the republican movement is the
IRA, more correctly, the Provisional IRA, which in 1970 split from what became the
Official IRA when the latter chose to emphasize ballots over bullets. See, e.g., S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xiii. For simplicity's sake-and because the Official IRA has
subsequently been largely absorbed into the Worker's Party, id.-this Article generally
refers to the Provisionals as the IRA. The IRA is the most active and bloodiest of
Northern Ireland's paramilitary organizations. See, e.g., Thomas, Anglo-Irish Agreement
Pits Both Ends Against the Middle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1985, at A3, col. 1. The IRA's
strategy is to launch intermittent, yet sensational strikes against military targets so as to
persuade British public opinion and votes to do what IRA bombs cannot: force the British
troops to withdraw from the island. See, e.g., A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45.
The IRA's occasional major military "victories" also help ensure continued financial aid
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British rule, which violence, directed as it is against both the British and
their Protestant allies, drives Protestant extremists to armed resistance and
transforms British troops into partisan enforcers of what Catholics
perceive as British rule and Protestant control.
A. HistoricalRoots

The troubles are the bitter fruit of 800 years of British colonial policy
in Ireland and fifty years of Protestant domination in Northern Ireland,
which in 1921 became a province of the United Kingdom when the rest
of the island gained home rule."5 The following passage is indicative of
the ties that bind modern Ulster with its unhappy past; though an accurate
assessment of the post-1969 situation, it was actually penned to describe
a pattern that emerged in the mid-seventeenth century:
It was a vicious circle. English consciousness of [Irish
resentment] produced a feeling of insecurity . . . the need
for security produced strong measures, thus intensifying
the Irish feelings at the root of the original feeling of
insecurity, and creating the need for still further strong
measures. 4
from supporters in the United States. The American support network is considered vital
to the IRA's continued armed struggle. The Provisionals "earn" about $1 million annually
from illicit enterprises within Ireland and another $250,000 each year from overseas
contributions, approximately $100,000 of which comes from Irish organizations in the
United States. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 146. Intelligence officials estimate that 75%
of the money collected in the United States by the Irish Northem Aid Society is used to
purchase weapons. D. CLARK, IRISH BLOOD: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE AMERICAN
CONSCIENCE 71-72 (1977).
The IRA is not the only armed republican organization. Most extreme of the others
is the Marxist Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which emerged in 1975 as the
military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). Some of its members overlap
with the Provisional IRA. White, From Conflict to Violence: The Re-emergence of the IRA
and the Loyalist Response, in NORTHERN IRELAND: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
195 (J. Darby ed. 1983) [hereinafter BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT]. The INLA is
believed to be responsible for such attacks as the 1979 deaths of Airey Neave, Conservative
spokesman for Northern Ireland, and of Sir Richard Sykes, British ambassador to the
Hague. Janke, Ulster: A Decade of Violence, 108 CONFLICT STUD. 14 (1979). The INLA
also claimed responsibility for the Ballykelly disco bombing that killed 16 in 1979. P.
O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVIL WARS 409 (1983).
45. See generally K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 33-77.
46. M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 61; see also C. CARLTON, BIGOTRY
AND BLOOD: DOCUMENTS ON THE ULSTER TROUBLES at xiii (1977) ("In Northern Ireland
the cliche that the past creates the present is particularly true."); L. URIS, TRINITY 751
(1976) ("In Ireland, there is no future, only the past happening over and over."). See
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The Anglo-Norman invasion of Ireland in 1169 A.D. marked the
beginning of English attempts, never fully successful, to conquer the
island."" Native hostilities were especially strong in the North,"' so
England concentrated its seventeenth century plantation of Protestant
settlers in Ulster, hoping to solve its Irish problem by uprooting the
Catholics." This was the same tactic later employed in North America
against the Native American population.' Unlike the United States, the
colonizers of Northern Ireland never fully drove out or defeated the
"natives," so that Ulster became what it is today, a province of two
mutually antagonistic populations.5"
The Anglican-landed minority that gained political power never
constituted more than one-tenth of the island's population52 and could not
hope to rule without force. 3 Catholic attemts to alter the balance of
power were swiftly and ruthlessly suppressed. This also held true after
generally R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 74-112.
47. See, e.g., R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 76-78.
48. For example, the first rebellion against British rule occurred in Ulster in the 1560s.
M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 56.
49. Id. at 61.
50. See C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at xiv; R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 78-79.
51. M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 62. The 1981 census reported a total
population in Northern Ireland of 1,562,200, of which 951,300 were Protestant and
610,900 Catholic. Thomas, supra note 44, at A3, col. 1; Thomas, supra note 2, at 35.
There has been little change in the intervening years. See IR. INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP,
supra note 12, at 13 (as of March 31, 1988, the government estimated that 60.9% of the
Northern Ireland population over the age of 16 was Protestant, 36.8% was Catholic and 2%

was unknown).
52. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD,
NORTHERN IRELAND 163 (1975).

LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF

53. This did not escape the commander in chief of the British regular army in Ireland,

who in 1787 noted, "but for the military there would be no government at all." Id. at 165.
54. C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 23. In retaliation for Catholic attacks against
Protestant settlers during the uprising of 1641, British forces conducted an 11-year
campaign that left 600,000 (out of an estimated population of a million and a half) Irish
dead, forced 40,000 Irish to flee into exile, caused another 100,000 to be shipped as virtual
slaves to the Americas, and saw at least 6,000 Catholics lose their land (amounting to 55%
of the island's total area). Id. In 1795, some 30 Catholics were killed in a reprisal attack,
and shortly thereafter, the Orange Order was established to "support the Protestant
ascendancy" and quickly intimidated another 700 Catholic tenant families to flee Armagh.
R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 81 (citing H. SENIOR, ORANGEISM IN IRELAND AND BRITAIN,
1795-1836, at 21 (1966)). The Orange Order exists to this day and is largely responsible
for Protestant agitation in the north against the 1985 Hillsborough Treaty, see infra note
230 and accompanying text, granting the South a token role in Northern Ireland's internal
affairs. See 200 Injured as Ulster Notes Battle of Boyne, San Francisco Exam., July 14,
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full union with Britain in 1800. Fifteen of the leaders of the brief 1916
Easter Rising in Dublin were executed, a harsh reaction that contributed
to the resolve of the Irish when in 1921 they overthrew English rule in the
South."
By 1703, the Protestant ascendancy was complete: native Catholics
owned less than 14% of all of Ireland, and in eight of Ulster's nine
counties, Protestants owned 95% of the land.m The eighteenth century
Irish were no longer citizens in their own country. So it would remain,
even after the official abandonment of anti-Catholic legislation, for the
next 200 years.5 7 Neither union with England nor emancipation in 1829
ended Catholic subjugation. Catholics remained dispossessed and were
treated as inferior subjects until the Irish Free State was established in
1921.8 As the terms of the Free State Treaty excluded the six counties
of Ulster, Catholics in the north remained under the domination of
Protestant authority until the introduction of direct rule from Westminster
in 1972.
The most draconian measures approved by the seventeenth and
eighteenth century Protestant Parliament in Dublin to control the Catholics
were the penal laws, under which Catholics could do none of the
following: vote or hold any administrative, judicial or political office; join
the bar; teach at or attend the university; establish their own schools; own
1988, at A6, col. I [hereinafter 200 Injured]; see also infra notes 238-40 and accompanying
text.
55. M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 141.

56. R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 79.
57. Id. at 80-81.
58. The Great Famine of the 1840s illustrates the impoverished state of the Irish in the
mid-19th Century. From 184547, an estimated one million Irish died and another one
million emigrated to the United States. M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 103-

05. The failure of the potato crop was the overt cause of the devastation. The manner in
which Catholics were forced to live and the slow reaction of the British government to the
crop failure, however, contributed greatly to the magnitude of the disaster. The majority
of Catholics were landless and wholly dependant on the potato as a source of income and
nourishment. A commission established to investigate land holdings in Ireland reported in
1845: "'In many districts, their only food is the potato, their only beverage water. . . their
cabins are seldom a protection against the weather ... a bed or a blanket is a rare luxury
...nearly in all cases their pig and manure heap constitute their only property.'" J.
BIGGS-DAVISON & G. CHOWDHARAY-BEST, THE CROSS OF SAINT PATRICK 165 (1984)
(quoting commission report). Since the British government concerned itself with Ireland
only in the event of a threat to English security, and since the famine actually had the
opposite effect by reducing the population of potential agitators against the Crown, London
did little to ease the situation, M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra, at 106, and nothing
substantial until 1847, too late to avert catastrophe. J. BIGGS-DAVISON & G. CHOWDHARAY-BEST, supra, at 166.
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land or a horse worth more than five pounds.59 All Catholic bishops and
higher church officials were banished from the country and executed upon
return.' The laws, intended to coerce the Irish peasantry into assimilating into the Anglican culture and religion, in fact did the opposite; by
making the Catholic church and the people partners in deprivation, the
laws actually cemented the bonds between the Irish and their church."
Thus did the Protestants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sow
some of the seeds of the current unrest. The church's grip on the Irish
remains unshaken to this day, 2 effectively undermining proposals for
political resolutions to the Irish problem, since northern Protestants fear
that inclusion in the Republic of Ireland would force them into a theocracy
alien to their faith and antagonistic toward rights presently enjoyed, such
as divorce, birth control and non-Catholic education. 3
59.

M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 77.

60. Id.
61. See Marx, Outline of a Report on the Irish Question to the Communist Educational
Association of German Workers in London (Dee. 16, 1867), reprinted in K. MARX & F.
ENGELS, IRELAND AND THE IRISH QUESTION: A COLLECTION OF WRITINGS BY KARL MARX
& FREDERICK ENGELS 130 (R. Dixon ed. 1972); see also R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 80.
] 62. "[T]he [Catholic] Church . . . [has a] practical stranglehold on the regulation of
morality in the South. . . ." S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 290. The Republic's 1937
constitution ordained an "'ecclesiastical imperialism' of the Catholic Church in Ireland."
Id. at 291. It begins:
In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom all Authority flows
and to Whom as our first end all actions both of men and states must
be referred. We, the people of Eire, humbly acknowledging all our
obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers
through centuries of trial . . . do hereby adopt, enact, and give to
ourselves this Constitution.
IR. CONST. preamble. Abortion, already illegal, became unconstitutional by referendum
approved by 67% of the voters in March 1984. See id. art. 40.3.3; Attorney General
(Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1989]
1 I.L.R.M. 19; R. BYRNE & W. BRADY, ANNUAL REVIEW OF IRISH LAW 1988, at 132
Many pharmacists refuse to sell condoms, and contraception remains largely
(1989).
unavailable. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 124. The Irish government may ban any book
and censorship is widespread. IR. CONST. art. 40.6.1; Censorship of Publications Act, §
7 (Ir. 1946); Censorship of Films Act, §§ 5, 7(2) (Ir. 1923-1970) (as amended in 1970).
See generally J. CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 313, 440-41, 488-89 (1987);
J. CONROY, supra, at 125. Secular education is difficult, if not impossible to obtain, see
S. BELFRAGE, supra, at 291, and the Catholic Church requires, as a condition of a church
marriage, that children of mixed marriages be raised as Catholics. See J. CASEY, supra,
at 513.

"'Britain can't leave until Ireland is
63. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 290-91.
tolerable for the other side to join.'" Id. at 290 (quoting BBC political commentator); see
also K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 63, 88. To some extent this is a red
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This is not to say that the reasons behind the repression of the
Catholics are religious in nature, a misconception bred by the use of
religious labels to identify the antagonists. In Northern Ireland, being
born Catholic or Protestant has historically dictated much more than
religious affiliation. To a large degree religious affiliation still dictates
origin and culture,' class standing,6 the access-or, more accurately
herring, for the Protestant clergy in the North has been equally active in dictating social
mores and public laws. Abortion is illegal, forcing an annual migration to the mainland
of more than 2,000 Northern women who can afford to obtain a legal abortion. S.
BELFRAGE, supra, at 116. Paisley, with his "Save Ulster from Sodomy" campaign, see
id., stood with Catholics to proscribe homosexuality until the European Court of Human
Rights found the law to be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. See
The Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, 24-25, 27 (ser. A) (1981) (judgment) (holding
sections 61 and 62 of the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861 and section I I of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 violated article 8 of the European Convention).
Although banning is not lawful, Paisley and other Protestant leaders have led demonstrations against a number of movies and publications, see 1. CONROY, supra note 3, at 125,
and they favor parochial, albeit Protestant, education. Id. Thus it has been said that
Northern Protestants "seem to object not to the interference of church with state in the
South, but to the fact that it is not the Protestant church that is doing the interfering." Id.
In any event, there is a belief in Ireland that the November 1990 election of Mary
Robinson to the republic's presidency "'signals a change in Irish society and a shift away
from traditional [i.e., Catholic] attitudes and allegiances."' Leftist Lawyer Is Elected
President of Ireland, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1990, at A3, col. 2 (quoting the Irish Press
newspaper). As a lawyer and legislator, Robinson fought to legalize divorce, contraception
and abortion information, and to decrimininalize homosexuality. Id.; Fresh Breeze in
Ireland, San Francisco Exam., Jan. 3, 1991, at A18, col. I (editorial). In response to
Robinson's election, Prime Minister Charles Haughey introduced a "10-year strategy" to
modernize Irish life, including consideration of legalized .divorce and legislation to legalize
homosexuality. Joyce, Plan to Liberalize Ireland, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 16,
1990, at 7, col. 4. Robinson is an outspoken critic of violence in Northern Ireland and,
interestingly, is married to a Protestant. Here's to You, Mrs. Robinson, IR. AM., Dec.
1990, at 9.
64. Almost all Catholics are of Celtic stock native to the island while most, if not all,
Protestants are of British or Scottish ancestry, though intermarriage has slightly diluted the
purity of bloodlines on both sides. See R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 33 (quoting O'Brien,
Holywar, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 6, 1969, at 10). Catholics regard themselves as part
of a historic Irish nation. They believe in a unified island, they fly the Tricolor, the flag
of the Republic and their national anthem is the "Soldier's Song." Protestants' allegiance
is to the British Crown, their flags are the Union Jack or the flag of Ulster and their
national anthem is "God Save the Queen." By the end of the seventeenth century,
Protestant settlers had eliminated the native Gaelic social order and culture and begun the
substitution of English for the Gaelic language that would be largely completed by the midnineteenth century, leaving only the Catholic church as a badge of identification for the
native populace. Id. Restoration of the Celtic traditions began in the late nineteenth
century and has been encouraged by the southern state, which, after partition, undertook
Vaizey, The Mind of Republicanism, in THE
the revival of the Gaelic language.
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in the case of Catholics, who in certain neighborhoods suffer rates of
unemployment as high as eighty percent,6 the inaccess-to employment and political control." The Unionist Party used its position to
CONSTITUTION OF NORTHERN IRELAND: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 57-58 (D. Watt ed.
1981). Meanwhile, Protestant laws prevented northern Catholics from sharing in this
cultural renaissance. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 61, 94-95; Maguire, The
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights 1973-1980, 32 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 31, 3839 (1981); see, e.g., Flags and Emblems (Display) Act (N. Ir. 1954) (preventing display
of the Irish Tricolor); Public Order Act (N. Ir. 1951) (non-traditional-i.e., Catholic-parades must receive approval from the Protestant RUC).
65. Catholics largely constitute the lower class in Northern Ireland. In 1970, only four
percent of Ulster residents with annual incomes of £2,000 or more (about $5,000 at the
time) were Catholic. See R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 35-36. This situation has not
changed much. One study of Northern Ireland after 10 years of the latest troubles found
a persistent "high level of financial deprivation in many Catholic areas." K. BOYLE, T.
HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 10. A primary cause of this financial
deprivation is the Payment for Debt (Emergency Provisions) Act, §§ 1, 3, 8 (N. Ir. 1971).
"'[One of the most vicious pieces of legislation to be passed this century,'" S. BELFRAGE,
supra note 30, at 170 (quoting Child Action Poverty League), the act allows the
government to confiscate from any government benefit check-including social security,
unemployment and welfare-as well as from any paychecks whether issued by governmental
or private employers, money owed for past due rent or utility bills. See Payment for Debt
(Emergency Provisions) Act (N. Ir. 1971). "The effect on the poor and the unemployed
was disastrous," leaving families without sufficient resources to feed their children or heat
their homes in the winter. S. BELFRAGE, supra, at 170-71; J. CONROY, supra note 3, at
77; K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 158. Thus 35% of Northern Irish households live below
the official British poverty line. S. BELFRAGE, supra, at 170. Meanwhile, there is
"relative prosperity in the majority community." K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14,
at 17.
66. See Ross, Northern Ireland: Jobsfor Catholics Called Key to Peace, San Francisco
Exam., Jan. 31, 1989, Al, col. 2; Whitney, British Introduce Bill to End Ulster Job Bias,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at A13, col. 1.
67. Catholic unemployment has historically been more than double Protestant levels.
It is currently 21h times that of the Protestants and is worse than anywhere in Britain. K.
BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 17; Ross, supra note 66, at A12, col. 6; Whitney,
supra note 66, at A13, col. 1. In 1981, at the depths of Ulster's near-depression, the
unemployment rate among Catholic males was 33%, compared with 15% for the rest of
Northern Ireland's population. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra, at 75. By the end of
1988, only 7% of Protestant men were unemployed, but 17% of Catholic men. Whitney,
supra, at A13, col. 1. The reasons for this disparity are no mystery. For Catholic
enclaves such as Derry, the 69 years since partition have seen "rapidly accelerating
underdevelopment," R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 9, caused in large part by discrimination
in employment and favoritism in the allocation of new industries. During the worldwide
depression of the 1930s, the Ulster Protestant League publicly campaigned against the
employment of Catholics, a movement endorsed by Sir Basil Brooke, who later, as
Viscount Brookeborough, became prime minister. R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 95. Ulster's
primary employers' workforees remain "overwhelmingly Protestant." Ross, supra, at A12,
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control local governments, even in areas of Catholic majorities, "by
barring tenants and lodgers (usually Catholics) from voting in local
elections and by allowing owners of business property (invariably
Protestants)" plural votes, up to a maximum six.' Unionists employed
the consequential illegitimate majorities to appoint Protestants to almost all
high level public positions' and to protect their political grip by gerrymandering ward boundaries for local elections. 7 The result was that in
Catholic areas permanent Unionist majorities were entrenched which, in
the words of the government's own investigating commission, bore "little
or no resemblance to the relative numerical strength of Unionists and
non-Unionists in the area. "7 In sum, disputes in Ulster have not focused
on points of religious doctrine, but on the use and abuse of political
cal. 6. Between 1945 and 1966, 217 new companies came to Northern Ireland, but only
17 to Catholic areas. R. STETLER, supra, at 22; Ross, supra, at A12, col. 6. Under the
Stormont reign, Catholics were also discriminated against in public employment: only 12%
of those employed by local governments, and only 6% of those working for the central
government, were Catholic. R. STETLER, supra, at 36. Westminster has been unable to
improve the situation. Despite the Fair Employment Agency, established in the Fair
Employment Act (N. Ir. 1976), "the proportion of Catholics holding high level civil service
jobs in 1983 was only 8%, dowm from 8.4% a decade earlier." J. CONROY, supra note 3,
at 215. It remains to be seen whether the new antidiscrimination law will be more
effective. See Whitney, supra, at A13, col. 1.
68. "[A] Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people," Ulster's first prime minister,
Lord Craigavon, proclaimed shortly after partition of the island in 1921. See R. ROSE,
supra note 3, at 92. And so Stormont was. Though patterned after Westminster, it was
only a replica of democratic government. Usually, due to gerrymandering and growing
feelings of political impotence that led to general withdrawal from the electoral process,
Catholics, who constituted more than a third of the population, were only slightly
represented there. .. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 21. Ulster was a one-party state where
Unionist members of Parliament did not fear political repercussion from anti-Catholic acts.
Thus, the Unionists in 1922 approved the Special Powers Act. Initially passed to defend
partition from republican terrorists, it remained in force until 1973, when it was replaced
by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973. The Special Powers Act
allowed flogging and internment without trial. The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act,
§§ 3-4 (N. Ir. 1922). Though nonsectarian in theory, in reality it was used almost
exclusively against Catholics: From 1921, when a predecessor to the Special Powers Act
was in place, through 1924, 2,000 suspected republican terrorists were interned. The act
was similarly used in 1938, 1940, and 1956-1962 to quell IRA uprisings. See K. BOYLE
& T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 59; R. ROSE, supra, at 95-96.
69. C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 77.
70. CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14.
71. The most blatant example was Derry, where in 1967 the 18,429 Catholic voters
elected eight members of the city council, while 8,721 Protestant voters elected twelve.
C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 77.
72. CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
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power.' In retrospect, it is difficult to believe Protestant leaders did not
realize their discriminatory abuse of political control would inevitably lead
to violent confrontation.74
B. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s
The plight of Ulster's Catholics bore strong similarities to the despair
of blacks in the United States, especially in the southern states, where
segregation was legally enforced. 7" It was not surprising, then, that in
1967 the civil rights campaign in the United States would set the example
for a similar nonviolent uprising in Northern Ireland.76 With the militar
wing of the IRA inactive since the defeat of its 1956 campaign,
73.

I. MCALLISTER & R. ROSE, CAN VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT BE RESOLVED BY

SOCIAL CHANGE? 20 (Centre for Study Pub. Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 103,

1982).
74. Ironically, it was fear of that very event-a Catholic uprising-that motivated the
Protestants, who were concerned that, given the higher Catholic birth rate, the nationalist
population might outgrow their own and someday overthrow Protestant rule. K. BOYLE
& T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 60. The strategy of denying Catholics a place in the
electoral process, in the job and housing markets, in fact, in the societal fabric of majority
Northern Ireland, was a conscious attempt to force a high rate of Catholic emigration. Id.
at 59-61; see also Devlin, The Playboy Interview, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1972, at 78-81. The
ploy succeeded, to a degree: the excess Catholic birth rate has been almost exactly equalled
by the high Catholic emigration rate. See R. STETLER, supra note i, at 26. Yet, as the
past 20 years bear testimony, this "success" came at great cost.
75. The parallels between the United States South and Ulster are striking. Both were
officially and thoroughly segregated. For details on the segregation of Ulster, see infra
notes 871-84 and accompanying text. Moreover, "[flrom Reconstruction [through] the
1950s, Washington left the South free to deal with its minority" population, while London

did the same in Ulster from partition through 1969. Where the strong military tradition of
the United States South led to the formation of an ultraconservative paramilitary
organization, the Ku Klux Klan, in Ulster the strong military tradition led to the formation
of the Orange Lodges. Just as in the United States conservative politicians used the fear
of blacks to win the votes of "poor whites," the Ulster politicians used the fear of Catholics
to gain support from the Protestant working class. C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at xviixviii; see J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 24.
76. Catholic demands were identical to many of those made earlier by southern blacks:
equal voting rights, fair and responsive local governments, freedom of speech and
association and freedom from discrimination, specifically in housing and employment. T.
HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 8. The nonviolent tactics employed by the Irish
movement were also motivated by the United States experience, including the frequent
singing of "We Shall Overcome" during marches. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 26. The
ill-fated Belfast to Derry march of early 1969 was modeled on the famous Selma to
Montgomery march of 1966. J. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTHERN
IRELAND 63-64 (1983); see supra note 3.
77. A British inquiry following the conflagration of August, 1969 found the IRA
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Catholic frustrations in 1967 found expression in a new form, the
embryonic Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, which cast aside the
historic Catholic goal of a united Ireland while pressing for a more
democratic state in Northern Ireland. 7" For the first time, Protestant
leaders were presented with a mainstream, primarily Catholic organization
that conceded the continued existence of partition in exchange for social,
economic and political reform. Significant concessions at that time would
have begun to instill in Catholics an acceptance of partition and perhaps
forever consigned the IRA to Irish folklore.79 As in the United States,
however, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was perceived by
the majority as a threat to its privileged position and was rebuffed
violently by official police suppression and unofficial civilian terrorism,' °
leading to bloody confrontation. As one observer aptly noted, during the
short life of the civil rights movement Northern Ireland had "stood at the
crossroads; and it took the wrong turning.""
Though some reforms were introduced by then-prime minister Terence
O'Neill, they were too insignificant to bridge the chasm between the
promise of reform and the reality of discrimination. I Meanwhile, even
the most modest reforms invoked angry reaction from the right, and civil
rights marchers fell under brutal physical attack from Protestant extremists
This fed Catholic misgivings toward Protestant rule,
and the police.'
already deeply ingrained by a history of subjugation. " The rebirth of the
guerrilla faction of the IRA, and the end of hopes for a peaceful resolution
to the Irish problem, had always been as close as renewed confirmation
unprepared to take any action during the Battle of the Bogside, and reported that the IRA
at that time did not pose a serious terrorist threat. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE
ON POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969, CMND. No. 535, at 12 [hereinafter HUNT
REPORT].
78. See, e.g., J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 31; K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 99.
79. P. BEW & H. PATTERSON, THE BRITISH STATE AND THE ULSTER CRISIS 15 (1985).
The IRA had all but surrendered the idea of armed struggle when the Battle of the Bogside
pushed Ulster to the brink of civil war. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 35, 43.
80. See R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 43.
81.

C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 78.

82. See, e.g., J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 33; R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 104; R.
STETLER, supra note 1, at 42-43.
83. See CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 44-48. Exact figures on the number of
civil rights marchers and Catholic civilians injured during the 1968-69 movement is
impossible to accurately assess. Id. at 46-47. More than 1,200 casualties were reported
prior to the August 1969 riots, including at least six fatalities. Id. at 30, 46-47, 51, 53;
J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 35; R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 40, 48; see also supra
notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
84. See T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 21.
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that Catholics could place no confidence in the Protestant state or its
forces of law and order." Once the civil rights campaign had begun,
that confirmation was not long in coming.'
During the civil rights campaign, Catholics saw those who had
forsaken the gun for nonviolent protest beaten by the Protestant police.
Nonprotesting Catholics bore the brunt of the August 1969 riots. Of the
eight people killed in Belfast on August 14 and 15, six were Catholics.'
Catholics occupied more than eighty-three percent of the homes damaged
or destroyed during the riots."' Catholic neighborhoods, besieged by
police and Protestants, had no organized protection. 9
For the first time in decades, the British army was officially called in
to aid civil authorities in keeping the peace.'
For the first time in
85. A British report predicted in October 1969:
If the conflict between these forces, working upon the tensions in
society, were again to recreate the explosive atmosphere of last
August, and the IRA terrorists were ready to take advantage of it, it is
possible that they might resume attacks on police stations and ...
RUC and British Army personnel.
HUNT REPORT, supra note 77, at 12. This forecast was only half right; the events of
August 1969 had been sufficient on their own to put in motion the split in the organization
that led to the formation of the Provisional IRA. See T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra
note 3, at 23; K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 124-34. The Stormont-established Scarman
Tribunal later asserted that, "[the major casualty of the [final Protestant reprisal against
the civil rights movement in August 1969] was the complete loss of confidence by the
Belfast Catholic community in the police force as then constituted and the determination
thereafter by subversive elements such as the IRA to exploit the opportunities for urban
guerrilla warfare in Belfast." I SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
86. For more detailed accounts of the Northern Ireland civil rights movement, its roots
and its aftermath, see generally CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3; CAMPAIGN FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN N. IR., NORTHERN IRELAND-THE MAILED FIST (1971); B. DEVL1N, THE PRICE
OF MY SOUL (1969); K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 81-139. For an excellent chronology
of events, see 2 SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
87. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 35. Of the nearly 1,000 injuries suffered during the
battle, 300 of the civilians were injured by CS tear gas, a particularly noxious and
potentially lethal gas used by United States combat troops in Vietnam. The British
government had previously sworn that CS would not be used in riot situations anywhere
in the United Kingdom. R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 145, 162-63, 176-95.
88.

1 SCARMAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 244.

89. The IRA was nowhere to be found. Id. at 11-12; see supra note 77.
90. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. Although the British government
maintained a permanent force of about 3,000 soldiers in Northern Ireland, K. BOYLE, T.
HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 25, British policy since the 1920s had been not
to use the troops to intervene in internal Ulster affairs. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra
note 14, at 59, 64. See generally M. FARRELL, ARMING THE PROTESTANTS: THE
FORMATION OF THE ULSTER SPECIAL CONSTABULARY AND THE ROYAL ULSTER
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history, the British army, responding to Catholic pleas for help, was
assigned the task of protecting the Catholic community of Northern
Ireland. 91 Catholics, feeling abandoned by the IRA,' openly welcomed
the British troops as guarantors against further Protestant and police
attacks, offering the bemused soldiers the ultimate in British hospitality
-tea. 93 But this unprecedented comraderie between Catholic natives and
British soldiers was short-lived. Within a year, army counterinsurgency
tactics on behalf of the Ulster regime and almost entirely within Catholic
areas led to repeated confrontations with Catholic crowds in Derry and
Belfast and to the deaths of several unarmed Catholic protesters,'
driving the most moderate Catholics to press for communal self-protection. 95 In Northern Ireland, that could mean but one thing. As one
Belfast woman lamented, "The IRA have been waiting for this for years.
Till this all happened no one listened to them . .

.

.Paisley and his crowd

CONSTABULARY 1920-27 (1983).
91. See J.HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 49; R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 88-90 (quoting
M. WALLACE, DRUMS AND GUNS: REVOLUTION IN ULSTER 4 (1970)).
92. Immediately after the Belfast riots, graffiti slogans began to appear in Catholic
ghettos: "IRA = I RAN AWAY." J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 43.
93. See, e.g., id. at 38; T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 23.
94. From the Catholic perspective, the first British actions were hopeful. The British
disarmed and disbanded the openly sectarian B-Specials, prompting Protestant riots in the
Shankill area of Belfast, in which a Protestant gunman shot dead an RUC constable. J.
HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 49-51. As pressure from Protestant politicians intensified,
however, the army began to take a tougher line against local defense groups and increased
its search for arms in the Catholic community without undertaking similar operations in
Protestant areas. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 25. Initially, the incidents
were minor, consisting of verbal abuse and harassment, especially from the Scottish
regiments which were particularly partial toward the Protestants. Within a short time, the
rioters were throwing petrol bombs in place of stones, and the army was firing CS gas and
bullets. Id. at 23-24. April 1970 brought the first open conflict between the British army
and Catholics, as severe rioting broke out in West Belfast. General Sir Ian Freeland, the
British army commander in the north, announced a new "get tough" policy, whereby
soldiers would shoot. demonstrators throwing petrol bombs. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at
142. British fear of IRA mobilization resurfaced thereafter. Id. A July 1970 joint armyRUC raid for arms in the Catholic Lower Falls Road area of Belfast (conducted after the
IRA had killed six Protestants, reportedly while defending Catholic areas of Belfast from
Id. at 146-47.
The army
Protestant invasion) led to Catholic stoning of soldiers.
responded with CS-gas canisters, rubber bullets, live ammunition, pick-axes and rifle butts.
The troops broke down doors, ransacked homes and imposed a 35-hour curfew. Five
Catholic's were killed and a dozen injured, and over 300 were arrested in what became
known in the Catholic community as "the Rape of the Falls." Id. at 147-48. See generally
R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 110-11. The IRA killed its first British soldier eight months
later. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra, at 24.
95. R. STETLER, supra note 1, at 164.
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[TIhe IRA will get more support
have played right into their hands ....
than it knows what to do with."96
Limiting itself at first to defense and policing of Catholic neighborhoods, 97 the IRA went on the offensive after the new Tory government
under Edward Heath and the British army instituted an ill-conceived policy
of confrontation with the Catholic community," and a twenty-year-old
gunner became the first British soldier killed in Ireland in more than fifty
Both the Protestant prime minister and the British home
years.'
secretary declared war on the IRA."° The rapidly deteriorating crisis
tumbled into the abyss on August 9, 1971, when British prime minister
Heath and the new Northern Irish prime minister Brian Faulkner initiated
internment, without charges or trial, of any suspected terrorists or terrorist
During the next four years, 2,158 orders of internment
sympathizers.'
were executed," ° predominately against Catholic males,"m most of
whom had no connection with the IRA or any other republican organization."° A majority of detainees were held without charges for more than
a year.' Heath would later concede internment was not only a political
96. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 39-40.
97. See K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 134-45.
98.

Id. at 146-48; see J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 36.

99. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 150.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 154. Code-named "Operation Demetrius," the indefinite detention of
hundreds of Catholic men, was instigated by Heath's government in response to a growing
IRA summer offensive-itself a reaction to the army's killing of several Catholics. Id. at
154-55. It was also instigated at the insistence of the Faulkner's Unionist Stormont regime.
K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 65; J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 59. This
was not the initial introduction of internment to Northern Ireland. The legal basis for the
operation was the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922, until it was replaced by
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act in 1973. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN,
supra, at 67. The 1922 act and its predecessor were used to intern republican sympathizers
at three stages of unrest during the 50 years prior to 1971. See id. at 59.
102. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 155.
103. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 67; J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 36;
J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 60.
104. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 65. Suspected republican
sympathizers were detained on the basis of information supplied by the RUC Special
Branch from outdated and highly inaccurate files. Id. Of the 342 detained in the first 24
hours, 116 were released within the next two days; a tacit admission of error. K. KELLEY,
supra note *, at 155. As few as 20% of the internees had any connection with the IRA.
J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 36.
105. A British commission reported that of the 540 in detention as of November 1974,
nearly 60%, 321, had been held for more than a year; of those, 63 had been detained for
more than two years and 15 for more than three. REPORT OF A COMMIrEE TO CONSIDER
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mistake but "an affront to human rights,"" ° not least because it resulted
in hundreds of cases of physical abuse of detainees, administered by both
the British army and the RUC. 7 In 1976, the European Commission
of Human Rights unanimously found Britain to be guilty of torture, as
well as inhuman and degrading treatment, of republican detainees in
Northern Ireland, in violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 0 8 The European Court of Human Rights sustained the commission's rulings as to inhuman and degrading treatment, finding a "practice"
by police of subjecting those in custody to "repeated violence," leading to
"intense suffering."" ° The British government admitted to the commission it had authorized the use of the so-called "five techniques" of
IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1975, CMND, 5847, at 38 [hereinafter GARDINER
REPORT].
106. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45; see Lohr, LR.A. Blast, supra note 14,
at A3, col. 1.
107. Internment resulted in at least 1, 105 complaints of assault and maltreatment against
the RUC and another 1,268 alleging assault or shooting against the British army. Ireland
v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56-57 (ser. A) (1978) (judgment). Between August
1971 and January 1975, compensation totalling £302,043 was paid to settle 473 civil claims
for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, with 1,193 claims outstanding.
Id. By October 1975 the British government had paid out at least £420,000, with 567
claims still to be resolved. D. REED, IRELAND: THE KEY TO THE BRITISH REVOLUTION
170, 247 (1984).
The last internees held under emergency legislation were released
December 5, 1975. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 39.
108. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTS. 512, 794 (Eur.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts.). Although this case was brought by the Republic of Ireland to
challenge interrogation techniques applied by the British army and the Ulster RUC against
citizens of Northern Ireland detained in Northern Ireland Interrogation Centres in 1971
through 1974, the commission restricted its ruling to only those interrogations conducted
in 1971. Id. Article 3 of the convention echoes the Universal Declaration's absolute
prohibition against torture and maltreatment, but the convention explicitly protects
individuals even within their home countries. European Convention, supra note 34, arts.
1, 3; see also J. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 34 (1969).
109. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 67, 94. Yet the court decided the
pain inflicted was not of the intensity required to constitute torture. Id. at 66-67, 94. In
so ruling, the court apparently ignored the definitions of torture set down in the Greek
Case, where the commission found physical torture was that "used to describe inhuman
treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions," The
Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RIGHTS 186 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.),
and established that non-physical torture amounted to "the infliction of mental suffering by
creating a state of anguish and stress by means other than bodily assault." Id. at 461.
These definitions have been accorded nearly universal deference; they have, for example,
been adopted by Northern Irish courts in cases regarding the Emergency Provisions Act.
See, e.g., R. v. McCormick, [1977] N. Ir. 105, 110-11.
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to obtain information and confessions and to inflict

110. According to the committees established by the British government to investigate
the allegations of prisoner maltreatment that arose in 1971, the five techniques consist of
wall-standing, hooding, noise, bread and water diet, and deprivation "ofsleep. REPORT OF
THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF PHYSICAL
BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST, 1971,
CMND. No. 4823, at 13 [hereinafter COMPTON REPORT]; MAJORITY REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AUTHORISED PROCEDURES
FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM, 1972, CMND. No. 4901,
(public outcry against the Compton Report
at 2-3 [hereinafter PARKER REPORTJ
.whitewash," especially in the House of Commons and from Amnesty International, forced
the British government to appoint the second committee of enquiry. P. TAYLOR, BEATING
THE TERRORISTS? 22 (1980)). The actual applications of the techniques are much more
onerous than the bare definitions make them appear. Men had black hoods placed over
their heads for days at a time; occasionally the hoods were tightened so the men nearly
suffocated. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 67. Men were forced to stand in the "search"
position, fingers only touching the wall, hands fully stretched to their limit, with feet as far
from the wall as possible, back rigid and head held up. If any part of the body was
relaxed, security personnel violently forced it back into position, often using batons to do
so. When heads became relaxed, they were "banged" against the wall. When the pain
became too extreme, or the extremities became numb, men collapsed, only to be violently
forced back against the wall. This continued for many hours, in some cases as many as
43 and in no case less than nine. See COMPTON REPORT, supra, at 16-17; J. HOLLAND,
supra, at 64-67. Detainees reported being severely beaten, J. CONROY, supra note 3, at
37, an allegation rejected by the first tribunal. See COMPTON REPORT, supra, at 16-17.
While under interrogation, or against the wall, the men were subjected to incessant and
monotonous noise at a high volume, described by one detainee as a "constant whirling
noise, like a helicopter blade going around." Id. at 15, 21; J. HOLLAND, supra, at 65.
The level of noise was between 85 and 87 decibels; subjection to such noise levels for as
little as 48 hours can result in 8 % temporary hearing loss and 1 % permanent hearing loss.
MINORITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM, 1972, CMND. No. 4901, at 16 [hereinafter GARDINER DISSENT]. Men were
not allowed to sleep for days on end. COMPTON REPORT, supra, at 15. The official diet
for detainees was bread and water every six hours. But while against the wall for 40
hours, one detainee received bread and water once and water alone on two other occasions.
Id., at 16-17; J. HOLLAND, supra, at 66. The non-physical torture reportedly consisted of
hooded men being placed in an operating helicopter for a period of time, then being pushed
out; since the helicopter was on or nearly on the ground, the men suffered only minor
bruises when they fell, but since the men were hooded, they were terrorized, believing they
were being pushed out of the helicopter to die. The Compton enquiry, based largely on
the testimony of a British helicopter crewman-whom the commission labeled an
"independent" witness-denied this deception had consisted of anything more than placing
the hooded men in the helicopter and leading them out again. COMPTON REPORT, supra,
at 23-26. The effects of this "in-depth interrogation" on the detainees: prisoners believed
they were about to be executed or "tortured to death." J. HOLLAND, supra, at 68. Lord
Gardiner listed the possible long-term effects of sensory deprivation as "permanent"
psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations, and persistent anxiety attacks,
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non-physical torture."
Internment sparked a bloodbath. The Catholic population rallied
behind the IRA, which promptly ordered a fullscale bombing camMore than 100 explosions ripped Belfast in August 1971 and
paign.'
thirty-five people were killed, compared with four in July." 3 In the
tremors, insomnia, nightmares and other symptoms of neurosis. GARDINER DISSENT,
supra, at 17. Of the twelve men subjected to the five techniques in 1971, none were
subsequently charged with any crimes. J. HOLLAND, supra, at 68.
British military officials developed the five techniques after World War II as a means
of combatting insurrections in British possessions, including Palestine, Malaya, Kenya,
Cyprus, the British Cameroons, Brunei, British Guiana, Aden, Borneo/Malaysia, the
Persian Gulf and Northern Ireland. PARKER REPORT, supra, at 3. These classic techniques
of sensory deprivation were pioneered by the Soviet KGB. P. TAYLOR, supra, at 20. As
.some if not all of the techniques in question would constitute criminal assault and might
also give rise to civil proceedings under English law," PARKER REPORT, supra, at 8, the
government maintained that neither the techniques nor any guidelines governing their use
were written down, but that soldiers were orally trained in their use at special intelligence
centres. Id. at 3. During cross-examination before the European Commission on Human
Rights, an expert witness produced written army instructions on the use of the techniques.
J. HOLLAND, supra, at 75. As only Parliament can make or alter laws, the unauthorized
development and use of these techniques was, and is, illegal under British law. GARDINER
DISSENT, supra, at 14. The Compton Commission whitewashed the use of the techniques
by determining they did not inflict "physical brutality" upon the victims, but instead
constituted "mere" ill-treatment. COMPTON REPORT, supra, at 21-23. The Compton
Commission's defimition of "brutality," however, was novel: as long as the authorities did
not reflect a "disposition to inflict suffering coupled with indifference to, or pleasure in,
the victim's pain," then torture was not brutal. Id. at 21-23. As Lord Gardiner, pointed
out:
[U]nder this definition, which some of our witnesses thought came from the
Inquisition, if an interrogator believed, to his great regret, that it was necessary
for him to cut off the fingers of a detainee one by one to get the required
information out of him for the sole purpose of saving life, this would not be cruel
and, because not cruel, not brutal.
GARDINER DISSENT, supra, at 13.
111. Ireland v. U.K., 1976 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. at 746. The martial lawtype legislation under which the prisoners were detained allowed for the detention of any
person for up to 48 hours for purposes of interrogation. Civil Authorities (Special Powers)
Act, § I (N. Ir. 1922). Indeed, Lord Parker justified the use of the five techniques by
claiming it provided the authorities with much needed information about terrorists. PARKER
REPORT, supra note 110, at 5-6. British officials knew little about the Provisionals at the
time internment was instituted in 1971. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 69. In November
1971, a spokesman for Lord Carrington, British defense secretary, told the House of
Commons the five techniques were officially authorized by Ulster prime minister Faulkner
and approved by the British government. Id. at 72.
112. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 156-57; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3,
col. 1.
113.

J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 60; see K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 156.
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seven months prior to internment, 1971 had seen thirty-four conflictrelated deaths; from August 9 through the end of that year the war
claimed another 139."' The following year was the bloodiest of the
current crisis, adding 474 to the conflict's burgeoning death toll.115
Internment won renewed support for the IRA at home and abroad,
especially in the United States, and helped the guerrillas recruit volunteers. 16 Moderate Catholics joined huge republican protests, held
despite an official ban, and the Catholic opposition to the Protestant
government and its British overseers crystallized in a massive civil
disobedience 7campaign, including tax and rent strikes that lasted more than
three years.
One of the largest anti-internment protests occurred on January 30,
1972, and when the British army opened fire on an estimated 20,000
unarmed marchers, thirteen died, seven of these teen-agers. ' "Bloody
Sunday," as the massacre became known, ignited rioting in both Northern
and Southern Ireland and launched a new IRA campaign, the old having
ended in a Christmastime truce. 119 By March 20, the IRA had killed 56
British soldiers and four days later Heath ordered Faulkner to suspend the
Northern Irish government at Stormont and submit to direct rule, which
the violent crush of events forced London to institute on an interim
basis. " It has, however, proven rather more than temporary-the
British still govern Northern Ireland.
C. The Current State of the Crisis
As the government's inability to halt the violence indicates, England's
policy in Northern Ireland has failed. 12' "The scale of the death and
114. P. BEW & H. PATTERSON, supra note 79, at 3. There was an average of three
explosions, five shootings and 47 house searches per day during those five months. J.
CONROY, supra note 3, at 37.
115.

K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 14.

116. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 43; Lohr, supra note 43, at 12, col. 1; see
also J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 37.
117. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 37; see J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 60; D. REED,
supra note 107, at 165-72; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 3.
118. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 37; see J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 61. See
generally K. KELLEY supra note *, at 161-64. A 14th was to die later of wounds sustained
that day. Id. at 163; D. REED, supra note 107, at 172.
119. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 38; see K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 163-64; D.
REED, supra note 107, at 173.
120. See J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 38. For a more exhaustive analysis of the events
that led to London instituting direct rule, see H. KELLY, How STORMONT FELL (1972).
121.

The commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion Royal Green Jackets, stationed in
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destruction seems unimaginable in a British context," stated the authors of
Some 3,000 have died in a province of only 1.5
a recent study."
million;"2 a proportional figure in Britain would exceed 100,000
deaths." In the United States, a comparable number of dead would be
450,000, far more than died in the United States Civil War." Government statistics report approximately 30,000 civilian injuries-4.5 million
adjusted for an American scale." 2 London points to a reduced level of
violence as vindication of its involvement. From 1980 through 1985, for
example, official figures list 469 dead in political violence, 127 two more
than the number killed in 1972 alone." s Yet even at this lower rate, for
the same percentage of Britain's population to fall victim to political
violence, between 3,000 and 4,000 would have to die each year. 29
Although the magnitude of this failure should be enough to pique
international concern, it is the explanations for England's failure that truly
reveal the necessity of international intervention.
Since instituting direct rule in 1972, London's strategy for restoring
peace to the province has evolved along two fronts, one military, the other
socioeconomic. To a large degree, these twin tactics are inseparable. By
vanquishing the IRA, British authorities believed they could force
Catholics to surrender their nationalistic aspirations and accept partiMeanwhile, politicians speak of compromise and reform
tion. "
reducing support for the IRA among Ulster's Catholic community to a
level too small to perpetuate urban guerrilla warfare. 3 ' This dual
Belfast for two tours of duty, in 1972 and 1973, wrote: "The turbulence, the disorder, the
killing, the maiming, the misery, the fear and the unhappiness have already lasted for
several years. That in itself is a failure." R. EVELEGH, PEACEKEEPING IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY I (1978). "What have we changed here in the last ten years?" asked another
soldier. "The people are more segregated than they were before the troubles. Children
are still being taught the same things they were taught when the troubles started, and in ten
years a new generation of bigots will be on the street and new riots will break out." J.
CONROY, supra note 3, at 61-62.
122. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 13.
123.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

124. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 13.
125. To compute comparable figures for the United States, Northern Ireland statistics
must be multiplied by 150. See P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 11.
126. Id; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
127. ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT 1986, at
70, reprintedin A. GUELKE, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE app.
(1988).
128.

Id.

129. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 13.
130. See P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 207-09.
131.

FitzGerald, Optimism on Northern Ireland, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1986, at A19,
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approach is flawed in at least three respects.
First, as the army privately concedes, the IRA is highly resilient and
largely immune to such tactics.132 The IRA admits it cannot overthrow
British rule through military might; its goal is to simply outlast the
British.' 33 To accomplish this, the IRA need not maintain a consistent
col. 1; Lelyveld, British and Irish Hold First Talks Under Pact While Protestants Rage,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at A12, col. 3.
132. As early as 1979, leading British military authorities were secretly conceding the
impossibility of a military victory. Well before the famous 1981 hunger strike-in which
elected Westminster member of Parliament Bobby Sands and nine other IRA inmates died
and the Provisional movement gained international support and subsequent political
victories-Brig. James Glover, later general commanding officer of British forces in Ulster,
authored a classified analysis contradicting official statements that the IRA was a weak foe,
soon defeated.
Among Glover's observations: "The Provisional leadership is deeply
committed to a long campaign of attrition.... [T]hough PIRA may be hard hit by security
force attention from time to time, they will probably continue to have the manpower they
need to sustain violence."
Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends (Jan. 4, 1979),
reprinted in J.HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 142-44; P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 26164; see also J.CONROY, supra note 3, at 55-58. For extensive examinations of the hunger
strike episode, see generally D. BERESFORD, TEN MEN DEAD (1987); J. CONROY, supra,
at 135-204; J. FEEHAN, supra note 76, at 100-48.
Undaunted by the army's sobering assessment, British officials publicly predicted the
eventual defeat of the IRA. See, e.g., British, Irish Vow Tougher War on IRA, L.A.
Times, Mar. 2, 1985, at 3, col. 1. Such braggadocio runs contrary not only to the army's
private concerns, but also to the facts. The IRA is growing in strength. D. DOUMrITr,
CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 149 (1985). The government now estimates IRA active
members number 500. Prokesch, Britain Says I.R.A. Appears to Be Stepping Up Its
Attacks Outside Ulster, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1990, at A3, col. 1. These "volunteers"
recently obtained an estimated 120 tons of weapons, id., and have displayed their
impressive array of arms on IRA missions, including: the United States M-16 Armalite
rifle and M-60 machine gun. J. HOLLAND, supra, at 147. The M-60 is capable of
downing helicopters, id., which it recently has. See Mallie, The Provos' Resurgence:
There's More to Come, FORTNIGHT, Sept. 1988, at 7; Copter Forced Down in Ulster, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at A7, col. 5. A huge cache of IRA arms recently seized by
authorities included Czechoslovakian-made explosives, Irish Cops Seize Huge IRA Cache,
San Francisco Exam., Sept. 14, 1988, at A19, col. 1, and Libya has, in the past, supplied
arms to the IRA. See A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45; 8 British Soldiers Die in
Bus Bombed by IRA, San Francisco Exam., Aug. 21, 1988, at A23, col. 5 [hereinafter 8
British Soldiers Die]. The Provisionals are also believed to possess surface-to-air missiles.
See Ross, Mixed Signals, IR. AM., Mar. 1988, at 16. The British government has
expressed grave concern at the IRA's greatly expended munitions store, especially the
weaponry provided by Libya's Col. Moammar Khadafy.
See infra note 541 and
accompanying text. These arms cost money, but the IRA has proven adept at fundraising.
See supra note 43.
133. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 258. "The Provisional fight a war of attrition,
not a war of body counts. A spokesman interviewed in 1980 said the organization was
'prepared for the long haul, thirty, forty, fifty years if necessary. "' J.CONROY, supra note
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level of violence, but need only rear its head intermittently and with
sufficient frequency so that Britons tire of the deepening bloodshed."
This the IRA has demonstrated an unshakable ability to do, even following

major military setbacks.'

Consequently, even Tom King, then Brit-

ain's secretary of state, admitted recently the IRA cannot be defeated,
"only subdued for limited periods of time."' 3
Second, Britain's inability to dent the effects of sectarian discrimination and colonial rule, 137 coupled with its unwillingness to curb abuses
in the military and police, ensured the collapse of its reform program. 38
Discrimination and its effects continue, albeit slightly reduced. The
supply of homes available to Catholic families remains woefully inadequate. 139 Overt discrimination persists in employment, 1" evidenced
3, at 55.
134. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 258.
135. For example, two months after Irish and British forces seized seven tons of
incoming rifles, pistols, submachine guns, hand grenades and other arms shipped to the
IRA from the United States, Goldman & Tuohy, Catch of the Year-IRA Arms Seized at
Sea, L.A. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at I, col. 1, the Provisionals killed nine Ulster police and
wounded 40 in a major mortar attack on a fortified police compound. IRA Bombards
Police Base, supra note 43, at 1, col. 5. The accuracy and power of the mortars
"shocked" British security officials. Id. It was not the first time IRA ingenuity escalated
the war-car bombs, made infamous in Lebanon, were invented by the IRA in 1972,
causing a huge increase in damage and doubling casualty figures. White, supra note 44,
at 194. Nor was it the last. Despite losing at least 20 members in clashes with security
forces in little more than a year, largely due to effective infiltration by informers, the IRA
turned the tables last year and launched a major offensive with such effectiveness that
officials now fear the IRA may have infiltrated the security forces. See What's the Point?,
supra note 41, at 48; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 1; Lohr, supra note
43, at 1, col. 1.
136. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45-46.
137.

See supra notes 47-74 and accompanying text.

138. Indeed, it is unlikely the second major focus of British rule-an attempt to "pacify"
the Catholic population by replacing discriminatory Stormont policies with even-handed
direct rule from Westminster, thereby reducing communal support for the IRA-could ever
succeed. As the IRA plan is simply to survive, it requires less communal support than a
typical guerilla-style war of liberation. One expert estimates the Provisional can function
sufficiently with a mere three percent of the Catholic population behind it. Clutterbuck,
Comment on Chapter 7: Security Constraints, in THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTHERN
IRELAND 141 (D. Watt ed. 1981). As the army concedes, "We see no prospect in the next
five years of any political change which would remove PIRA's raison d'tetre . . . . We see
little prospect of political development of a kind which would seriously undermine the
Provisionals' position." P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 263 (quoting former commanding
officer of British troops in the Six Counties); see J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 60 ("'I see
it continuing at its present level indefinitely.'") (quoting army major).
139. D. DouMr, supra note 132, at 216. As long as Protestants ran the agencies that
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by the staggering Catholic unemployment rate."" The political violence
has also taken its toll, damming the flow of foreign investment and
contributing to the loss of more than 60,000 jobs. 4 2 For this bleak
economic situation each side blames the other, 43 creating yet another
allocated housing, a scarce resource in Northern Ireland, Protestants were routinely favored
in the allocation process, both as a source of political patronage and as a means to
manipulate the demographics to ensure Protestant political control even in areas of Catholic
majorities. See CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, 24, 91; R. ROSE, supra note 3,
at 292-93; R. STETLER, supra note I, at 14; see also G. BELL, THE PROTESTANTS OF
ULSTER 26-27 (1976).
When public housing became available, Protestant-dominated
councils were unwilling to let Catholics move from their overcrowded units. Only after
Patricia McCluskey organized the Homeless Citizens League in 1963 and led protests and
'squat-ins" did the Protestant council of Dungannon grant Catholics tenancies to vacant
units. R. ROSE, supra, at 101. In other areas, Protestant councils refused to allow new
homes to be built for Catholics. CAMERON REPORT, supra, at 21. Although direct rule

by the British Parliament in Westminster brought the Northern Ireland Housing Executive
and significant progress in eradicating the worst housing conditions, see K. BOYLE & T.
HADDEN, supra note 14, at 75; J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 215, there remains
considerable unfit housing conditions in inner-city areas. See G. BELL, supra, at 26-27.
For vivid depictions of the squalid state of the Catholic ghettos of West Belfast, see S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 1-4; J. CONROY, supra, at 72-76. The credit the government
can take in this area is largely due to the establishment in 1972 of a government-controlled
Northern Ireland Housing Executive. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra, at 75. The price,
however, has been a permanent segregation of Catholic communities into walled
developments with limited, easily policed entrances and reinforced pavement to bear the
weight of armored vehicles, a price extracted by members of the security forces who sit on
official housing commissions in a vain attempt to confine the violence within certain
Catholic areas. Hillyard, Law and Order, in BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT, supra note
44, at 47. This technique of deliberately creating ghettos in which the dissident population
can be contained was a feature of Nazi policy in Warsaw. Id. The forbidding 20 foot-high
concrete barrier that now divides Belfast has been likened to the Berlin Wall and is a
symbol of deepening sectarian hatred. Marshall, Ulster-the Sectarian Hatred Deepens,
L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 1985, at 1,col. 4. Segregation is not the only controversial housing
plan. Although housing officials have been generally exonerated of all conscious desire to
discriminate, the policies of allocating units to more "responsible" tenants and of building
homes near new factories for skilled (i.e., Protestant) workers invariably mean great
advantages to Unionists in the housing market. See Tomlinson, Housing: the State and the
Politics of Segregation, in L. O'DOWD, B. ROLSTON & M. TOMLINSON, NORTHERN
IRELAND: BETWEEN CIVIL'RIGHTS AND CIVIL WAR 123-31 (1980); Rolston, Reformism and
Sectarianism, in BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT, supra, at 221.
140. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
141.

See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.

142. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 245; see also Simpson, Economic Development:
Cause or Effect in the Northern Irish Conflict, in BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT, supra
note 44, at 79-109.
143.

D. DOuMTr, supra note 132, at 216. Northern Ireland is the least affluent region
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vicious circle-violence begets greater unemployment and poverty, which
begets greater violence.'"
Third, and most fundamentally, because Britain is waging military as
well as socioeconomic war in Ulster, it can never win Catholic hearts and
minds. For many Catholics, the problems created by British "andterrorist" policies and its military presence have superseded those created
by Protestant rule. Discrimination is no longer the primary issue.
Perhaps it never was; although the civil rights movement focused upon it,
the subsequent violent conflict erupted after more than a decade of rising
living standards and a reduction in the jobless rate, 45 indicating the
depth of Catholic enmity, and bitterness toward monolithic Protestant
control, ran much deeper than economic standing. In any event, the past
eighteen years of British rule has intensified Catholic sentiments. Due to
the dual nature of British policy, the increase in economic and political
reforms was matched by an increase in military repression, 1" confirming Catholic suspicions that the British were not in Ulster to keep the
peace, but to maintain the status quo.' 47 The British, in the eyes of
many Catholics, have acted not as neutral saviors, but as an occupying
army bent on suppression of the minority community, thereby feeding
sufficient support to the IRA to ensure its campaign will continue. 48
D. Great Britain's "Law and Order" Strategy in Northern Ireland

A full appreciation of Catholic animosity toward British "peacekeepers" requires a more detailed review of the nature of England's "law
and order" strategy in Northern Ireland. Broadly speaking, British tactics
of the United Kingdom and one of the least prosperous within the European Economic
Community. Simpson, supra note 142, at 79. As of 1987, Ulster had "the highest infant
mortality, the highest unemployment, the lowest wages, the lowest standard of living, and
the lowest life expectancy in the United Kingdom." J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 216.
144. See D. DouMITr, supra note 132, at 217.
145. I. MCALU1STER & R. ROSE, supra note 73, at 12.
146. L. O'DowD, B. ROLSTON & M. TOMLINSON, supra note 139, at 205.
147. The British military admitted as much. Said Commanding Officer Evelegh, "[T]he

Army, when operating in the suppression of civil disorder within the United Kingdom, acts
generally as the direct instrument of the Government of the day." R. EVELEGH, supra note
121, at 3; accord S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 284 ("'It's commonly accepted that the
British army is there to protect the Protestants, no matter what anyone says'" (quoting
British soldier)).
148. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 54-55. A New York Times survey of West Belfast
found "[niot many Catholics see the soldiers as necessary peacekeepers." Prokesch, With
the World Made Over, Can Even Belfast Change?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1990, at AI0, col.
4. "Most resent them, and that resentment is sometimes turned into hatred by the soldiers'
actions or patrol, which are heavyhanded at times." Id.
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to defeat the IRA revolve around the security forces and the legal system.
Beyond the elimination of discrimination, what was needed in Northern
Ireland, after the excesses of the RUC and the B-Specials that forced
British intervention, was an evenhanded military approach, focused on
rooting out extremists elements in Northern Ireland's police and preventing abuse by the British army, as well as on subduing the IRA. What
developed was something else.
The most publicized practice-and one that incenses the minority
community-is the shoot-to-kill policy, which has extracted a heavy toll
on innocent Catholics unaffiliated with the republican movement, as well
as on republican paramilitarists who were unarmed at the time of their
deaths. 49 Another source of Catholic grievance is England's refusal to
curb security force use of the supposedly non-lethal plastic bullet as a
method of riot control." 5° In 1984, the European Parliament passed a
non-binding resolution calling for member states to ban the use of plastic
Plastic bullets are used
bullets,' specifically in Northern Ireland.'
in no other Council of Europe country,' 5 3 although they are used by the
149. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
1
1
150. A plastic bullet is a solid cylinder 3 / inches long and I A inches in diameter. It
weighs five ounces and has an operational range of up to 72 yards. Unlike its rubber
predecessors, the plastic bullet is designed to be fired directly at its targets at speeds of 130
to 170 miles per hour. Research by the United States Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, however, revealed that any direct-impact, crowd-control device can cause
severe damage-including skull fractures, rupture of the kidney and heart, fragmentation
of the liver and hemorrhaging-if its energy at impact exceeds 90 foot-pounds. At a range
of five yards, the plastic bullet has an energy impact of 210 foot-pounds, and at 50 yards,
it still maintains an energy impact of 110 foot-pounds. Jennings, Bullets Above the Law,
in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE, supra note 31, at 131, 133 (quoting United States study); A Short
History of the Plastic Bullet, FORTNIGHT, July-Aug. 1981, at 6.

151. Doe. No. 2-659/84, 1984-85 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 2-317) 143-51 (Oct. 11,
1984); BULL. EUR. COMM., 10-1984, point 2.4..8.(ii), at 62; see Stewart v. United
Kingdom, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 162, 166 (1982) (noting that the use of plastic bullets
"was condemned by a large majority vote in the European Parliament on 13 May 1982");
ASS'N FOR LEGAL JUST., 2ND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY INTO DEATHS AND
INJURIES BY PLASTIC BULLETS (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter PLASTIC BULLETS INQUIRY],
reprinted in 8 Hum. Rts. Internet Rep. 551 (Apr.-June 1983).
152. U.S. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 42, at 1138.
153. Stewart, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 166; 10 Hum. Rts. Internet Rep. 86 (Sept.-Dec.
1984). London claims plastic bullets are less dangerous than live ammunition. U.S. STATE
DEP'T REPORT, supra note 42, at 1138. Plastic bullets are not used in place of live rounds,
but rather in situations where soldiers and police would otherwise not fire, such as riot
control. Id. at 1137. Consequently, the ability of plastic bullets to inflict injury must be
compared with the potential for injury of other riot control gear, such as tear gas and
batons. The plastic bullet is much more deadly; it is, according to an international tribunal,
"a lethal weapon capable of causing horrific injuries." PLASTIC BULLETS INQUIRY, supra
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South African and Israeli armies.154 Through mid-1989, plastic bullets
and their rubber predecessors had killed seventeen Northern Irish,' 55 at
least eight of whom were children.'
A third irritant is army harassment of suspected republicans, which reportedly is common practice, if
not policy. 5 7 Warrantless searches of Catholic homes are sanctioned by
law, routine and, complain Catholics, result in needless destruction of
Catholic property.' 58 Equally lawful, and nearly as prevalent, are
note 151, at 551.
154. Viets, Blinded Belfast Woman Aims to Ban a Bullet, San Francisco Chron., May
7, 1988, at A13, col. 5. The Israeli government, through Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
concedes the purpose of firing plastic bullets at demonstrators "'is to increase the number
(of wounded).'" Broder, Israelis Aim to Wound More Arabs, San Francisco Exam., Sept.
28, 1988, at Al, col. 2 (quoting Rabin). The press quickly labeled this a "shoot-to-wound"
policy. See id. In effect, the result was a de facto shoot-to-kill policy. The day Rabin
announced the new policy, two Palestinians were killed by plastic bullets. Id.
155. On August 9, 1989, 15-year old Seamus Duffy became the fourteenth person killed
by plastic bullets, Jennings, supra note 40, at xxvi; three others had been killed by rubber
bullets until those rounds were replaced by plastic bullets in 1973, Jennings, supra note
150, at 135; see K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 70. In the month of rioting
that followed the death of the IRA hunger strikers in 1981, 16,656 plastic bullets were fired
into Catholic crowds. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 215. In that May and June alone,
plastic bullets killed four, including two girls, aged 12 and 14 years, id., partially blinded
three, inflicted permanent brain damage on another three and forced 100 more to the
hospital for treatment of injuries ranging from flesh wounds to broken bones and damaged
internal organs. Id. Since their introduction in 1973, some 54,000 plastic rounds have
been fired, inflicting injuries on more than 400 victims. Jennings, supra note 40, at xxvi.
Another 55,834 rounds of rubber bullets were fired before they were entirely withdrawn
from use in 1975. Jennings, supra note 150, at 133.
156. Duffy was the eighth victim aged 15 or younger. Jennings, supra note 40, at xxvi;
Jennings, supra note 150, at 135; see Viets, supra note 154, at A13, col. 6. One of the
most publicized victims was Brian Stewart, aged 13, who in October 1976 was struck on
the head by a plastic bullet fired by a British soldier after a group of children threw stones
at soldiers. 10 Hum. Rts. Internet Rep., supra note 153, at 86. Stewart died six days later
of severe brain damage. Id. The European Commission declared the case brought by
Stewart's mother against the United Kingdom to be inadmissable and found the use of
plastic rounds "less dangerous than alleged." Stewart, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. at 172. An
international inquiry disagreed, citing "case after case" where plastic bullets were used "in
non-riot situations, indoors where crowd dispersal was impossible, at short-range where
there was no threat to the security forces, on small children, and aimed at the head,"
PLAsTIc BULLETS INQUIRY, supra note 151, at 551, all in violation of army and RUC
regulations governing the use of the weapon. Id.
157. For one soldier's description of how he harassed Catholics, see S. BELFRAGE,
supra note 30, at 281.
158. U.S. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 42, at 1140; K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P.
HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 26. Anti-terrorist laws in Ulster allow security forces to
search without warrant any premise to determine if any arms or radio transmitters are
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warrantless arrests. 159 Moreover, as powerless as the British are to stem
IRA attacks on Protestants, the army has proven equally incapable of
preventing Protestant paramilitary executions of Catholic civilians."W
Through 1988, Protestant paramilitarists-especially the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA), which the British have yet to ban as they have the
IRA 6 1-had killed more civilians during the course of the troubles than
No
See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, § 15.
stored therein.
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, is required. Id. The searches, initially conducted
primarily by the army and more recently by the RUC, were never intended to uncover
significant caches of arms or IRA supplies; rather, the broad power to search homes at will
was used almost exclusively against the minority community as a means of gathering
information on the IRA. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra, at 26. At the
program's peak in 1974, the army and police searched 71,914 homes, or more than 200 per
day. J. FEE-AN, supra note 76, at 30-31; Tomlinson, Reforming Repression, in L.
O'DowD, B. ROLSTON & M. TOMLNSON, supra note 139, at 195. The figure subsequently leveled off at 15,000 annually. Id. During these searches, there have been
numerous complaints of soldiers smashing furniture and destroying other aspects of the
home, looting, and beating those who tried to stand in the way. See, e.g., S. BELFRAGE,
From 1971 to 1986, security forces searched 338,803
supra note 30, at 10-11.
houses-some 75% of all houses in Northern Ireland, and, more to the point, the
equivalent of searching twice each of the 170,000 Catholic houses in Northern Ireland.
Hillyard, Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Laws in Northern Ireland, in
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE, supra note 31, at 191, 197.
159. See AMNESTY INT'L, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 296 (1986) [hereinafter AMNESTY
INT'L 1985]; AMNESTY INT'L, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 235-37 (1979) [hereinafter AMNESTY
INT'L 1978].
160. See K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 19; D. CLARK,
supra note 44, at 76; P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 259. In early 1989, the British
junior Home Office minister, Douglass Hogg, appeared to encourage the execution of
Catholic lawyers by Protestant gunmen. Hogg alleged that a number of Northern Irish
lawyers were "unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA," apparently because they
represented suspected Catholic terrorists in court. Hogg omitted that many Catholic
Even the moderate, anti-IRA
lawyers also represent suspected Protestant terrorists.
Catholic Social Democratic Labor Party proclaimed that Protestant extremists would likely
interpret Hogg's statement as a call to arms. Within two weeks, the Protestant Ulster
Freedom Fighters assassinated Pat Finucane as he, his wife and three children were taking
Sunday tea in the kitchen. Finucane had represented several IRA defendants in highly
publicized cases. See Whitney, Sectarian Killings in Ulster Are Continuing to Increase,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, at A8, col. 5.
161. The UDA is the largest of the Protestani organizations openly engaged in
paramilitary activities. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 19-20;
see P. BEW & H. PATrERSON, supra note 79, at 48, 61. The UDA is not banned. See S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xiv. Since May 1973, the UDA has used the noin de guerre
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) as cover. S. BELFRAGE, supra, at xiv; K. BOYLE, T.
HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra, at 20. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 93. The British
government responded by banning the UFF, which never existed, but not the UDA, which
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had their Catholic counterparts. 62
These excesses and omissions might not have cost the British at least
the tepid support of some Catholics-the majority of whom do not support
the IRA's armed campaign-had the British and British-backed provincial
authorities investigated and prosecuted unlawful violence perpetrated by
members of security forces and Protestant paramilitary with the same
vigor as they did violence perpetuated by Catholics.
Unhappily, there is substantial evidence that authorities block full and
fair prosecutions of security personnel.
In 1984, when Amnesty
International undertook an investigation into whether the killings of
unarmed republican suspects resulted from a deliberate policy to eliminate
the government's opponents, its inquiry was "hindered by the inadequacy
of official information on suspicious killings." 1" A coroner informed
the Amnesty team that police supplied his office with incomplete and
misleading information on some of the more suspicious killings. 1 The
Amnesty probe concluded that the British government failed to investigate
and prosecute unlawful killings by the security forces." t At the trial of
was in reality guilty of the murders for which the UFF was publicly claiming responsibility.
Compare Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, sched. 2 (proscribing the
UFF, but not the UDA) with Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989,
sched. I (proscribing only two republican organizers-the IRA and the INLA-but no
Protestant organizations); see also J. HOLLAND, supra, at 93.
Consequently, when
arrested, UFF members often use their UDA membership to avoid responsibility for their
acts. Hall, The Prevention of Terrorism Acts, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE, supra note 31, at

144, 150. Between 1972 and 1977 alone, the UDA murdered approximately 440 people,
seriously wounded thousands more and instituted a massive intimidation campaign against
Catholics that forced thousands to flee their Belfast homes. Id. at 91; J. CONROY, supra
note 3, at 72. The other major Protestant paramilitary force is the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF). See S. BELFRAGE, supra, at xiv. Like the UDA, the focus of the UVF is civilian
Catholics. See J. HOLLAND, supra, at 164. Five out of every six persons killed by
Protestant paramilitary violence are civilians; see Thomas, supra note 29, at A2, col. 2;
through 1988, of 676 known killings by unionist paramilitarists, 610-or 90.5%-were
civilian. IR. INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP, supra note 12, at 14 (table 1). Additionally, the
RUC, Ulster's police force, and the Northern Irish militia attached to the British army, the
Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), are overwhelmingly Protestant. See S. BELFRAGE, supra,
at xiii; Thomas, The Ulster Patrol: I.R.A. Bombs and Critics' Barbs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22,
1986, at A2, col. 3.
162. From 1969 through December 31, 1988, loyalist paramilitarists had killed 610
civilians, republican paramilitarists 562. IR. INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP, supra note 12,
at 14 (table 1).
163. AMNESTY INT'L 1985, supra note 159, at 298. "Inquests were held only after long
delays, and in the cases of particular interest . . . still had not been held after 26 months."
Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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a policeman charged with murder for one of the 1982 RUC killings of
unarmed Catholics, the officer testified his superiors had ordered him to
In some of the more
prepare false reports and destroy evidence. 1
egregious incidents, witnesses reported being harassed and shot at by
soldiers to prevent their giving evidence that might lead to conviction."
Thus in 1988, Amnesty International seriously called into question the
government's commitment to investigate fully disputed killings by its
security forces and to prevent the possibility of unlawful killings in the
future. 16s
In 1984, John Stalker, the deputy chief constable for the Greater
Manchester Police Force, was assigned by the British government to
investigate six 1982 killings. In May 1986, however, Stalker was abruptly
removed just three days shy of completing a two-year inquiry that would
have revealed the involvement of British domestic intelligence in one of
the killings" ° and that pointed to a conclusion that the RUC had killed
"in cold blood . . . and then plot[ted] to hide the evidence."" 7 Stalker
concluded that "[tihe circumstances of those shootings pointed to a police
inclination, if not a policy, to shoot suspects dead without warning rather
166. Thomas, supra note 29, at A2, col. 2. Constable John Robinson of the RUC
appeared before Justice McDermott in a Northern Ireland court on April 3, 1984 for a trial
on charges of murdering Seamus Grew. Robinson was acquitted, as expected, but the
testimony he gave in his own defense shocked the British public. Robinson stated under
oath that Grew was not shot at a random police road check, as police claimed, but rather
following a long surveillance operation that had included an RUC sortie into the Republic
of Ireland. Neither had the two men been killed by regular police, as claimed, but rather
by members of a highly trained special squad, including Robinson, which had planned the
operation. Robinson testified that he had been instructed by senior police officers to lie in
his official statements to protect the secrecy of the operation. J. STALKER, supra note 42,
at 13; see R. v. Robinson, [1984] 4 N.I.J.B. 65.
167. One such incident involved the killing of a civilian shot dead by the Paratroop
Regiment in the Ardoyne area in April 1973. T. HADDEN & P. HiLLYARD, supra note 3,
at 38.
168.

AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, at 3.

169. J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 256; Thomas, supra note 2, at 32. Stalker had
learned that anti-terrorists operatives from MI5 had installed electronic surveillance in the
hayshed where 17-year-old Michael Tighe, a lad unaffiliated with the IRA, mistakenly
walked into an ambush. The MI5 bug recorded the entire event. J. STALKER, supra, at
50-51, 65-66, 256. It was Stalker's efforts to obtain the tape, despite official obstruction,
especially from the RUC, which eventually led the British government to pull Stalker off
the case. See id. at 65-110, 256, 261-271. Stalker subsequently obtained a government
document establishing that senior British civil servants conspired to remove him from the
investigation. Rule, London Linked to '86 Ouster of Ulster Investigator, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
170. J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 67; see id. at 9.
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than to arrest them."'
He uncovered a corps of senior Special Branch
officers of the RUC whose job it was to concoct stories to cover the truth
of the pre-planned killings." 7 A year into his investigation, Stalker
submitted "a very damaging political document"'-an interim report,
unreleased by the government-which recommended prosecutions of

eleven RUC officers and high-ranking officials for a variety of criminal
offenses, 74 including conspiracy to pervert the course of justice and
penury.1

Early in 1988, the British attorney general announced he would
prosecute none of the officers implicated in the 1982 killings or in the
intricate cover-up because of "considerations of national security." 7 '
The 1982 shootings did, however, receive considerably more official
attention than is typical. Less than a third of civilian allegations against
security forces are even investigated. In 1981, for example, while
complaints against the RUC rose by 19.3% to 1,715, the number actually
investigated fell by 21% to 519.176
171. Id. at 2 5 3.
172. Id. at 59; cf. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 32-37.
173. J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 264.
174. Id. at 254.
175. 126 PARL. DEB., H.C., (6th ser.) 425 (1988); Clines, British Stand on Ulster
Police Reopens the Rift with Dublin, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1988, at Al, col. 4; Thomas
supra note 2, at 32. Sir Patrick Mayhew, Britain's attorney general, further defended the
government's refusal to prosecute on grounds that although he was aware of "attempts to
subvert the course of justice," the prosecutions would not be "in the public interest."
R. U.C. Cleared Over 'Shoot-To-Kill' Policy, IR. AM., Mar. 1988, at 13. Instead, the
government announced that 20 RUC officers involved in the 1982 shoot-to-kill deaths and
subsequent cover-up would face unspecified disciplinary action for their role in "pervert[ing] the course of justice." Ulster Officers to Be Disciplined, San Francisco Exam.,
July 5, 1988, § 1, at 2, col. 3. None of the officers, however, were even placed under
suspension. Id. Eighteen low-ranking officers were eventually reprimanded and one was
cautioned. Whitney, 18 Ulster Officers Are Reprimanded, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989,
at AI5, col. 1. Such mild disciplinary proceedings for criminal prosecutions did not
assuage the public. Ulster Officers to Be Disciplined, supra, at 2, col. 3. Both Sinn Fdin,
the political branch of the republican movement, and one of the widows of the 1982 killings
decried the action, Sinn Fdin calling it "a farce." Whitney, supra, at A5, col. 1.
176. P. BEW & H. PATrERSON, supra note 79, at 148. British authorities insist that
each complaint against security personnel is investigated and that the director of public
prosecutions has complete independence to decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings.
In fact, the director is subject to the attorney general, who in 1978 admitted that such cases
were discussed with him. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 70. After
soldiers shot and killed 13 unarmed Catholic civil rights demonstrators on "Bloody Sunday"
in January 1972, the failure to take legal action against the officers involved led to specific
allegations that such proceedings had been prevented by a directive from the attorney
general. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 38; Tomlinson, Reforming
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When charges are brought against security personnel, convictions are
rare; most cases result in acquittals.'77 Of sixty known cases through
1980 where troops fatally shot innocent persons, only seven soldiers were
brought to trial and none convicted. 78 The decade since has seen little
improvement.'" Conversely, Catholics too frequently are convicted on
less than compelling evidence. One Catholic teenager was convicted
despite police admissions on the witness stand that they had lied, upon
orders from senior officers, about the facts of his arrest." The "Birmingham Six"-six Irishmen sentenced to life imprisonment in 1975 for
allegedly killing twenty-one people in a 1974 IRA bombing in Birmingham, England-remain in jail, although the British government now
concedes that the confessions used to convict the six likely were concocted
by police; in August 1990, the government referred the case for a second
time to the Court of Appeal, which in 1988 upheld the convictions
Repression, in L. O'DowD, B. ROLSTON & M. TOMLuNSON, supra note 139, at 192.
Officially, a government tribunal concluded that some of the dead men might have been
armed. REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE EVENTS ON SUNDAY,
30TH JANUARY 1972, WHICH LED TO THE Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH THE

PROCESSION INLONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220 (the WIDGERY
REPORT); see J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 37.
incident occurred, concluded otherwise:

The city coroner of Derry, where the

It strikes me that the army ran amok that day and they shot without
thinking of what they were doing. They were shooting innocent
people. These people may have been taking part in a parade that was
banned, but I don't think that justifies the firing of live rounds

indiscriminately. I say it without reservation it was sheer unadulterated
murder.
Statement of the Derry city coroner, reprinted in K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 163.
177. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 70.

178. Tomlinson, supra note 176, at 193.
179. Two soldiers who in 1981 drove their army Land Rovers into a crowd of Catholic
youths at 50 miles an hour, and then backed up over the body of one of the two teenagers
to die that day, were subsequently tried for reckless driving, not murder, and acquitted.
J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 153, 205. The lone policeman tried as a consequence of the
1982 killings was acquitted. J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 13. The only officer tried for
the RUC's 1984 plastic bullet assault on a peaceful rally in Belfast, which killed a young
father and injured at least 20, was acquitted. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 32-37; see
also Thomas, supra note 2, at 34. The British commandoes who shot and killed three IRA
guerrillas on Gibraltar in March 1988 were found by a coroner's jury to have acted
lawfully, although the suspects were unarmed. Jury Says Killings Lawful, supra note 39,
at A9, col. 6; see supra note 39. Through late 1988, only 22 members of all security
forces operating in Northern Ireland had been prosecuted for killings on duty involving
firearms, and all but two of these (or 91 %) had been acquitted. JUSTICE UNDER FIRE,
supra note 31, at xix-xx.
180. J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 65.
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notwithstanding new revelations by former police officers, who claimed
to have witnessed the confessions being beaten out of some of the accused,
Three other Irishmen
and new challenges to the forensic evidence.'
and an English woman-the Guildford Four-served fourteen years in
prison until the Court of Appeals quashed their convictions in late 1989
after the British government conceded they were wrongly convicted based
on confessions and evidence "fabricated" by the police." s Earlier this
year, the government finally announced the convictions of the McGuire
181. AMNESTY INT'L, APPEAL HEARING OF SIX MEN CONVICTED OF BOMBINGS IN
BIRMINGHAM 1-2, 5-7 (1988) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, BIRMINGHAM SIX APPEAL]; No
Retrial for Birmingham Six, IR.AM., Mar. 1988, at 14 [hereinafter No Retrial]; Clines,

supra note 175, at Al, col. 4. Despite a petition signed by more than 130 members of
Parliament demanding that the case be reopened, Lord Chief Justice Lane opined it would
be "highly unsatisfactory and unjust" to retry the six after 13 years. No Retrial, supra, at
14. Photographs taken of the men after three days in a Birmingham prison reveal severe
facial bruises and lacerations. C. MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGMENT: THE BIRMINGHAM
BOMBINGS 120-21 (1986) (reproducing photographs); AMNESTY INT'L, BIRMINGHAM SIX
APPEAL, supra, at 2-3. Moreover, a Labour Party member of Parliament who interviewed
the IRA guerrillas who actually executed the bombings, and documented his evidence in
a recent book, was not allowed to testify before the appeals court. No Retrial, supra, at
14; see C. MULLIN, supra, at 247-60. The appeals court also ignored the 1985 findings
of Dr. Brian Caddy, head of the forensic science unit at the University of Strathclyde, who
proved that the forensic evidence upon which much of the government's case rested was
unworthy of any credence. See id. at 236-38. As Mullin concluded his report:
At the time of this writing, the six Irishmen have served nearly twelve
years for a crime they did not commit. Had the death penalty been in
force at the time of their conviction, they would all have hanged.
Unless the Home Office and the judges can summon up the courage to
admit publicly what many people are saying in private, these men are
destined to remain in prison for the rest of their natural lives.
Id. at 261. The Home Office may have heeded Mullin's call when, in 1990, after the
convictions of 11 other bombing suspects were quashed because their confessions were
concocted by police, see infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text, the Home Office asked
the Court of Appeal to review the Birmingham Six case yet again because the government
now doubted the authenticity of police records of "confessions" obtained from at least two
of the six. Cowdry & Oakley, Birmingham Six Cases Go to Second Appeal, The Times
(London), Aug. 30, 1990, at 1,col. 1;Rule, Britain to Allow Appeal for 6 Convicted of
1974 Pub Murders, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1990, at AI0, col. 1. As this Article went to
press, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Britain admitted there was
insufficient evidence to support the six convictions, an announcement that "made it all but
certain the men would be freed when the Court of Appeal hears the case," some sixteen
years after the six were imprisoned. Prokesch, British Moves to Free 6 Linked to I.R.A.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
182. R. v. Richardson, [1989] C.L.Y.B. 752 (quashing convictions of Guildford Four
on reference from the home secretary since it appeared evidence, including confessions, had
been fabricated by the police); Toolis, When British Justice Failed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
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Seven-one of whom died in prison' during the fifteen years they have
been incarcerated for crimes they did not commit-"cannot stand" because
the government's evidence, including the confessions, had been completely
discredited. "
Where convictions of security personnel are obtained, sentences often
do not fit the crime. When a group of RUC men were convicted for
murdering a Catholic man, kidnapping a Catholic priest and bombing a
Catholic bar, only two of the policemen received life sentences. The rest
were granted suspended sentences by Judge Lowry who called the murder
of a Catholic father of eight, a man unaffiliated with the IRA, "'understandable' but 'inexcusable' . . . 'really an act of retribution, or revenge
because of other murders that had been committed." ' 1 In early 1988,
Britain announced the only soldier ever sentenced to life for fatally
shooting a Northern Irish civilian had been pardoned and released after
only twenty-six months incarceration and had been restored to active
Meanwhile, "a young Nationalist was sentenced to six
service.' 5"
months imprisonment" for writing NO TEA FOR DAD'S ARMY on a
Catholic served a twelve-month term for shouting
wall, ' 6 and another
17
"Up the IRA." 1
This appearance, at the least, of a two-track judicial system enhances
Catholic antipathy toward the special "Diplock" courts, where judges sit
without juries and may convict solely on the basis of uncorroborated
confessions often obtained under questionable circumstances... or
183.
Mills & Jones, Maguire Convictions 'Cannot Stand,'The Independent (London),
June 15, 1990, at 1,col. 1.
184.

J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 170.

185.

See, e.g., A. GUELKE, supra note 127, at iii.

186.

J. FEEHAN, supra note 76, at 55; see also K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 146.

187.

T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 43.

188. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 68-69. In 1972, a government
commission chaired by Lord Diplock recommended the abandonment of jury trials for
"terrorist" offenses and strongly urged admitting into evidence any confession, even those
which breached the common law rules against coerced or involuntary statements, as long
as the suspect could not introduce prima facie evidence that the confession had been
obtained by torture or maltreatment. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL
PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIvITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1972, CMND.
5185, at 30 [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT]. Even if the suspect introduced prima facie
evidence that the statement was coerced through torture or inhuman treatment, the
committee recommended the confession still be admitted if the prosecution rebutted the
suspect's allegations. Id. These recommendations became law a year later, see Northern
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, § 8, and remain in force. See Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, § 5A. Under them, the outcome of the trial is actually
determined in police interrogation centers, not in court. One study of the Diplock courts
found 86% of all defendants had "confessed." K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD,
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unsubstantiated and often-discredited testimony by paid informants.'

9

supra note 40, at 44. More recent studies reveal the same alarming pattern, Hillyard,
supra note 139, at 50, alarming because a wide body of evidence indicates that torture and
ill-treatment have been-and continue to be-applied to obtain confessions, see AMNESTY
INT'L, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 325, 327 (1988) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, 1987]; see
also supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text; infra notes 220-29 and accompanying text,
yet the likelihood of excluding any such confession is minute. A government committee
reported that of 2,293 cases in Diplock courts between 1976 and 1978 only 15 statements
were ruled inadmissable on grounds of ill-treatment. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1979, CMND.
No. 7497, at 52 [hereinafter BENNETr REPORT]. The overall conviction rate in Diplock
courts runs between 90-95%, and 80% of those convictions are based solely on the
suspects' statements of guilt made while incarcerated. See K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P.
HILLYARD, supra, at 60. One RUC interrogator estimated that at least 2% of all those
convicted in Diplock courts between 1976-79 were innocent, P. TAYLOR, supra note 110,
at 339, which translates into more than 290 wrongful incarcerations. In one case, a Belfast
social worker was convicted of murder and membership in the IRA and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The only evidence against him was a series of allegations by the police that
he made a verbal, unsigned confession, which the suspect denied, maintaining that at the
time of the alleged confession he was completely disoriented as a result of lack of sleep,
continuous interrogation and forced standing for prolonged periods. The only issue was
the admissibility of the verbal confession, which was allowed in as evidence. The man's
appeal was denied. See 9 Hum. Rts. Internet Rep. 407 (Dec. 1983-Feb. 1984); AMNESTY
INT'L, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 319 (1985) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L 1984]. The Diplock
courts also reveal the institutionalizing of a martial law-type state in Northern Ireland;
while originally created to deal only with terrorist crimes, Diplock courts now hear cases
involving ordinary crimes as well. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 98.
189. Another innovation of Lord Diplock has been the special courts' reliance on the
testimony of accomplices, known as "supergrasses." At common law, courts refused to
admit testimony "obtained by advantage . . . held out by a person in authority." Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1976] App. Cas. 574, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 419, [1975]
3 All E.R. 175. As in the case of confessions, the Diplock Commission urged that the
detailed technical common law rules be replaced by more lenient standards. DIPLOCK
REPORT, supra note 188, at 30. They were. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act, 1973, § 6, superseded by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978,
§ 8; see also AMNESTY INT'L 1987, supra note 188, at 326-27; Greer, Admissibility of
Confessions Under the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, 31 N. IR. L.Q. 210
(1980). The Cobden Trust, a civil liberties research and education organization, studied
the cases of three witnesses-all of whom had committed violent crimes-who were granted
immunity in 1982-83 in exchange for their testimony, on which 47 men were convicted.
See generally L. GIFFORD, SUPERGRASSES: THE USE OF ACCOMPUCE EVIDENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (1984). There were several disturbing traits common to these and
other supergrass cases. First, the witnesses were highly motivated to lie, yet even when
judges recognized the falsity of the supergrass' testimony, convictions often resulted. One
judge noted that the supergrass before him was "a ruthless, resourceful and experienced
criminal ... who has committed murder" and whom, the judge admitted, had lied in court.
Id. at 14-16. Nonetheless, the judge convicted 15 of the 16 defendants solely on the basis
of this perjured testimony, with sentences ranging as high as life. Id. at 16-17. Second,
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Inevitably, the minority community came to place no stock in either
the military or the legal system as a means of reform."g Stalker learned
firsthand the depth of Catholic distrust of Protestant and British "justice."

"None of them believed the investigation would actually achieve anything
or lead to prosecutions of policemen," wrote Stalker of the Catholics he
interviewed, "and several of the people I saw said prophetically that I
would never finish the enquiry, particularly if it began to threaten the
RUC or the British government.""u' The results of such a pervasive
distrust are predictable: "Where lack of confidence of this kind is
combined with deep seated and fundamental differences in political
objectives, the temptation to resort to violence and terrorism is great,
particularly when as in Ireland there is a lively tradition of paramilitary
activity . . . ."
London's response to the recent wave of violence illustrates Britain's
incapacity to implement a political resolution in Northern Ireland, for it
reveals a government insensitive to the need for neutral policymaking and,
at the same time, a government so at a loss for constructive solutions that
it instead launched a broadside attack on fundamental individual freedoms.
In 1988, Prime Minister Thatcher publicly vowed to "wip[e] the IRA off
Toward achieving Thatcher's
the face of the civilized world. " r9"
even when some of the supergrass-based charges were dismissed because the testimony was
perjured, judges remain willing to convict on other charges resting on different testimony
from the same witness. In one case, the judge conceded the witness had lied and dropped
30 of 45 counts, yet convicted seven of the 10 defendants on other charges. Id. at 23. See
generally U.S. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 42, at 1142. Third, even when all
charges were dismissed, this only occurred after the suspects had been held in jail for
months and even years, based on unsubstantiated allegations. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN,
supra note 14, at 69. In one case three men were held for five years-four before
trial-solely on the testimony of three supergrasses, all of whom the courts later deemed
not credible. AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, at 61. In
another, 17 of 18 men spent 21 months incarcerated, until a judge determined that the
He had little or no
witness "lived in a sort of half-world between reality and charade ....
regard for the truth." L. GIFFORD, supra, at 9, 25. In 1984, the much-awaited report of
the Baker Committee urged the continued use of the Diplock courts. REvIEW OF THE
OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1978, 1984,
CMND. No. 9222 [hereinafter BAKER REPORT]. According to Amnesty International, the
reforms recommended were insufficient to remove the risks of unfair trial. AMNESTY INT'L
1985, supra note 159, at 297. While no supergrass charges have been brought since
October 1986, the British government has refused to rule out reinstituting supergrass trials
despite procedures Amnesty International concluded "do not provide adequate safeguards
for... fairness." AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra, at 62.
190. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 5; see, e.g., Thomas, supra note 29,
at A2, col. 2. See generally K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 52.
191.

J. STALKER, supra note 42, at 46; see Thomas, supra note 2, at 31-32.

192. T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 3, at 5.
193.

What's the Point?, supra note 41, at 48; see McKibben, Thatcher Vows to Snuff
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decidedly non-neutral military solution, her government, in addition to
again deploying army reinforcements in the North," 9 took desperate
steps.
In late 1988, the British secretary of state renounced the centuries-old
right of.criminal suspects to remain silent by announcing that, henceforth
in Northern Ireland's courts, the finder of fact may draw "whatever
inferences would be proper from the fact that an accused remained
silent." 195 This legal sanction against suspects who refuse to respond to
police questioning, which reverses the presumption of innocence fundamental in Anglo-Saxon law since the Star Chamber was abolished in
1641," 9 and which would appear to allow conviction solely on the basis
of a suspect's silence, was directed primarily at the IRA. 97
Inflation, San Francisco Exam., Oct. 15, 1988, at A8, col. 4. Thatcher made no similar
pledge against Protestant paramilitarists, nor would it have made sense from a British
standpoint for her to do so. As one British soldier explained, "'It's commonly accepted
that the British army is there to protect the Protestants, no matter what anyone says.'" S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 284 (quoting soldier).
194. Britain sent a new army brigade to patrol Ulster's border with the Republic of
Ireland. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45. This contradicts British policy, which
for more than a decade has been to "Ulsterize" the war; i.e., to portray Northern Ireland
as a problem of law and order to be solved by Northern Ireland's police. See Thomas,
supra note 2, at 34. Toward that end, Britain has attempted to shift primary security
responsibility to the RUC and the UDR. See IRA: Going Soft, ECONOMIST Aug. 6, 1988,
at 44, 45. "Send in too many troops, and it becomes harder to pretend that the conflict has
a political solution." A Battle of Gestures, supra, at 45.
195. Britain Moves to End Right of Silence by Irish Suspects, San Francisco Exam.,
Oct. 20, 1988, at A2, col. 3 [hereinafter No Right of Silence]; see Jackson, Recent
Developments in Criminal Evidence, 40 N. IR. L.Q. 105, 109 (1989). The controversial
law abolishing the right is contained in the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of
1988, in articles 3-6. The announcement was made, and the draft order introduced, on
October 20, 1988. Jackson, supra, at 108. The order became law after a single, short
Commons debate on November 8, 1988. See 140 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 182-221
(1988); Jackson, supra, at 180 & nn. 14-15; Shell, British Constitution in 1988, 42
PARLIAMENTARY APT. 287, 291 (1989).
196. Boudin, Northern Ireland: Freedom vs. Law and Order, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1988, at A15, col. 2; see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person .. . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."). The right is considered so important
that a 1981 government commission recommended it not be diminished, even against
suspected terrorists. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1981, CMND. 8092,
para. 4.52; see Boudin, supra, at AI5, col. 2; Jackson, supra note 195, at 112. It is
difficult to reconcile excising of this right with England's pledge in the Hillsborough Treaty
to protect basic rights in Northern Ireland and to consider drafting a Bill of Rights for the
province. See Hillsborough Treaty, infra note 230, art. V(a).
197. Jackson, supra note 195, at 108; No Right of Silence, supra note 195, at A2, col.
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At the same time, Thatcher's government exercised its power under
the Broadcasting Act'9" to ban British electronic media from airing
interviews not only with Catholic and Protestant paramilitarists, but also
with certain Catholic elected and other political representatives affiliated
with Sinn Fdin, the republican political party, which holds a seat in British
Parliament and which draws 11% of the Northern Irish vote," 9 and
In late Novembetween 35% and 42% percent of the Catholic vote.'
ber, the government proposed another measure aimed at Sinn Fin: a law
permitting prosecution and removal of elected political officials who
As expected the law easily
publicly support the IRA campaign."
where Thatcher commanded
Commons,
House
of
the
650-member
passed
198. Broadcast Act, 1980, § 29; see Hillyard & Percy-Smith, The Coercive State
Revisited, 42 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 533, 538 (1989); Whitney, supra note 14, at A5, col.
4. Thatcher used this and other powers to thwart media coverage of Northern Ireland. In
1985, Home Secretary Leon Brittan, without having viewed the program and with full
support from the prime minister, pressured the British Broadcasting Corporation into
announcing it would not air a 45-minute documentary on the province because Britain found
the program "contrary to the national interest." Wilson, Cracking Down on Coverage:
Britain's Blurred TV Picture, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 1988, at 33; Marshall,
Strike Halts BBC News Worldwide, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, § IV, at 1, col. 6. Only
a 24-hour walkout by nearly every television reporter in Britain forced the BBC to finally
broadcast an amended version three months later. Wilson, supra, at 33; British Media
Strike Ends as BBC Decides to Show IRA Documentary, L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1985, § I,
at 9, col. 5. Previously Thatcher had thrice publicly scolded the BBC for its coverage of
Ulster. Wilson, supra, at 33. Police have seized film footage and government officials
have launched investigations into television producers and correspondents who have
produced stories on Northern Ireland not to the government's liking. Id. Through the end
of 1985, the British government had caused more than 50 programs on Northern Ireland
to have been canceled, censored, withdrawn or at least delayed. J. CONROY, supra note
3, at 38.
199. Northern Ireland: Whose Oxygen?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 62; Boudin,
supra note 196, at AIS, col. 2; Whitney, supra note 14, at AS, col. 4. Although the ban
covers all outlawed paramilitary organizations, Protestant and Catholic alike, the only legal
political party affected is the Catholic Sinn Fdin. See Whitney, supra, at A5, col. 4. The
ban, imposed by decree, was approved after a single, three-hour debate in Commons on
November 2, 1988, Shell, supra note 195, at 291, and was immediately decried by the
BBC. Whitney, supra, at A5, col. 4. Among the ban's earliest effects: a song about the
Birmingham Six by the Pogues was not broadcast; interviews with politicians and citizens
about civil liberties in Northern Ireland and the Guildford Four case were banned or
canceled; and, although the ban technically covers only electronic media, the April 1989
edition of Playboy appeared on the stands in Britain with pages from an interview with Sinn
Fdin's Gerry Adams torn out of the magazine. Hillyard & Percy-Smith, supra note 198,

at 539.
200. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 214.
201. British Proposals on IR
A28, col. 2.

Terrorism, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 25, 1988, at
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a considerable majority. 2
At
On their face, these actions run contrary to international law.'
the least they reveal a disregard for fundamental rights and freedoms
unhealthy in a government charged with the extraordinarily difficult task
of maintaining an appearance of fairness and lawfulness in its handling of
Renewed calls, both at home and abroad, demand
the Ulster crisis.'
that Britain finally adopt a written Bill of Rights," incorporating the
terms of the European Convention on Human Rights so as to force the
government to pay closer attention to them. Britain has been hauled
before the European Commission on charges of violating the Convention
more than any other signatory nation" and has lost more cases than any
202. Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act, 1989; see British Proposals on IRA
Terrorism, supra note 201, at A28, col. 2. In 1982, the first year Sinn FHin stood for
elections, it garnered 64,000 votes-more than one-third of all Catholic votes cast, see K.
KELLEY, supra note *, at 350, and in the May 1989 local elections fell 11 votes shy of
69,000, good for roughly 35% of the Catholic vote. See Pyle, SDLP Makes Gains as DUP
Slumps in Poll, Irish Times (Dublin), May 20, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
203. Allowing Northern Ireland courts to use as evidence against an accused the fact
that she refused to cooperate with the police or take the stand to testify violates article
14(3)(g) of the International Covenant, supra note 33, ("In the determination of any
criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality: . . . Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
Cf.
guilt."). Interestingly, the European Convention contains no such protection.
European Convention, supra, note 34, art. 6(3)(c) ("Everyone charged with a criminal
offense has the following minimum rights .

.

. to defend himself in person .

. . .").

The

ban on interviews with members of Sinn FHin, as well as with members of outlawed
Catholic and Protestant paramilitary groups, and the proposed law preventing politicians
from publicly supporting the IRA, arguably violates article 10(1) of the European
Convention, although under subsection (2) governments may curtail the freedom of
Id. art 10(2); see also
expression as "necessary" to protect "national security."
International Covenant, supra, art. 19(3)(b) (same). Official notifications of derogation,
however, are required, see infra note 577, and none appears to have been filed by the
British government. In addition, the Universal Declaration contains no such qualification.
Under it "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Universal Declaration, supra
note 32, art. 19. Moreover, both the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant
guarantee the right to be elected regardless of political opinions. See id. art. 21;
International Covenant, supra, art. 25(b).
204. For further discussion on this point, see supra notes 145-94 and accompanying
text.
205. A Half-Bill of Rights, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 1988, at 15-16; Whitney, The Appeal
of a British Bill of Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, § 4, at 2, col. I.
206. A Half Bill of Rights, supra note 205, at 16. About 800 complaints are filed each
year against the British government. Jones, The British Bill of Rights, 43 PARUAMENTARY
AFF. 27, 34 (1990).
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other country.'
Most recently, the European Court of Human Rights, in an opinion
issued November 29, 1988,"° found Britain in violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights,' affirming the determination by the
European Commission on Human Rights that Britain's security law
allowing detention for up to seven days without charges"' breached the
207. Jones, supra note 206, at 34. Roughly one-in-three Commission decisions against
a government have been against the British. Id.
208. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988)
(judgment). The case was brought by four Northern Irish men-Terence Brogan, Dermot
Coyle, William McFadden and Michael Tracey-detained for between four and six days,
but never charged with any crime. Id. at 19-21; see Anti-Terrorism: What's European for
Justice?, ECONOMIST, Dee. 3, 1988, at 52.
209. The 19-member court, composed of justices from as many countries, ruled 12-7
that all four men had been denied their right to "be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" after their arrests, as required
by article 5(3) of the European Convention, supra note 34, art. 5(3), and ruled 13-6 that
the four had been denied "an enforceable right to compensation," as guaranteed by article
5(5). Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30-37. A majority of the court, however, rejected
the detainees' argument that they had been deprived of their rights under the Convention
to "liberty and security of person" and to "proceedings by which the lawfulness of [their]

detention[s] shall be decided speedily by a court."' Id. at 28-30, 34-35, 37; see European
Convention, supra, arts. 5(1), 5(4).
210. See D. REED, supra note 107, at 245. Detention without charges did not end with
the official cancellation of internment in December 1975. From 1975 through 1978, some
12,605 Northern Irish were arrested under emergency police powers; the equivalent figure
in Britain would be nearly 450,000. Id. at 246. No reasonable grounds are required to
justify an arrest under the Emergency Provisions Act of 1973, as modified by the 1978 Act,
and the Temporary Provisions Acts of 1984 and 1989. Of the 2,960 detained for more than

four hours during the period between September 1977 and August 1978, only 1,029, or
35%, were charged with an offense. Id. Under section 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989, security personnel can detain without warrant persons
on suspicion of terrorist activities for up to seven days without filing criminal charges; the
first 48 hours under the RUC's own authority, the remaining five days by approval of the
secretary of state. The acts, however, allow those charged to be held almost indefinitely
without trial, in one case, for 31h years. U.S. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 42, at
1140.
Under these regulations, which in 1989 Parliament made permanent in the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989, see Jennings, supra note 40,
at xxv ("the expression 'Temporary Provisions' is highly misleading as the Act no longer

has a maximum lifespan like its 1984 predecessor ....

"); Jackson, supra note 195, at

237-45, 256; Northern Ireland: Whose Oxygen?, supra note 199, at 63, the focus of the
police shifts from pre-arrest acquisition of independent evidence to post-arrest interrogation.

These detentions have escaped condemnation as "internment" largely due to Britain's
"criminalization" strategy, under which arrests are carried out by the RUC, not the British
army, and are thereby described as police action against criminal suspects, not military
action against political opponents. See generally D. REED, supra, at 244-46; Note, Pre-
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Convention's requirement that a detainee be presented promptly to a judge
or other official empowered with judicial authority.211 Thatcher's
government announced it would refuse to abide by the court's ruling,
choosing instead to derogate from its obligations under the Convention.21 2 Moreover, Thatcher refused to rule out reinstating internment
of suspected IRA members and sympathizers, 213 a practice of incarceration without trial not unlike that employed by South Africa 2 4 and
Israel,2 t which, when initially implemented in 1971, was followed by
the bloodiest year of Northern Ireland's present troubles and brought down
on "the cradle of democracy" international condemnation for blatant
violations of basic civil rights.21 6 That Thatcher was unable prior to her
ouster as prime minister to reimpose this drastic measure was due solely
to political and military concerns, 1 7 confirming commentators' concluTrial Detention of Suspects in Northern Ireland:A Violation of Fundamental Human Rights,
11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 297 (1990).
211.

Brogan, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30-34, 37.

212. Whitney, Britain, Citing Ulster Terrorism, Keeps Detention, N.Y. Times, Dec.
25, 1988, § I, at 4, col. 1. Britain signed the European Convention in 1950 and is thus
See European
bound by rulings of the European Court absent valid derogation.
Convention, supra note 34, art. 53. Simultaneous with its derogation from the European
Convention, Britain also notified the United Nations that it intended to continue detention,
despite acknowledging that the policy appears "inconsistent with article 9(3) of the
[International] Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights]." Notifications Under Article 4(3)
of the Covenant (Derogations), reprinted in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 147, 158 (notifications of Dec. 23, 1988), U.N. Doe. No.
ST/LEG/SER.E/8, U.N. Sales No. E.90.V.6 (1990). For the requirements of a valid
derogation, see infra notes 564 & 577 and accompanying text.
213. See A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45; Northern Ireland: Whose Oxygen?,
supra note 199, at 45; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 3; Lohr, supra note
43, at 12, col. 1.
214. See, e.g., H. RUDOLPH, SECURITY, TERRORISM AND TORTURE-DETAINEES'
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL 1-36: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1984). The Internal
Security Act 74 of 1982, section 28, permits South African authorities to detain persons for
McQuoid-Mason, Detainees and the Duties of District
purposes of "interrogation."
Surgeons, 2 S. AIR. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 59 (1986). These "[dietainees, because of the
draconian provisions of the Internal Security Act, are vulnerable to abuse by the detaining
authorities." Id.
215. See, e.g., H. RUDOLPH, supra note 214, at 61-132. Administrative detention has
existed in Israel since its inception as a nation in 1948. At that time the Israeli government
incorporated into its laws the Defence (Emergency) Regulations that Britain had enacted
in 1945 and maintained those regulations for more than 30 years after independence. Id.
at 61.
216. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45; What's the Point?, supra note 41, at
48; Lohr, supra note 43, at 12, col. 1; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 3;
see supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
217.

See A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 45; What's the Point?, supra note 41,
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sions that due process of law is another casualty of a war Britain refuses
to admit it is waging.2" 8
The decision to retain detention raises worrisome possibilities.
Perhaps most ominous is the combination of continued detention and the
detainee's loss of the right to silence.219 While the British vowed that
the practices of "torture" and "inhuman treatment," as found by the
European Commission and Court, respectively, had been abandoned,'
the evidence is to the contrary. Earlier this year, Ireland's Supreme Court
unanimously voted to disallow the extradition of two convicted IRA
members on the ground that the court found a "probalhle risk" that the
men would be assaulted by the prison staff in Northern ireland upon their
return. 2" In 1989, Amnesty International reported evidence supporting
allegations of ill-treatment of suspected terrorists-including perforated
eardrums-sustained during RUC interrogation. z' In 1985, an Amnesty
International investigation reported "considerable evidence" that torture
and ill-treatment were applied to a prisoner during interrogation by the
In March 1979,
RUC in Castlereagh Police Holding Centre, Belfast.'
at 48; Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 3.
218. See What's the Point?, supra note 41, at 48; Thomas, supra note 2, at 33.
219. Jenkins, Not-So-Free Speech in Britain, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 8, 1988, at 23
("In British law this right goes back to the mid-seventeenth century and was the response
to the inquisitorial methods employed in such courts as the Star Chamber. One may doubt
whether matters have significantly improved in some Northern Ireland police stations.").
220. In March 1972, Prime Minister Edward Heath told the House of Commons,
"[T]hese techniques will not be used .... The statement that I have made covers all future
circumstances." 832 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 743 (1972); see P. TAYLOR, supra note
110, at 26. In June 1972, the Palace Barracks Interrogation Centre, where much of the
torture had been applied, was closed. Id. British representatives to the European
Commission's hearings at Strasbourg informed the commission that both the attorneygeneral and the army had issued directives ordering the immediate disuse of the five
techniques. Id. For details of the European Commission and Court rulings, see supra
notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
221. Irish High Court Bars Extraditing 2in LR.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at A3,
col. 4; see Prokesch, Court Counters Irish Policy on Extraditions to Britain, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 1990, at A3, col. 1. On the United States' attempts to extradite and deport former
IRA member Joseph Doherty, see Note, Deportation as De Facto Extradition: The Matter
of Joseph Doherty, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 263 (1990).
222. AMNESTY INT'L, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 241 (1990) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L
1989]. An Amnesty surgeon concluded the injuries were not self-inflicted. Id.
223. AMNESTY INT'L, NORTHERN IRELAND: ALLEGED TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT
OF PAUL CARUANA (1985) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, ALLEGED TORTURE]. The man,
arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1984,
section 12, was held 72 hours before allowed to see his attorney, id. at vi, in direct
violation of RUC regulations that dictate access to counsel after 48 hours. B. DICKSON,
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Dr. Robert Irwin, a Protestant doctor at Castlereagh, resigned, announcing
he had treated dozens of injuries suffered by prisoners, such as fractured
eardrums, that could not possibly be self-inflicted, as the RUC
In June 1978, Amnesty International published a detailed
claimed.'
report of interrogation violations in Northern Ireland. The Amnesty
mission investigated seventy-eight cases of alleged torture and ill-treatment
of prisoners between the ages of thirteen and sixty and found medical
evidence substantiating the claims of abuse,' findings later confirmed
Two United States Congressby a government committee of inquiry.'
men later in 1978 reported to President Carter their investigation in
Northern Ireland had revealed "harsh interrogation methods" and
"suppression of human rights."'
As the International Commission of
supra note 31, at 86. An Ulster surgeon and an Amnesty physician examined the suspect
and found the physical evidence consistent with his allegations. AMNESTY INT'L, ALLEGED
TORTURE, supra, at vii. Amnesty International also noted reports of ill-treatment against
a pregnant woman and her mother in late 1983 as Castlereagh. AMNESTY INT'L 1985,
supra note 159, at 296-97.
224. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 168. Dr. Denis Elliott, another Protestant physician
and a former councilor for the loyalist Official Unionist Party, also resigned after stating
that his professional oath made it impossible for him to continue at Castlereagh. Id.
Beginning in 1977, the chief forensic officers charged with examining prisoners at
Castlereagh and Gough, the two primary police centers, protested increasing discoveries
of bruising, contusions and abrasions, serious injuries, increasing mental agitation, hypertension and hyper-flexion of joints. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY:
THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 230 (1983).
225. AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO
NORTHERN IRELAND 12, 20 (1978) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L, N. IR. MISSION]. The
Amnesty report concluded by announcing that "maltreatment of suspected terrorists by the
RUC has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment of a public
inquiry to investigate it." Id. at 70.
226. The British responded to the Amnesty report by appointing yet another commissiofi
to investigate police interrogation procedures. The results were devastating. Where the
Compton and Parker committees essentially had acquitted the security forces of wrongdoing, the Bennett Report produced a large volume of evidence sustaining the Amnesty
allegations. Amnesty had commented on the high number of complaints filed in 1971-75.
Id. The Bennett Committee reported similarly high numbers in 1976-77.' BENNETr
REPORT, supra note 188, at 52. The Bennett Committee concluded that in many of the
cases it investigated, "injuries whatever their precise cause had not been self-inflicted and
had been sustained in policy custody. . . . Moreover, we cannot blind ourselves to the
possibility that if, as we have found on the basis of medical evidence, ill-treatment causing
injury could occur, so could ill-treatment which leaves no marks." Id. at 55. The report
also noted, "[w]e have to consider the unwelcome possibility that the questioning by the
officers investigating complaints may not be as searching or persistent as it might be." Id.
at 115.
227. Report of House Subcom. on Inmigration, Citizenship, and International Law,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 213 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter
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Jurists concluded in 1983, still in Northern Ireland "safeguards against
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment generally, and against improper
In the first
interrogation techniques in particular, are required."'
decade of the conflict alone, security forces subjected an estimated 20,000
Catholics to some form of torture or ill-treatment.'
E. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and Its Aftermath

The 1985 Hillsborough Treaty'-which establishes an intergovernmental conference involving representatives from Britain, Ulster and
Ireland-offers little hope of curbing repression or curtailing IRA activity.
It is intended to do what the British alone could not, give Catholics a
measure of power and erode support for the IRA."' On paper, this will
be accomplished if Britain allows mixed courts with judges from the Irish
Republic and drafts a Bill of Rights for Ulster, in exchange for a greater
Dublin commitment to crack down on the IRA, which operates from south
of the border. 2 Yet London need only consider these reforms: it is
under no obligation to institute them, or to listen to Dublin's concerns at
all, 3 and, in fact, Britain has not instituted any of the major reforms in
the accord's five-year existence.2"
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Thatcher and her aides consistently
claimed the pact ensures Ulster will never leave the union. 5 This in
turn hands the IRA a fresh reason to fight. The day the pact was signed,
Northern Ireland Report].

228. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 224, at 246.
229.

R. FIELDS, SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE 67 (1977).

230. Treaty on Northern Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985, United Kingdom-Republic of Ireland,
1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 62 (Cmnd. 9690) [hereinafter Hillsborough Treaty].
231. Thomas, The Ulster Pact: Big Hopes, Big Risks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985, at
AS, col. 1.
232. Lelyveld, Britain and Ireland Sign Accord That Gives Dublin Role in Ulster, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1985, at AI, col. 1.
233.

Hillsborough Treaty, supra note 230, arts. II, V-VII.

234. Officials of the Republic of Ireland now concede the Anglo-Irish accord has
Frankel, Northern Ireland's Troubles, San
produced only "incremental progress."
Francisco Chron., Mar. 7, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
235. Thatcher Regrets Aide's Remark on Ireland, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1985, at A9,
col. 1 [hereinafter Thatcher Regrets]. It does in fact accomplish this by guaranteeing that
Ulster will never be united with the South unless a majority in Northern Ireland assent to
it. Hillsborough Treaty, supra note 230, art. I. Two-thirds of Northern Ireland is, of
course, Protestant and opposed to unification. See, e.g., S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at

viii.
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the IRA murdered a policeman in South Armagh. 6 In the two months
following announcement of the Anglo-Irish accord, the IRA killed at least
six security personnel and wounded ten in six different attacks."
As expected, the thought of even de minimis control over Ulster's
affairs in the hands of the Irish Republic enraged many Protestants, who
decried the accord as a sellout of unionism and merely the first step
toward a united Ireland. 8 In response to the Hillsborough Treaty,
Protestant marauders armed with axes, clubs and guns terrorized Catholic
sections of normally peaceful villages." 9 Hundreds
2 of loyalists occupied
a Catholic border town and attacked Irish police. 10
It thus seems a significant measure of Britain's lack of progress that
government ministers draw comfort from the accord's survival as a sign
of hope,"' given that officials of the Irish Republic and representatives
of the Northern Protestant community now concur that agreement has
failed to narrow the fundamental chasm between Protestants and CathoEven the May 1989 local elections, which some in Britain
lics. 2
perceived to be a victory for the accord, 3 in fact undermined such
hopes. On the Protestant side, while the most extreme of the Protestant
parties-Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)-lost considerable
support,' the party that gained in the polls-the Ulster Unionist Party
236. Thomas, supra note 231, at A8, col. 1.
237. Id.; LR.A. Kills A Soldier in Ulster, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at All, col. 4;
I.R.A. Ambush Kills 2 Ulster Policeman, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1986, at A3, col. 4; Police
Station Shelled in Northern Ireland, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1985, at A5, col. 1.
238. Lclyveld, supra note 232, at Al, col. 1. In a major blow to hopes the Hillsborough Treaty would be accepted by a majority of Protestants, all but one of the 15 Protestant
members of Parliament who resigned their seats to protest the agreement were overwhelmingly re-elected in January 1986, revealing that the insecurity of the past continues to
permeate throughout the majority community. Unionist candidates received 418,230 of the
votes cast, or 43,86%, to only 70,917 votes for the only Protestant party to favor the
agreement. Thomas, 14 Unionists Win Elections, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1986, at A6, col.
1; Thomas, Ulster Protestants See Vote as Challenge to Pact, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1986,
at A7, col. 1.
239. 200 Injured, supra note 54, at A6, col. 1.
240. Clines, Not All Ulster Catholics Like English-IrishAccord, N.Y. Times, Aug. I1,
1986, at A2, col. 3.
241.

A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 46.

242. See, e.g. Frankel, supra note 234, at A3, col. I (Irish officials "concede they may
have 'oversold' the healing powers of the agreement."); McCreary, Irish Court Blindsides
1985 Accord, San Francisco Chron., May 9, 1990, § Z-1, at 2, col. I (accord has failed
to mollify Protestant fears).
243. A Battle of Gestures, supra note 15, at 46.
244. Support for Paisley's DUP "slumped from 24.3% in 1985 to 17.8%." Pyle, supra
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The Catholic
(UUP) 5-is equally hostile to the Anglo-Irish pact.24
moderate,
anti-IRA
Social
Democratic
was
mildly
more
hopeful;
the
side
Labor Party (SDLP) achieved unprecedented gains,247 an event immediately hailed "as a reaction in the nationalist community to IRA violence
as well as overwhelming endorsement of the Anglo-Irish Agreement."'
Nonetheless, electoral support for Sinn Fdin, which opposes the agreement
because it maintains British presence and control in the North, was
"virtually unshakable" in republican strongholds throughout the Catholic
community. 4 9 Aware that Protestant resistance to the Anglo-Irish
accord may again, as in the past, translate into an armed invasion of
Catholic neighborhoods, the IRA will continue to garner sufficient
communal support and will attract new recruits, thus increasing the
Provisionals' striking power; as long as Protestant leaders remain united
in defiance, therefore, the pact remains a dead letter insofar as ending the
war is concerned.' ° Indeed, critics argue the accord itself has become
part of the problem, in that the pact allows Britain and Ireland to give an
illusion of progress without the reality of providing any real possibility of
peace 5" The Northern Irish are not fooled, however; a recent province-wide poll found only four percent of Protestants, and only one-in-six
Catholics, believe the agreement has benefitted their respective countries.5 2
Fifteen years earlier, the Hillsborough compromise might have
restored peace.5 3 But now certain segments of Northern Irish society
note 202, at 1, col. 3.
245. Id. The UUP gained 1.9%. Id. at 10, col. 1.
246. Pyle, A Kick in the Teeth for the Bad Guys, Irish Times (Dublin), May 20, 1989,
at 8, col. 1. The defeat for the Paisleyan forces seems more a backlash against certain
DUP tactics, not a repudiation of Protestant resistance to the Anglo-Irish agreement. Id.
247. The SDLP increased its share of the vote to 21.2%, up from 17.8%, the highest
level of support the party has achieved in local elections in its 21-year existence. Pyle,
supra note 202, at I, col. 3.
248. Id.
249. See id. Though Sinn Fin's total fell 0.5%, to 11.3% of the total vote, most of
the seats it lost were in rural areas. Id.
250. Q K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 370-71; see Lohr, Protestant Cause Hurt by
Belfast Strike, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1986, at A8, col. I.
251. See Frankel, supra note 234, at A3, col. 1.
252. Wilson, Poll Shockfor Accord, FORTNIGHT, Apr. 1988, at 68. More significantly,
perhaps, only 25% of Catholics believe the Anglo-Irish pact benefits Protestants while only
9% of Protestants think it aids Catholics, id., demonstrating that antipathy in Ulster toward
the accord is based not on subjective fears as much as it is based on objective recognition
that the agreement has not, and cannot, deliver a meaningful solution.
253. Marshall, supra note 139, at 17, col. I.

19901

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL

Sectarian assassinations,
have resigned themselves to violence.'
terrorist bombings and urban guerrilla warfare have become a routine part
of a life that otherwise appears normal3 55 Violence has cemented the
extremists on both sides into hardline positions that they defend with the
bullet and the bomb, making compromise implausible, if not impossible.'
One study reported that the psychological harm inflicted on
children reared in areas where political violence is a constant to be so
great that it "seriously decreased the probable survival of the group,""57
largely because these children can only be expected to intensify that
violence as they become adults and move into leadership positions within
the two communities. 8 The polarization of society, coupled with the
indoctrination of the young into a psychological acceptance of violence as
a legitimate or even preferred means of dealing with the situation,"
may well create a country divided into two sides whose leaders possess no
belief in their ability to effect change absent violence. - °
Proof of this trend is the violent Protestant reaction to the Hills254. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 188.
255. Cf.R. FIELDS, supra note 229, at 21.
256. See D. DOuMirrr, supra note 132, at 160.
257. R. FIELDS, supra note 229, at 55; see also id. at 31.
258. I. McALuisTER & R. ROSE, supra note 73, at 13.
259. R. FIELDS, supra note 229, at 52-53. Children reared in environments where hate
builds to a level requiring external release, and where alternate means to channel
emotion-such as politics-are largely unavailable, learn "that there is no pathway to justice
but violence." Drexler, Children of Violence, San Francisco Chron., July 1, 1990, § Z-l
(Magazine), at 19. Northern Ireland is one such environment. Id.
260. Id. at 55. This is not to say that violence in Northern Ireland is either mindless
or random. Quite the contrary, because so many Protestants and Catholics perceive
violence as the means toward their divergent ends, the violence is, "on both sides, deeply
considered." Thomas, supra note 2, at 34.
Almost everyone in Northern Ireland wants "peace"; the question is
what price they're willing to pay to get it. Many Catholics feel that
the status quo, in a state set up to maintain the Protestant ascendancy,
obliges them, as they put it, "to live on your knees." They would
rather fight. Protestants, on the other hand, fear that any change in the
status quo would strip them of their culture, their heritage, their very
soul. They would rather fight. The conflict is terrible, but it is not
"mindless."
Id.; accord Ivens, Ulster: English Inanity, Not Irish Insanity, SPECTATOR, Aug. 27, 1988,
at 6, col. I ("'Senseless killing'!? That idiotic phrase has poisoned the mainland's thinking
about Ulster for the last 20 years. Of course it makes 'sense' for the IRA to kill British
soldiers. It is what the IRA is for. Moreover it is a strategy which proved its 'sense'.
when Ireland gained its independence. . . . Irish Unionists who 'senselessly' refused to
accept Westminster's dictate in 1914 and 1974 will go on being 'senseless.' And what have
they gained by it? The answer is 'senseless' freedom from Dublin rule.").
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borough Treaty; 26' despite assurances from then-prime minister Thatcher
and her aides that the pact ensures "there will never be a united Ireland," 2 Protestants in response assaulted British officials,'
rioted
against Ulster police,2 and returned to the sort of vicious attacks
against moderate Catholics that marred the 1968-69 civil rights movement
and initiated the current era of the troubles.2" As in 1969, this Protestant violence forced Britain to send in the army; for the first time since
1981, reinforcements were ordered into the province.'
Even the authorities concede that while the statistical level of violence
dropped in the several years prior to 1988, bitterness and fear had
not. 67 So much hatred has been injected into the system that it has
become impregnable."
Consequently, even in an environment where
violence is superficially suppressed, the smallest provocation may spawn
a major escalation of the war.'
"Even if 'peace' is restored, the
motivation for politically inspired violence will remain," army Brigadier
Glover predicted several years ago. "Any peace will be superficial and
brittle. A new campaign may erupt in the years ahead." 2"
And so it did. The March 6, 1988 shooting by British SAS soldiers
261.

See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.

262.

Thatcher Regrets, supra note 235, at A9, col. 1.

263. Northern Ireland secretary Tom King was accosted by about 50 Protestants, who
trapped him in Belfast's City Hall for two hours. Belfast Protestants Pummel British Aide,

N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
264. The rioters injured 78 officers in one incident alone. Ulster Violence Rekindled
with Marches in 19 Cities, San Francisco Exam., July 13, 1986, at A3, col. 2.
265. In February 1986, for example, Protestant gunmen murdered a Catholic man with
no known political connections as he lay in his North Belfast bed. Gunmen Kill Belfast
Catholic, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at A12, col. 4. The following month, during a oneday strike by Protestants that paralyzed the province, Protestants burned a factory where
200 Catholic women were working, Thomas, Irish Premier Vows to Press On With Ulster
Accord, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1988, at A17, col. 1, and were responsible for more than
500 incidents of intimidation and property damage. Lohr, supra note 250, at A8, col. 1.
In July of that year, scores of Protestant extremists armed with clubs, pickax handles and
hatchets staged a predawn raid on Catholic homes in the normally peaceful village of
Rasharkin. 200 Injured, supra note 54, at A6, col. 1.
266. An emergency army battalion arrived in Ulster the first week of 1986. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at AS, col. 4; 550 More British Soldiers Being Sent to Ulster, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1985, at A2, col. 6.
267. Marshall, supra note 139, at 17, col. 1.
268. Id.
269. See J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 171.
270. Id. at 143 (quoting "Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends," Brigadier
Glover's 1979 analysis of the IRA); see also P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 261.
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ot the three unarmed IRA suspects on Gibraltar, 271' and the Protestant
grenades and gunfire that killed three Catholic mourners at the Belfast
funeral of the Gibraltar victims, 2' ignited the simmering powderkeg that
is British-occupied Northern Ireland. Two armed British plainclothes
soldiers watching the mourners' funeral were dragged from their car,
beaten and shot to death in full view of the world's television cameras, 27 capping "one of the grisliest weeks in the last two decades of
violence in Northern Ireland." 274 They were only the first; the IRA
killed at least forty-four British soldiers in 1988 27 5-compared with just
three in all of 1987 7 6-the highest figure since 1973.'n The Irish
Republic's extradition of an escaped IRA prisoner back to the North
touched off a fierce republican response, a spree of at least forty bombings
and shootings in Belfast and Derry that injured twelve security personnel
and four civilians 78 in the most intense and widespread civil disruption
in recent years. 2" In reply, SAS soldiers killed three more IRA suspects. 21 During 1988, more than 100 died, forty-eight of these civil271. Clines, British Amend Account of Killing of 3 in Gibraltar, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1988, at A7, col. I [hereinafter Clines, 3 Killed in Gibraltar].The shooting prompted even
moderate Catholics to decry a "'license to kill' attitude among antiterrorist agents" of the
British army. Clines, supra note 38, at A7, col. 1;see supra note 38.
272. Clines, 3 Killed by Grenades at I.R.A. Funeral, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1988, at
Al, col. 2; Lawlessness in Ulster, supra note 39, at 445. "Dozens" were wounded by the
gunman, widely believed to have been a member of one of the paramilitary Protestant
gangs. Clines, supra, at Al, col. 1.
273. Clines, 2 British Soldiers Killed at I.R.A. Rites, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, §
1, at 1,col. 3; Lawlessness in Ulster, supra note 38, at 445.
274. Clines, supra note 273, at Al, col. 3.
275. I.R.A. Bomb Damages 100 Homes, supra note 14, at A16, col. 1. In May, the
IRA killed three British servicemen in the Netherlands, Raines, supra note 39, at Al, col.
6, in June blew up an army van, killing six soldiers, Blast at Race in Ulster Kills 6 British
Soldiers, N.Y. Times, at A5, col. I, and in August blew apart a busload of British soldiers,
killing eight and wounding 28, Lohr, supra note 43, at Al, col. 1,the deadliest attack on
British forces since the signing of the Hillsborough Treaty. See 8 British Soldiers Die,
supra note 132, at A23, col. 5.
276. Lohr, I.R.A. Blast, supra note 14, at A3, col. 1.
277. See K. BoYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 14.
278. In little more than 24 hours after the Irish Republic in Dublin turned over to
Northern Irish officials Robert Russell, an IRA member convicted of terrorist activities who
had escaped prison in 1983, the IRA detonated 17 bombs and was reportedly responsible
for 23 separate shootings. Lohr, 3 I.R.A. Slain, supra note 14, at A3, col. 2; Aftermath
of I.R.A. Blitz, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1988, at A13, col. 4.
279. Lohr, 3 I.R.A. Slain, supra note 14, at A3, col. 3; Aftermath of I.R.A. Blitz, supra
note 278, at A13, col. 5.
280. See Lohr, 3 I.R.A. Slain, supra note 14, at A3, col. I.
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ians, 28 ' in ten months that witnessed 244 separate bombing incidents.' The intensification of conflict, initiated in 1988, shows no signs
of abating even now, nearly three years later. A wave of merciless IRA
and unionist paramilitary attacks, and controversial security force
counterattacks, swept Northern Ireland, the British mainland and European
continent in 1990, killing at least another 76.23 This bloody wave had
not crested as this Article went to press, as the IRA redoubled its
campaign on the mainland in the dawning days of 1991 while Protestant
paramilitarists accelerated assassinations of Catholic civilians. 2'
The ongoing escalation of violence forced the conservative Irish prime
minister Charles Haughey to concede that the Hillsborough Treaty has
failed to prevent a severe deterioration of the solution in the North, and
to admit that peace in Northern Ireland could only be achieved through a
broader, international approach than the Anglo-Irish accord.285
F. The Likely Scenario of Britain Unilaterally Withdrawing

In 1969, a tribunal commissioned to investigate violence by Northern
Ireland's security forces warned that lawlessness by the government as
well as the paramilitarists would bring dire consequences. "[W]e cannot
stress too strongly," the committee cautioned with deadly accuracy, "the
catastrophe which must befall any society which ceases to respect the rule
of law or takes the law into its own hands."2 16 Britain's failure to heed
281.

Whitney, supra note 14, at AS, col. 6; see supra note 14.

282. Whitney, supra note 14, at AS, col. 6.
283. See, e.g., Violence in Ulster, supra note 12, at 3, col. I (surveying 1990 conflictrelated deaths); Prokesch, supra note 16, at Al, col. 2 (reporting IRA bomb attack on
security force positions, killing 7); Rule, supra note 16, at A3, col. I (reporting IRA
bombing of London Stock Exchange); Prokesch, Blast Rocks Club for Tories in London,
Injuring 7, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1990, at A7, col. 1;Prokesch, supra note 132, at A3,
col. I (reporting British belief that IRA was increasing "attacks outside Ulster"); Wave of
Bomb Attacks Hits Northern Ireland, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1990, at A7, col., 1.
284. In February 1991, the IRA executed a daring daylight mortar strike on the prime
minister and his cabinet, Whitney, I.R.A. Attacks 10 Downing Street with Mortar Rounds,
Hitting Yard, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at Al, col. 3, and launched a widely condemned
bombing campaign against London rail stations. Schmidt, 2 Rail Terminals in Central
London Hit by I.R.A. Bombs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1991, at Al, col. 3. Protestant
gunmen were even more active in early 1991; the UVF shot to death four Catholic men and
seriously wounded a fifth at a pub in a village 50 miles outside of Belfast. Protestant
Group Admits Killing 4, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1991, at A8, col. 4.
285. In a 1988 speech in New York, Haughey acknowledged that, despite the
Hillsborough Agreement, the situation was even worse than in the past. A. GUELKE, supra
note 127, at iv.
286. HUNT REPORT, supra note 77, at 9.
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this warning proved disastrous, for within the decade a United States'
congressional fact-finding mission reported that Belfast of 1978 was
"worse than Saigon in 1968."2"7 Six years later, the former commander
of Britain's Ulster forces predicted that "violence is likely to continue
while the British remain in Northern Ireland."288 The deepening
bloodshed of the past three years confirm the accuracy of this forecast;
significantly, it was the British army, in its role as enforcer of British
policy, that reopened the festering wound.28 9
Simply put, the record supports neither of Lord Caradon's early
claims about the impartiality and ability of the British army vis-A-vis
Northern Ireland. The army cannot serve two masters; it cannot enforce
the political dictates of one party to the conflict and remain faithful to the
peacekeeper's principal obligation of neutrality. 2"
Neither, quite
clearly, can it end the war. 91 This failure of policy and implementation
led the authors of one comprehensive study to conclude that "[tihe [United
Kingdom] is not 'above' the [Northern Irish] problem, it is an integral part
of that problem."'
Equally clear is Britain's inability to end the war with a unilateral
withdrawal. Whatever their shortcomings, the mere presence of the
British troops does prevent fullscale sectarian warfare of the type that
threatened to erupt in 1969.13 Without some buffer between the two
communities,
civil war far bloodier than the present conflict would likely
4
ensue. 29

British withdrawal would no doubt be interpreted by the vast majority
of Protestant paramilitarists as London abandoning them to the evils of the
republic to the south. 295 The sentiments of the majority community
would probably be those expressed by one middle-aged Protestant: "A
287. Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 203.
288. P. O'MAL.EY, supra note 44, at 263.
289.

See supra note 272 and accompanying text.

290. Indeed, this is the exact conclusion to which the United Nations came more than
three decades ago. See infra notes 380 & 812-17 and accompanying text.
291.

See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.

292.

L. O'DowD, B. ROLSTON & M. TOMUNSON, supra note 139, at 208.

293. See Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 114. Recall that in 1969 the
British army was sent into the Northern Irish fray in response to urgent international
appeals from Catholic leaders for protection for the minority community from armed
Protestant mobs, backed by the RUC and other Protestant security and paramilitary forces.
See supra notes 2-10 & 90-93 and accompanying text.
294. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xv. See generally K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P.
HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99.
295. See generally P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 249.
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united Ireland is inevitable, but we'll go down fighting."'
And they
have the means to do so.'
Tens of thousands of armed Protestant
paramilitarists," and another 20,000 armed members of the Ulster
Defense Regiment (UDR), the RUC and the RUC reserve,' would
likely attempt to establish a provisional independent Protestant government
and at the same time invade Catholic neighborhoods in an attempt to be
"finished with this problem once and for all."'
In the war that would ensue, the IRA would be capable initially of
mustering at most 1,000 volunteers to protect Catholic enclaves, 3"'
though recruits would certainly flock to its side as refugees by the
thousands fled to the South.'
Experts expect the fighting would spill
across the border,' and the Republic would be forced to send troops
into the fray. Like the Turkish government during the Cyprus crisis,'
it could not stand by and watch a minority comprised of its "own" be
slaughtered. 5 The conflict would escalate quickly into a civil war on
the scale of Cyprus.'
Vowed one Protestant, "Belfast will look like
Berlin after the war."'
Nor would the battle be contained in Ireland.
There are approximately one million native Irish-and another four million
296. Blance, supra note 12, at 10, col. 4; see also S. BELERAGE, supra note 30, at xv,
211, 235.
297. As of the end of 1985 there were 123,169 licensed firearms in Northern Ireland,
a count that excludes, of course, many. of the weapons in paramilitary hands.
S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xv.
298. Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 71 (estimating armed Protestant
pararnilitarists number between 70,000 and 80,000).
299. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99.
300. Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 114.
301.

K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99.

302. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 248.
303. Id. at 251.
304. From late December 1963 through 1974, when a separate Turkish state was
established in the north of Cyprus, Turkey on many occasions threatened to invade the
island when the Greek Cypriot majority appeared on the verge of full-scale war on the
Turkish minority. Though it did not invade until 1974, Turkey did send in additional men,
guns and supplies when fighting broke out. 2 S. BAILEY, How WARS END: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 1946-1964, at 667-702 (1982).
305. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99; M. O'BRIEN & C.
O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 176.
306. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99. "The casualties in
a week would probably exceed the number of victims of political violence in Northern
Ireland in the past fifteen years and large numbers of people, both Catholic and Protestant,
would also be rendered homeless." M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 176.
307.

Blance, supra note 12, at 10, col. 4.
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first-generation Irish-in Britain who may be driven to take sides,
especially in cities with large Irish concentrations, triggering severe rioting
in England." °s
The IRA scoffs at this grim scenario, maintaining that Protestants
would grudgingly accept the inevitability of unification rather than initiate
an irrational and disastrous civil war..
The experts, however, do not
agree. They point out that in 1912, 1920 and 1972, Protestant paramilitarists mobilized in defense against anticipated attempts at unification,
attracting tens of thousands of volunteers.31 When the British withdrew
in 1920, for example, Protestant police auxiliary units immediately grew
to more than 50,000-strong. 1 1 In the early 1920s and in 1972, substantial numbers of Catholics were murdered by Protestants fearful that
unification was at hand. 31 2 Home rule meant "Rome Rule" to Northern
Protestants then, 313 and unification remains anathema today. 314 The
intensity of this fear is strong incentive to what would appear in some
quarters to constitute "irrational" behavior.
The guarantee of continuing bloodshed whether Britain stays or goes
has left many observers of Irish affairs exceedingly pessimistic. "Many
talk about a solution to Ulster's political problem but few are prepared to
say what the problem is. The reason is simple. The problem is that there
is no solution." 316 This appears true if Britain insists on proceeding
alone-and nothing in the Hillsborough Treaty suggests that the policing
of Northern Ireland will not remain the sole province of the British
authorities.3 17
308. P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 248, 251.
309.

Id. at 247; see K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 38.

310. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 38.
311.

K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 40, at 99.

312. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 38.
313. M. O'BRIEN & C. O'BRIEN, supra note 30, at 131.
314. See, e.g., P. BEW & H. PATTERSON, supra note 79, at 2-3; J. CONROY, supra note
3, at 117-26. 1 refer those who doubt that this view persists to the recent article by Alf
McCreary, supra note 242, at 2, col. I ("Unionist politicians, their worst fears appearing
to have been realized by the Irish Courts [which ruled that the Irish Constitution gives the
Republic claim to all of the island which and which refused to extradite two suspected
terrorists for fears they could be ill-treated], have even more reason to drag their heels and

cry, 'No Surrender'").
315. See O'Malley, Ulster: The Marching Season, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1986,
at 28, 32.
316. R. ROSE, NORTHERN IRELAND: TIME OF CHOICE 139 (1976).
317. While the Hillsborough Treaty lists a number of security issues to be discussed by
the intergovernmental conference, the use of Irish or any other non-British or nonProtestant security force in Northern Ireland is never mentioned. Hillsborough Treaty,
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In the past when Britain was unable alone to solve a deteriorating
situation in a former possession, it turned to the United Nations for
assistance."
It should do so again in regards to Northern Ireland.
Specifically, it should request a United Nations peacekeeping force319 to
replace a withdrawing British army. This would remove the IRA's raison
d'etre. Since the IRA has made withdrawal its immediate goal, and
because a sizable majority of the Catholic population has grown weary of
IRA violence-which it tolerates because it sees no other options, given
Great Britain's mission in the North-it is likely the guerrilla crusade
would lose much of its communal support once the British went
home."' This in turn would reduce the intensity of the Protestants' own
paramilitary movement. Assuming United Nations' troops could provide
a buffer between the two communities in the immediate post-withdrawal
period, when emotions would run exceedingly high, an environment could
be created in which negotiations toward a peaceful resolution of the
conflict finally could begin.
III. UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The concept of a peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland is not
novel,32 but such a strategy has never been thoroughly considered.
supra note 230, art. VII.
318. After the Cyprus Christmas riots in 1963, Britain called for United Nations' aid,
which led to the sending of United Nations peacekeeping troops to the troubled island. See
19 U.N. SCOR (1095th mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1095 (1964); see also 2 S.BAILEY,
supra note 304, at 676; Ehrlich, Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the

Current Crisis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1045 (1966).
319. There are two main categories of United Nations peacekeeping operations: the
observer mission and the peacekeeping force. Personnel in the former are not armed and
are dispatched to oversee truces and cease-fires. In the latter, the soldiers are armed and
are deployed between the hostile powers or communities to prevent an escalation and
facilitate conditions under which a meaningful cease-fire can take hold. I have used the
terms "force" and "mission" interchangeably to refer to United Nations peacekeeping;
unless otherwise specified, all references to United Nations peacekeeping are to the latter
form.
320. See R. ROSE, supra note 316, at 324.

321. The Republic of Ireland pressed unsuccessfully for an United Nations force in 1969
at the time of the August riots. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. Three years
later, Professor Kenneth McCallion suggested that Britain should accept United Nations
involvement in Northern Ireland.

Hearings Before the Subcommittee in Europe of the

House Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 512-13 (1972) (Statement of
Kenneth McCallion, Fordham Univ. School of Law) [hereinafter McCallion Statement].
More recently, Frank Newman, Professor emeritus of international law at the University
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Critics have dismissed the idea in a conclusory fashion, asserting that
Ulster's troubles are not of a sufficiently serious or international nature to
warrant such a force;3 that Britain would never allow one to be
deployed in Northern Ireland; 3' that previous peacekeeping missions
have failed;3 ' and that, even had they succeeded, such an attempt would
produce chaos in Ulster. 3" It is to the first contention, and the clash
between conflicting norms of state sovereignty and the protection of
international peace and human rights, that this Article now turns.
A. Intervention in Internal Conflicts Is Essential if
the United Nations Is to Keep the Peace
When world leaders gathered in San Francisco in April 1945, the
still-unconcluded Second World War had already killed nearly fifty
million. 3'
A considerable proportion of these deaths were civilian
casualties of totalitarian policies that had resulted in violations of human
rights unequaled in human history.327 The League of Nations, an
of California at Berkeley and former associate justice of the Supreme Court of California,
has called for "more exploration of whether in the common interest of all of us, the use of
United Nations troops might be appropriate even in Northern Ireland." Newman, NonMilitary Intervention by Internationaland Regional Organizations in Internal Conflicts, 13
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 341, 342 (1983).
322. At the Security Council meeting on August 20, 1969, called to discuss the
burgeoning crisis in Northern Ireland, the British representative proclaimed that, "Northern
Ireland is and has long been an integral part of the United Kingdom. Events in Northern
Ireland are accordingly an internal matter for the United Kingdom Government.... United
Nations intervention against our wishes would be in violation of Article 2(7) [the domestic
jurisdiction exclusion] of the Charter." 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doe.
S/PV. 1503 (1969); see also C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 143.
323. See C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND 300-01 (1972). Certainly, Britain vigorously
fought against the Republic of Ireland's efforts to have an United Nations peacekeeping
operation instituted in 1969.
See 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d mtg.), at 1, U.N. Doe.
S/PV. 1503 (1969); Questions Relating to Europe, supra note 10, at 181; Note, supra note

9, at 483-92.
324. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 39.
325. See S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 193; P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44, at 250-51.
326. See, e.g., Graefrath, Priority to the Right to Peace: On the 40th Anniversary of
the United Nations, 11 GDR COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. 75, 76 (1985).
327. Of the approximately 10 million Jews in those portions of Europe occupied by Nazi
Germany, about half-between 4.194 million and 5.7 million-were killed between 1939
and mid-1945. W. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 1273-74 (1959).
A recent book reported that civilians constituted 40% of World War II's casualties. J.L.
ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, WAR ZONES: VoicEs FROM THE WORLD'S KILLING GROUNDS
at xxvi (1988).
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international alliance formed in the wake of the First World War to
"abolish[] war from the earth and substitut[e] the saner procedures of
international conciliation,"" utterly failed to prevent the epic tragedy
of World War II. The League of Nations proved ineffective as an
instrument of international peacekeeping because it had no practical basis
for employing force to keep the peace. 3' Not surprisingly, then, the
primary purpose of the United Nations' founders, when they met to create
an organization to succeed the League of Nations, was to cure this defect
by providing for armed collective security when necessary."
This ambitious aspiration was inscribed in the preamble of the United
328. 1 E. LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1982). The language of its
Covenant committed the League:
[T]o promote international co6peration and to achieve international
peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to
war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between
nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international
law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another ....
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT preamble (1919).
329. The League clearly contemplated the use of "collective security" to prevent
international acts of aggression. The covenant explicitly declared that "[a]ny war or threat
of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby
declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that
LEAGUE OF
may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."
NATIONS COVENANT art. X1, para. I. Any member nation who resorted to war in
disregard of the League's Covenant was "deemed to have committed an act of war against
all other Members of the League," id. art. XVI, parm. I, and therefore "[tihe Members of
the League undert[ook] to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial
integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Id. art. X.
Toward this end, the League's council had authority "to recommend to the several
Governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the Members of the League
shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the
league." Id. art. XVI, pam. 2. Member nations, however, were not obligated to commit
armed forces to do so. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 290 n. I (3d ed. 1969).
Consequently, "while nations would readily subscribe to the abstract theory of
'collective security,' they were not usually willing, in concrete situations, to undergo the
strenuous sacrifices involved in going to war to fulfil it." I E. LUARD, supra note 328,
at 5; see also Wise, Veto Cannot Bar U.N. General Assembly from Establishing a
Peacekeeping Force, 51 A.B.A. J. 1169, 1169 (1965). When Japanese, Italian and German
aggression were bringing the world once against to the brink of war, "the League proved
1 E.
incapable of putting into effect the main principle to which it was committed."
LUARD, supra note 328, at 4; see also W. SHIRER, supra note 327, at 398-400.
330. Wise, supra note 329, at 1169; Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective SelfDefense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 783 (1948).
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Nations Charter:
We the peoples of the United Nation determined to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought sorrow to mankind, and
... to unite our strength to maintain international peace
and security, and to ensure . . that armed force shall not
be used, save in the common interest . ..have 3resolved
1
to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. 1
This broad guarantee is reaffirmed throughout the Charter. The first
sentence of the text emphasizes that the United Nations' purpose is "[to]
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace
....
"332
Chapter VII of the Charter authorizes the United Nations to
"take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security." 333 An early
United Nations report which gained unanimous support from the Security
Council members included the proposition that the United Nations should
be able to employ armed forces to enforce the provisions of the Charter. 31 The collective security measures outlined in the Charter, combined with other key sections mandating that all member states refrain
from threatening or using force against any other state335 and prescribing
methods for the pacific settlement of disputes," signaled that the United
Nations in 1940 launched what United States ambassador Philip Jessup
labeled "our war against war."337 Yet as the nature of war evolved
during the subsequent decades, the United Nations' strategy for combatting
the threat of war stagnated, captive of a myopic post-war vision. While
"the most typical, and quite possibly the most dangerous, threats to peace
in our time are not situations in which one state may choose to resort to
aggressive war, but situations of actual or incipient turbulence in which
331.

U.N. CHARTER preamble (second and third emphases added).
332. Id. art. 1, para. 1. Professor Halderman identified this section of the charter as,
"[tihe most fundamental grant of power supporting the creation of [United Nations] armed
forces." Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces, 56 AM. J. INT'L L.

971, 972 (1962).
333.

U.N. CHARTER art. 42.

334. Report of the Military Staff Committee, 2 U.N. SCOR Supp. Special (No. 1)at 1

(1947).
335.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

336. Id. ch. VI.
337. Jessup, International Security Through the United Nations and the Atlantic Pact,
20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 281 (1949).
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rival powers may become so entangled that they cannot ultimately escape
violent confrontation,""33 the United Nations has-with few exceptions,
at least until recently-proven largely ineffective at disarming internal
conflicts and deterring civil wars. Thus the United Nations has become,
like its predecessor, impotent in many situations to eradicate the seeds of
war before they germinate into hostilities between nations. The organization also has failed to halt the widespread deprivation of human rights that
accompanies such "civil" strife, in contravention of its duty under the
Chatter to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.339
This is not to say the United Nations should or could intervene
whenever internal disputes threaten international peace or the abridgement
human rights. The historic concept of state sovereignty retains considerIn addition, even where a state's internal conduct
able vitality.'
exceeds its domestic jurisdiction, other factors-such as the political
realities of the United Nations, including the need to maintain s tates'
confidence in and adherence to a fragile international order," and the
practical constraints presented by certain internal crises, which render
peacekeeping ineffective'-counsel against intervention in many cases.
These latter concerns are considered in Sections V and VI. As the next
few pages demonstrate, while the norm of state sovereignty is still valid,
the post-Charter limitations placed upon that sovereignty are sufficient to
defeat challenges to United Nations peacekeeping intervention where the
internal conflict threatens the peace or significantly imperils human rights.
B. The Traditional,Expansive View of State Sovereignty
At first blush, the evidence against intervention343 in internal affairs
338. Claude, The Peace-Keeping Role of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE 56 (E.B. Tompkins ed. 1972).
339. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1,para. 3; see also Markovid, Implementation of Human
Rights and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 51 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1967) (proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium,
Oslo).
340. See, e.g., Friedman, Human Rights Inteirnationalism: A Tentative Critique, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, 29, 32-33 (J. Nelson & V.
Green eds. 1980); see also Markovid, supra note 339, at 53.
341. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 291; Friedman,
supra note 340, at 36; see also infra note 354 and accompanying text.
342. See infra notes 745-46 & 801-04 and accompanying text.
343. There has been considerable discussion of what constitutes intervention. See, e.g.,
L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 67. This debate is irrelevant
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appears considerable. The prohibition against intervention in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of states is recognized expressly in all
the most
major instruments establishing international organizations,'
important of which is the United Nations Charter, which provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter .... 31
This proscription was reinforced later in the Charter by a limitation
on Security Council competence to matters affecting "international
peace"' and by two subsequent United Nations declarations, the first
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty," 7 the second on
to this Article, for under any definition insertion of a peacekeeping force constitutes
intervention. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11-12, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1966) ("No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State [including] . . . armed
"). I therefore do not consider
intervention and all other forms of interference ....
whether and how less-intrusive United Nations responses, such as diplomatic pressure or
economic sanctions, might alter the balance between state sovereignty and international
obligations to protect the peace and human rights, or might be permissible regardless of
state sovereignty because not rising to the level of intervention. For examinations of these
questions, see J. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 56 (1987); Buergenthal,
Domestic Jurisdiction, Intervention, and Human Rights: The International Law Perspective,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 111, 113, 116-17 (P. Brown & D. MacLean
eds. 1979); see also Leary, When Does the Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights
Constitute Interference into the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State?, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE 15, 20 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978); Wieclair, Human Rights
and Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra, 142-44.
344. See, e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15, para. 8 (principle of nonintervention in matters "within the domestic jurisdiction of thie] party"); Charter of the
Organization of African Unity, May 23, 1963, art. I11, paras. 2-3, 479 U.N.T.S. 39,
reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963); see also Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 111-14.
345. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. An important exception allows the United Nations
to apply "enforcement measures" against a state without regard to whether the matter
creating the need for such measures falls within or without that state's domestic
jurisdiction.
Id. ("the principle [of non-intervention in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction] shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII"). As peacekeeping is not, despite appearances, an "enforcement measure[]," see infra
notes 619-24 and accompanying text, this exception is inapplicable to an analysis of the
propriety of peacekeeping in Northern Ireland.
346. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
347.

G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014
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Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States," s which expounded upon the Charter's
limitation:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of
the State or against its political, economic and cultural
elements, are in violation of international law. 9
These international pronouncements are, in effect, a codification of a
doctrine well-etched into customary international law." Deriving from
the fundamental principles of sovereignty, equality of states and nonintervention, or independence,"'1 this rule of international law was so firmly
established that "[u]ntil the formation of the United Nations, there was
virtually no significant challenge to the proposition that what a government
does to and for its citizens within its own territory is its own business, in
the absence of a specific provision to the contrary. "352 From the
practical policy underlying this principle-restraining the freedom of the
stronger nations to impose their will on the weaker 5 3-fiows a corresponding purpose for applying the principle in the United Nations, where
it was emphasized that allowing some powerful states to use the organization as a surrogate to do what international law prohibited would bring the
United Nations into such disrepute its very existence would be threat(1966).
348. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028

(1970).
349. Id.
350. Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 113.
351. See id.; Friedman, supra note 340, at 32.
352. F. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 775 (1977).
While this may be something of an overstatement-it was not uncommon, after all, for
individual states long before the formation of the United Nations to undertake acts of
humanitarian intervention, see, e.g., L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 137-211 (1973) (listing numerous examples)-it is close
enough to the truth. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 340, at 32-33. Nor has the advent
of the United Nations lessened the appeal of this notion in some corners. Markovid, supra
note 339, at 53; see, e.g., 19 GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 20, 25, U.N. Doe. A/5802 (1964)
(British representative arguing that what South Africa did to the blacks within its borders,
while "evil," was not of international concern); see also Leary, supra note 343, at 15, 18.
353. See Leary, supra note 343, at 18; Markovid, supra note 339, at 53.
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ened."
It was no surprise, then, that the early United Nations' armed

operations in Korea355 and the Middle

EastI5 6

were responses to

undisputed international interstate crises, while the Congo mission, though
an internal operation, was justified by Belgian invasion. 57 Moreover,
in his 1958 report to the General Assembly, 358 then-secretary-general
Dag Hammerskjold enunciated general principles, drawn from the
experiences of the early missions, to govern United Nations peacekeeping
activities.
A basic tenet of such exercises, Hammerskjold wrote,
"precludes the employment of United Nations elements in situations of an
essentially internal nature." 35 9
The weight to be accorded to state sovereignty therefore appears
354. See Friedman, supra note 340, at 36.
355. There has been much debate whether the intervention in Korea in 1950 by the
United States and other countries under both their own flags and that of the United Nations
was actually a measure taken by the United Nations or a war fought by its member states.
Compare Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from
Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209, 254-55 (1951) (the Korean operation was an action of the
United Nations, at least to the extent of requiring members, under article 2(5) of the
Charter, to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the present Charter") with J.STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
234 (1954) (intervention in Korea was not a United Nations operation and thus had the legal
nature of war). The former view, that it was indeed a United Nations operation, is
supported by the United Nations General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, which
affirmed the "determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet
the aggression" of China and North Korea. G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
20A) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/1775/Add.I (1951).
356. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was dispatched in great haste in
1956 to check the invasion into the Suez Canal Zone by France and England after the
Israeli invasion of Egypt. The force succeeded in keeping the Soviet Union and the United
States out of the fray, and within six weeks of its arrival the 6,000-strong UNEF had
completely replaced the British and French troops. Shortly thereafter the Israelis withdrew
in return for UNEF acting as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. For overviews of UNEF,
see W. FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE (1957); Goodrich & Rosner, The United
Nations Emergency Force, II INT'L ORG. 413 (1957).
357. In 1960, a Belgian force invaded the Congo to rescue its nationals when the
government installed after Belgium granted independence to its colony was unable to
maintain order. A United Nations force that grew to 20,000 men, known by the initials
ONUC of its French title, Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, succeeded in allowing
a central government to be restored without interference by the major powers. See BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 21, at 215-19; see also L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS,
supra note 329 at 71-72. For the controversial history of ONUC, see 3 R. HIGGINS,
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967 (1980); BLUE HELMETS, supra, at 215-57.
358.

13 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 65) at 8, U.N. Doe. A/3943 (1958).

359. Id. at 29.
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significant, even dispositive. Domestic jurisdiction has been alternately
described as "exclusive " ' and "absolutist, " " which would seem to
bar United Nations intervention in any internal affair.6 2 Indeed, no
sooner was the organization formed, under a Charter expressly acknowledging international responsibility to prevent war and human rights
violations, than countries guilty of blatant deprivation of residents' rights
began playing the familiar trump card of state sovereignty. The first
objection to United Nations competence to entertain complaints of internal
human rights violations came, not surprisingly, from South Africa, which,
when challenged for its treatment of Indians, declared that international
action would be unlawful: "The Union of South Africa is a sovereign state
and cannot acquiesce in any interference in its domestic concerns by any
other State . . . . "
Among other strong opponents of international
The
intervention were the pre-glasnost Eastern European states. 3"
stated position of the Soviet Union, as enunciated by a senior researcher
at the Institute of State and Law in Moscow, was that "the ensurance and
direct protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the internal
The Russian delegation to the United Nations
affair of every state."'
has argued repeatedly that any criticism of its unenviable human rights
record constitutes illicit interference in its domestic affairs.6 In sum,
the most frequent argument against Security Council competence to even
consider concerns about internal violence has been the contention that the
matter is "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state, 3"7 or
360. Markovid, supra note 339, at 52-53.
361. Friedman, supra note 340, at 37.
362. See Markovi6, supra note 339, at 53.
363. 1 U.N. GAORC.I &C.6 at 81, 110-11, U.N. Doe. A/167 (1946).
364. When, for example, Australia and Bolivia in 1949 requested the General Assembly
to consider "the question of the observance in Bulgaria and Hungary of human rights and
fundamental freedoms," 3 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 at 31-32, 36, U.N. Does. A/820, A/821,
and A/829 (1949), the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, as well as the
countries involved, argued that the matter was within the domestic jurisdiction of the two
states and therefore beyond the reach of the General Assembly. See 3 U.N. GAOR Gen.
C. at 7, 10, 26, U.N. Doe. A/820 (1949).
365. Kartashkin, Human Rights and Peaceful Co-existence, IX-I HUM. RTS. J. 5, 7
(1976).
366. See J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at 64.
367. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 7. Several countries have challenged the Security
Council's competence to intervene in the internal affairs of a state. See, e.g., Czechoslovakia, 3 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr. 1948) at 6, U.N. Doe. S/718 (1948) ("[T]he discussion of
internal matters of Czechoslovakia in the Security Council is contrary to the basic principles
of the Charter, inspired by the aim of protecting the sovereignty and independence of the
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the closely related objection that the situation presented no possible threat
Fortunately, the ancient concept of state
to international peace.2
sovereignty, while still powerful,'
is no longer dispositive.
The
From
domestic jurisdiction doctrine "has yielded . . . much ground ....
absolutist heights it has declined to a relativist status. "31
C. The Shrinking Scope of State Sovereignty

Assertions that the conduct of governments affecting human rights is
a matter solely within states' domestic jurisdiction suggests, as Professor
Buergenthal notes, that under international law human rights are by
definition domestic issues. 3 1 Implicit in this view is the proposition that
because human rights are inherently domestic, they can never be
internationalized 3" and therefore are permanently beyond the reach of
the United Nations. Despite the continued popularity of this argument in
some darker corners of the globe, it finds no support in contemporary
international law. 3

. . ."); Soviet Union, 3 U.N. SCOR (268th mtg.) at 90, (1948) ("All States and
all peoples must themselves settle their own domestic affairs . .. [n]o one is entitled to
intervene in the affairs of other States and attempt to seize control of their internal and
external policy."); 3 U.N. SCOR (303d mtg.) at 33 (1948) ("[It] is our right, in order to
protect Czechoslovakia's sovereignty . . . to prevent . . . the Security Council [] from
interfering in the internal affairs of the ...State ....");South Africa, 19 U.N. SCOR
Supp. (Apr.-June 1964) at 161, U.N. Doc. S/5723 (1964) ("[Tlhe Group of Experts
nominated by the Secretary-General [of the Security Council on developments in South
Africa] consisted of 'persons who . . .have no first-hand knowledge of the situation in

States .

South Africa .

. . .'");

France, 7 U.N. SCOR (574th mtg.) at 6; U.N. Doc. S/PV. 574

(1952) ("The duty of the Security Council . . .obliges it, and obliges each of its members,
to avoid needlessly laying hold of events which are themselves outside its purview . . .");
and Great Britain, 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d mtg.) at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1503 (1969)
("The principle of domestic jurisdiction is fundamental to us all. If it were breached, if
it were eroded, the consequences for the United Nations and for all of us would be most

serious.").
368. See, e.g., 7 U.N. SCOR (619th-624th mtgs.), U.N. Doc. S/3085 (1953)
(challenges relating to discussion on the inclusion of the question of Morocco); see also L.
GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 274.
369. See Friedman, supra note 340, at 32.
370. Id. at 37.
371. Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 113.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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1. Matters of International Concern Are Not Within the "Domestic
Jurisdiction" of the States
The argument that domestic issues were always and forever outside
international jurisdiction was first authoritatively rejected in 1923, when
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Tunis and Morocco
Nationality Decrees " declared that "the question whether a certain
matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially
relative question; it depends upon the development of international
relations.""7 The court went on to give at least a partial definition of
when "the development of international relations" would overrule claims
of domestic jurisdiction. After noting that the question of nationality at
that time constituted a matter of domestic jurisdiction, the court stated that
if a nation entered into international agreements on a particular subject,
such as nationality, this action would remove the subject from the nation's
domestic jurisdiction. 376 This relative, flexible approach, under which
domestic jurisdiction shrank as international law expanded-at least to the
extent a given nation obligates itself to respect the latter by subscribing to
international agreements circumscribing the ability of states to do unto
their own as they saw fit-has been adopted by the Institute of International Law,3" has gained support from leading scholars378 and has
consistently prevailed in the United Nations.379 Its place in customary
374. National Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at
145 (Feb. 7, 1923).

375. Id. at 156.
376. Id.; see Buergenthal, supra 343, at 114; Leary, supra 343, at 19.

377. The Institute declared: "The reserved domain is the domain of State activities
where the State is not bound by international law. The extent of this domain depends on
international law and varies according to its development."
DE DROIT INT'L 150 (1954).

45 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUTE

378. Professor Louis Henkin writes: "[t]hat which is governed by international law or
agreement is ipso facto and by definition not a matter of domestic jurisdiction." Henkin,
Human Rights and 'Domestic Jurisdiction,' Paper Presented to the American Society of
International Law Conference on the Helsinki Accord (June 1977) (Strasbourg, Fr.),
reprinted in Leary, supra 343, at 19; accord Buergenthal, supra 343, at 114.
379. See, e.g., Telegram from the Chairman of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights to the Government of Chile, 56 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 56, U.N.
Doc. E/5464, E/CN.4/I154 (1974) ("The Commission ... has considered with deep

concern numerous reports from a wide variety of sources relating to gross and massive
violations of human rights in Chile in contradiction with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other relevant international instruments ratified by a great number of
countries, including Chile . . . ."); S.C. Res. 311, 27 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1639th
mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1972) (condemning South Africa's failure to abide by
its "obligations under the Charter" and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); 7
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international law cannot be denied." s
2. Determining When Matters Are of International Concern
Whether particular governmental conduct is within the domestic
jurisdiction, and thus insulated from international intervention, depends on
whether the conduct has been internationalized, which occurs if that
government has undertaken international obligations governing the general
area or the specific conduct."' Threatening or breaching the peace and
violating human rights have both been proscribed by international
agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party.

U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 7) (381st mtg.) at 63, U.N. Doc. A/PV.381 (1952) ("[ilt is
possible to know when a matter is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of States; it is when
the matter in question is the subject of an international agreement, whether bilateral or
multilateral.") (statement of Chilean representative); G.A. Res. 385, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 20) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) (condemning "the wilful refusal of the
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania to fulfil their obligations under the
provisions of the Treaties of Peace").
380. It is, of course, possible for the United Nations viewpoint to become part of
customary law over time, at least where, as here, repeatedly endorsed without significant
opposition. See D. FORSYThE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 228 n.6 (1983).
The opposition of a handful of nations-such as South Africa and the former Communist
bloc-cannot be considered a legitimate challenge to the relativist theory of domestic
jurisdiction. And the admonitions of former secretary-general Hammerskjold with respect
to peacekeeping, see supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text, are not to the contrary.
It is clear from their content that Hammerskjold intended not to prohibit intervention by
United Nations forces simply because the conflict was physically internal, or largely so, but
rather he wished to prevent the United Nations troops from being employed to enforce a
political solution sought by one side or the other, or to tip the political balance in any
armed dispute, especially those contained within a given country.
See Nathanson,
Constitutional Crisis at the United Nations: The Price of Peace Keeping, 11, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 249, 295 (1966) [hereinafter Nathanson II]. His guiding principle, then, was simply
that any United Nations peacekeeping force must remain impartial with respect to political
conflicts, be they internal or external. Id. Similarly, the United Nations declarations on
state sovereignty do not preclude intervention sanctioned by international law. See
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, supra note 343, at 12 ("Nothing in this
Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United States relating to the maintenance of international peace and security,
in particular those contained in Chapter VI, VII and VIII."); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, preamble, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971)
(same).
381. See Buergenthal, supra 343, at 114.
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a. Threats to, and Breaches of, the Peace
Both article 1(1)"z and article 39" of the United Nations Charter
identify "threats to the peace, . . . acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace" as sufficient 3to justify the use of collective measures, including
"provisional measures" ' and "land forces," to "maintain international
peace and security." 385 Although there has been considerable debate
over what constitutes a threat to the peace, 3" it is clear that, at the least,
the Charter provides the Security Council with the power to respond to
internal conflicts when it "determines that a threat to international peace
is involved. ""' This interpretation is reinforced by the doctrine of
paramount purpose. It is generally conceded that, "'[t]he Charter is surely
not to be construed like a lease of land or an insurance policy; it is a
constitutional document whose broad phrases were designed to meet
changing circumstances for an undefined future."' 3 8 When a constitu382. This article provides:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
383. This article provides:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id. art. 39.
384. "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation," the Charter allows the
Security Council, "before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures
provided for in Article 39," to "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable." Id. art. 40.
385.

Id. art. 42.

386. See, e.g., L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 295-97.
387. Fox, Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security, 39 AM. POL. Scd. REV. 970,
971 (1945).
388. Gardner, The Development of the Peace-Keeping Capacity of the United Nations,
in 57 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 224, 231 (1963) (quoting Book Review, 60 YALE L.J.
189, 193 (1951) (reviewing H. KELSON, LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950))). See
generally D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 7; Markovid, supra note 339, at 51.
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don is being considered, the so-called "doctrine of paramount purpose"
requires that, where feasible, the document should be interpreted so its
purpose can be implemented. 3s9 The first among the United Nations
four purposes is "[tlo maintain international peace and security." 3

It

is unlikely the United Nations founders considered an absolutist interpretation of state sovereignty to be inconsistent with the organization's
obligation to protect international peace. It is evident that when they
decried "the scourge of war" 39' they were referring to the conditions

Within their experience and knowledge,
created by interstate war.
"war" had described military contests between sovereigns.
The structure of the United Nations quite naturally was predicated on
the belief that threats to international peace and security would continue
to arise out of disputes between nations. 3 But now the line separating
matters of internal concern from those of international importance is
blurry at best. 395

This has understandably become a "major problem"

for the United Nations; international peace is often endangered by actions
other than interstate warfare. Although much armed conflict has occurred
since 1945, very little of it has involved traditional interstate war. 396
Were the Hammerskjold admonitions taken to their literal extreme, and
domestic jurisdiction treated as synonymous with any internal conflict or
affair, then the United Nations "would be condemned to sitting on the
sidelines" in many of the disputes most likely to threaten world peace.397
Were governments permitted to claim immunity from international action
for any activity, however vile or threatening, because contained within its
own borders, then the United Nations would be useless, unable to fulfill
its paramount purpose. 9 To fulfill the Charter, the United Nations
must recognize that internal strife can outgrow domestic jurisdiction and
389. Wise, supra note 329, at 1171. Justice Stone explained the essence of the
paramount purpose doctrine when he wrote, "If we remember that 'it is a Constitution we
are expounding,' we cannot rightly prefer, of the possible meanings of its words, that
which will defeat rather than effectuate the Constitutional purpose." United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
390.

U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. I.

391. Id. preamble.
392. 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 20-21.
393. Id. at 20.
394. Id.
395. Nathanson II, supra note 380, at 308.
396. 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 20.
397. Nathanson II, supra note 380, at 308.
398. See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
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become a matter of international concern within the competency of the
United Nations if it threatens the organization's ability to fulfill its
principal purpose of maintaining international peace. 3"
In practice, the United Nations has recognized that certain internal
problems are properly the subject of international intervention.'° The
deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops on the island of Cyprus
in 1964, for example, signaled that the organization realized it had a duty
to intervene in internal situations if it was to keep international peace."
Indeed, the Cyprus intervention indicates an internal episode need not
actually threaten international peace before peacekeeping is proper, for in
establishing the Cyprus peacekeeping force the Security Council noted
"only the situation was likely to threaten international peace and security. "4

At a minimum, no nation that is a party to the United Nations Charter
can argue that a situation is still within its domestic jurisdiction if the
Security Council determines the situation constitutes at least a live threat
to international peace, regardless of the source of the threat. Rather, "[i]t
is so patently a matter of international concern that the Council is under
an obligation to take the necessary measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security.""

399. Significantly, the word "internal" appears nowhere in the text of the Charter.
Instead, the document only excludes from Security Council consideration those matters
"within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
400. See, e.g., id. art. 14; Sohn, Introduction to Panel III: Regional and Other
International Organizations Response to Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L.
323, 324 (1983 Supp.).
401. Nathanson 11, supra note 380, at 308. For details of the Cyprus situation, see infra
notes 834-35 & 845-70 and accompanying text.
402. S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1102d mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/19Rev. 1 (1964) (emphasis added). The resolution left unstated whether the legal
support for the mission was based on chapter VI or chapter VII of the Charter.
Commentators generally read the Cyprus resolution as invoking chapter VI jurisdiction sub
silentio. See, e.g., D.W. BoWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES 553 (1964); Theodorides,
The United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 765, 766
(1982). If correct, this reveals that the Security Council may, in general, invoke its
authority to promote pacific settlements of dispute in order to send peacekeepers into any
dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. If the Security Council may invoke chapter VI as the
constitutional basis of a peacekeeping operation, the specific provision within that chapter
to which the Council would look is article 36, which allows the Council to, "at any stage
of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature,
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." Id. art. 36, para. 1; see
infra notes 626-32 and accompanying text.
403.

See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 292.
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b. Human Rights Violations
Significant violations by a government of its residents' fundamental
rights present an issue of international concern ' in at least two different
ways: first, by a Security Council determination that the level of rights

deprivation in a particular country is so severe it amounts to a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; and second, by a
determination that a nation's internal conduct is in violation of an
international obligation by which it is bound to abide.
It is unquestionable, being evident from the very text of
the provision itself, that th[e] reservation [against United
Nations' action on matters within domestic jurisdiction] is
immaterial when we are faced with such violations of
human rights as might lead to a threat to or to a breach of
peace and security in the world, or to aggression, according to Art. 39 of the Charter.'
In such a case, "there is no possibility of invoking the reservation of
non-interference in internal affairs."'
It is not mere rhetoric to suggest that human rights violations may
threaten the peace or result in acts of aggression, as evinced by the United
States' "Operation Stanleyville" to rescue some westerners from internal
violence in the Congo, 4° or Israel's raid on the Entebbe airport in
Uganda to free hostages taken during an airline hijacking." ° When
violations reach the level of international condemnation, they have been
used as justification for invasion by another country to achieve some other
political goal, as in the Indian "humanitarian intervention" to stop the
slaughter in East Pakistan,' which served the purpose of dismembering
404. See L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY at xi-xiii (1978); J.NICKEL, supra
note 343, at 10; Buergenthal, supra 343, at 114; Szasz, Role of the United Nations in
Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345, 350 (1983 Supp.).
405. Markovid, supra note 339, at 55.
406. Id.
407. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 28; L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 352, at 195-211.
408. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 28; Knisbacher, The Entebbe Operation:
A Legal Analysis of Israel's Rescue Action, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 57 (1977); Salter,
Commando Coup at Entebbe: Humanitarian Intemention or Barbaric Aggression?, II
INT'L LAW. 331 (1977).
409. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 28; R. LILICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POUICY 524 (1979).
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arch-rival Pakistan, 1" and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia to oust the
murderous Pol Pot regime, which also served to install a Vietnamesebacked government.4 ' Practice confirms the denial of basic rights that
begins as domestic policy toward an indigenous population, clearly
confined within national boundaries, may "easily" cross borders and
become international.I2
While the United Nations has too often failed to respond to such
widespread atrocities, 13 the Security Council has on occasion recognized
that internal deprivation of human rights required the Council to issue a
binding judgment that the violations constituted a threat to the peace.4 14
In 1966, for example, the Council declared the racial policies of the white
government of Rhodesia 4 represented a "threat to the peace" justifying
410. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 28.
411.

See id.

412. McDougal & Reisman, supra note 398, at 13 ("It has been too often confirmed
that practices of indignity and strife which begin as internal in physical manifestation in a
single community quickly and easily spread to other communities and become international.").
413. Among the worst examples are: the United Nations' failure to respond to the year
of terror in Indonesia, 1965, in which not less than 300,000 persons of Chinese origin were
murdered, see Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 219, 224 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974); Cambodia, where the horrors of the
Khmer Rouge's reign of terror from 1975-79 did not even provoke so much as a finding
of human rights violations by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, see R.
LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 386-87; and Bangladesh, where "an orgy of
terror" by the Pakistani army in March 1971 killed thousands of civilians in one 48-hour
period Id. at 486-87. Regarding this last situation, the International Commission of Jurists
later reported that "[iut is difficult to resist the conclusion that if the Security Council had
met before [India's invasion in] December 1971 to consider the situation they would have
determined that it constituted a threat to the peace." INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE
EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN, 1971, at 79 (1972).
414. It is of course for the Security Council, the General Assembly, or whichever
United Nations committee is hearing the complaint, and not the government at issue, to
determine whether the circumstances represent a threat to the peace or any oiher
international concern, thus conveying competence over the matter upon the United Nations.
L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 285; see 7 U.N. GAOR
(Agenda Item 7) at 62, U.N. Doc. A/PV.381 (1952) ("We have no text defining what is
meant by a question falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of States, but of one thing
I am convinced: the State concerned cannot itself by the sole judge of whether a given
situation is within its exclusive jurisdiction, for that would enable any State to evade the
fulfillment of its international obligations.") (statement of Chilean representative). The
United Nations' discretion in making this determination is "very broad." McDougal and
Reisman, supra note 398, at 6; see also L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra,
at 68.
415. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 296, 297 n.24;
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selective but mandatory economic sanctions against that country," 6 the
first such action ever undertaken by the Security Council.417 As the
situation in Rhodesia deteriorated, this determination was reiterated, and
1973419 and again in 1976. 420
fresh sanctions imposed, in 1968,'
In a strongly worded 1977 resolution, the Security Council pronounced the
"policies and acts" by the Republic of South Africa to protect its apartheid
system, including violence against its own black residents, to be "fraught
with danger to international peace and security," and imposed a mandatory
arms embargo against the country binding on every United Nations
member state. 421 Seventeen years earlier, before widespread violence
had taken hold, the Council had determined that the very existence of
South Africa's highly discriminatory racial policies, created "international
friction, and if continued, might endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security. " 41 Practice and policy thus recognize that once
human rights violations create a threat to the peace of international
proportions they can no longer be considered within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state.' 2
Even absent such a finding, the large number of international
conventions, which together establish a vast network of human rights
obligations, leave any nation that has accepted some or all of these
obligations4 ' powerless to hide systematic deprivation of human rights
see also R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 392.
416. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dee. (1340th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1966).
417. R. LI..LICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 401.

418. S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1428th mtg.) at 5, U.N.
S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968).
419. S.C. Res. 333, 28 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1716th mtg.) at 14, U.N.
S/INF/29 (1973).
420. S.C. Res. 388, 31 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1907th mtg.) at 6, U.N.
S/INF/32 (1976).
421. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N.
S/INF/33 (1977).
422. S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1960) at 1, U.N.
S/INF/15/Rev. 1 (1960).
423. See MeDougal and Reisman, supra note 398, at 13.
424. As Professor Bilder explains:
In determining whether a treaty is a potential source of obligation with
respect to a situation involving a particular country, it is of course
important to ascertain: (1) whether the treaty is in force, since
multilateral treaties typically do not take effect until a certain number
of nations have deposited ratification; (2) whether the nation in
question has ratified the treaty, since signature alone in the absence of

Doe.
Doe.
Doe.
Doc.
Doc.
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from international scrutiny and intervention behind a cloak of "domestic
jurisdiction."'
International documents recognize that protection of human rights in
all nations "is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
Chief among these is the United Nations Charter itself,
world." 4"
which elevates protection of human rights to a position of high priority,
listing among its four "Purposes and Principles" the "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." 427
Equally significant, in article 55, the Charter expressly recognizes that
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"
is "necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations."428
This provision indicates strongly that any failure of a country to observe
and respect such rights creates a threat to "peaceful and friendly relations
among nations," or, in other words, a threat to international peace.
Moreover, article 56 requires all members "to take joint and separate
action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55."9
It would not be stretching the doctrine of paramount purpose" to
recognize it would utterly frustrate the primary policies underlying this
subsequent ratification does not normally legally bind a nation to the
obligations of a multilateral treaty and (3) whether the nation in
question has ratified the treaty with any reservations which expressly
modify its treaty obligations.
Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 343, at i, 7. Great Britain is bound, of
course, by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
passed by the General Assembly, as well as by its ratification of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 33, and the European Convention, supra note 34, among others. For
other instruments involving the protection of human rights to which Great Britain is a
ratifying party, see COMM. ON HUM. RTs., THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES 71-72 (1976).
425. "In practice, the most important source of internationalhuman rights law . . . is
international treaties, which clearly and directly create obligations for the states parties."
Bilder, supra note 424, at 7 (emphasis in original); see MeDougal and Reisman, supra note
398, at 13.
426. Universal Declaration, supra note 32, at 71.
427. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
428. Id. art. 55.
429. Id. art. 56. For discussions of other charter provisions pertinent to human rights,
see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 352, at 505-06; Markovid, supra note 339,
at 51.
430. See supra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
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"global constitution" for member states to treat violations of human rights
as outside the United Nations' purview.43 While the architects of the
United Nations Charter saw violations of human rights as a concern
arising largely out of interstate conflict,432 such conflicts between
belligerent states no longer constitute the principal enemy of human rights,
an ignominy now bestowed on 433government and government-orchestrated
counter-insurgency campaigns.
431. See McDougal & Reisman, Response to Comment by Charles Marshall, 3 INT'L
LAW. 438, 444 (1969) ("Any other interpretation would be suicidally destructive of the
explicit purposes for which the United Nations was established.").
432. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 4. The first multilateral treaty on human
rights-the Geneva Convention of 1864-was an attempt by major states to mitigate the
type of "appalling suffering" witnessed on the battlefield of Solferino in 1859, Draper,
Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 326, 326-27 (1972), and the oldest
branch of human rights law therefore is that devoted to protecting against violation in
interstate armed conflict. See D. FORSYTHE, supra, at 4. In addition, the founders had just
lived through the atrocities of World War II, and to the extent the various delegates were
determined to protect human rights, they were determined to do so by preventing a repeat
of Nazi-style aggression and oppression. Id. at 8; see also L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO &
A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 371-72; J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at 1. Finally, the
argument was frequently advanced in the early years of the United Nations that a broad
grant of domestic jurisdiction, and a correspondingly narrow international competence to
interfere in internal affairs, was necessary, since the converse would only lead to
intervention, thus generating tension and likely resulting in breaches of the peace and
interstate hostilities. See Friedman, supra note 340, at 36.
433. Insecure or threatened governments often attempt to impose order or preserve
power by abusing their own. See J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at xi. Thousands of civilians
are starved to death to advance political or military objectives. See, e.g., The Famine
Effects on African Refugees: Hearings on Oversight on the Issue of Emergency Food Aid
and Famine Relief to Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., IstSess. 3, 10, 22,
38 (1985); Ethiopia: Alive Another Year, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1988, at 50 (civil war
contributed greatly to the 1984-85 famine in which at least 500,000 died); Perlez, A Further
Lesson on the Politics of Swollen Bellies, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at A5, col. 2 ("Both
the Government and the rebel group use food as a weapon" in the Sudan, where at least
8,000 died between June and September 1988 because the government barred food
deliveries to areas believed sympathetic to rebels); Perlez, In Town 'Liberated' by Sudan
Rebels, Refugees Wither as Food Trickles In, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
Prisoners are maltreated and tortured and "ItIhe lives of thousands of citizens [are] taken
by the state," AMNESTY INT'L 1985, supra note 159, at 1, many of these "the victims of
deliberate political killings in various countries: unarmed civilians [are] killed in large
numbers by the army and the police, by other security forces or by 'death squads'
sanctioned by the authorities." Id. While rebel troops are often far from innocent, id. at
3; see, e.g., J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 173-77 (1988) (in Sri
Lanka the civilian population is "under siege" from Tamil separatists and the government's
counter-insurgency campaign); NORWEGIAN HUM. RTS. PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1986, at 266 (1986) (in Nicaragua, "there are many examples of
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The United Nations has remained ineffective in preventing the
repression practiced by member nations"' because of an unhealthy
unwillingness to override states' assertions of sovereign control over
internal affairs.4 35 Yet if, in fact, international organizations "do not
have the authority or power to enforce rights" in such situations," as
one scholar claims, then there is "no alternative to assigning sovereign
states the main responsibility for upholding the rights of their residents." 37 This is an unappealing alternative, for it is those governments
that most flagrantly mistreat their own citizens who still take refuge in
"the ancient diplomatic canon" of state sovereignty. 438 As the American
Association for the International Commission of Jurists warned, "those
with the most dubious records are often the most vehement in their
insistence on the need for greater respect for sovereign rights. 4 39 For
the contra's conscious use of terror to reach their goals," including documented episodes
where "contra groups killed, tortured and raped civilians"); see also supra notes 566-72
and accompanying text (detailing IRA violations of human rights in Northern Ireland),
Amnesty International and other human rights organizations view governmental abuses as
the primary problem:
The taking of human life by the state must be recognized as an urgent
and imperative issue for the international community. The exercise of
state power to end a citizen's life strikes at the heart of two of the most
fundamental of all human rights: the right of life and the right not to
be cruelly treated. International public opinion should no longer
tolerate the use by governments of executions and assassinations,
whether to address political difficulties or problems of law and order.
Whatever the circumstances, torture and political killings by governments can never be justified.
AMNESTY INT'L 1985, supra, at 1; see also J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra, at xxi
("Today, civilians are once again war's primary victims, but their killers are rarely
invaders; usually, they are the soldiers of their own governments, or the guerrillas of the
local 'national liberation movement. ").
434. Foreword, Symposium on Human Rights, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 258

(1979).
435. See L. HENKIN, supra note 404, at 110-12; Markovid, supra note 339, at 53.
436. J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at 42. Nickel says this is so because "national
governments are unlikely to give them this authority." Id.
437. Id.; see also Bilder, supra note 424, at 9.
438. AM. A. FOR THE INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POuCY 51 (1984).
439. Id. "A historical reference on how the world community reacted not too long ago
to state-inflicted tyranny can be a reminder of the potential consequences of international
indifference and passivity." Id. In 1938 the western powers refused to act in the face of
the German Reich's anti-semitic campaign, the French going so far as to send the German
Foreign Ministry a message stressing that "[nione of the states would dispute the absolute
right of the German government to dictate with regard to its citizens such measures as are
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example, long before embracing its current "reformist" attitude, South
Africa attempted to fend off international intervention by insisting it has
Were the rhetoric
made "striking advance . .. in human welfare."'
of countries such as South Africa-where it is no exaggeration to say that
violations of human rights were until very recently, and to a lesser degree
continue to be, national policy"-the only protection against deprivation
of human rights available to their residents, then the Charter's promise of
protection for human rights would be without value."' Fortunately, it
is widely accepted by scholars" 3 and the United Nations itself' that
member states, bound by the Charter, cannot claim human rights are
matters within their exclusive domestic jurisdiction, at least not where a
within its own sovereign powers." Id. Thus assured, the Gestapo newspaper Das
Schwarze Korps just four months later proclaimed, "Because, after all, no power on earth
can hinder us, we will now bring the Jewish question to its totalitarian solution. . . . The
result will be the actual and definite end of Jews in Germany and their complete
extermination." Id. As noted, it was exactly this international faindance in the face of the
genocidal pogroms of Nazi Germany that prompted the formation of the United Nations,
and it was the organization's mission to prevent similar quiescence in the future. See supra
notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
440. 1 U.N. GAOR C.1 & C.6 at 81, 111, U.N. Doe. A/167 (1946); see L. SOHN &
T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 352, at 569.
441. L. HENKIN, supra note 404, at 109.
442. "The Charter would become merely a scrap of paper if it was suggested that any
signatory could, with impunity, violate its terms without the United Nations having any
right to take action." I U.N. GAOR C.A & C.6 at 10, U.N. Doe. A/167 (1946).
443. See, e.g., AM. A. FOR THE INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, supra note 438, at 51; L.
HENIUN, supra note 404, at 94; Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 115; Markovid, supra note
339, at 55.
444. As early as 1949, the General Assembly recognized "that in the preamble to the
Charter of the United Nations all the signatory countries resolved 'to re-affirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women"' and "that Article 1(3) of the Charter binds all Members to
encourage 'respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."' G.A. Res. 285, 3 U.N. GAOR Pt. II,
at 34-35, U.N. Doe. A/900 (1949) (declaring Soviet measures to prevent wives of foreign
nationals from leaving the country "not in conformity with the Charter"); see also G.A.
Res. 3219, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 83, U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974); U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/1160, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/354, U.N. Doe. A/9767 Annex 1I(1974) (urging Chile to
comply with human rights documents it had signed and ratified); S.C. Res. 301, 26 U.N.
SCOR (1598th mtg.) at 7,U.N. Doe. S/INF/27 (1971) (declaring South Africa's presence
in Namibia a breach of its international obligations); G.A. Res. 2079, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965) (calling on Tibet to abide by its obligations
created by the human rights provisions in the Charter); G.A. Res. 385, 5 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 20) at 16, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950) (condemning refusal of Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania to fulfill obligations under international agreement regarding human rights).
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government's acts or policies evoke "a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights. ""'
Although the Charter does not define what rights are considered
"human,"'
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 7 adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 without dissent, is
considered an authoritative definition of Article 55.s Among other
significant rights declared to be "universal" and "protected by the rule of
law" are "the right to life, liberty and the security of person"; 449
freedom from "torture or . . .cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"; 4' ° equal protection of the law; 451 freedom from "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" ;452 and the right to a fair trial. 453
More importantly, although the Declaration was originally non-binding on
member states, it has assumed the status of mandatory customary
international law, 4' having been reaffirmed without opposition countless
times within the United Nations,"' incorporated into several national
445. See, e.g., E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8, U.N. Doe.
E/4832/Add. 1 (1970). This phrase has become a term of art within the United Nations.
Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 115.
446.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c.

447.

G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).

448.
n.23.

See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 9; Buergenthal, supra note 343, at 115 &

449. Universal Declaration, supra note 32, art. 3.
450. Id. art. 5.
451.

Id. art. 7.

452. Id. art. 9.
453. Id. art. 11.
454. See Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-27, 1968,
reprinted in 9 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 94, 95 (1968) ("The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order,
and has over the years become a part of customary international law."); see also D.
FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 9; L. HENKIN, supra note 404, at 96-97 n.*; R. LILUCH &
F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 65; Bilder, supra note 424, at 8; Buergenthal, supra note
343, at 115; Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17
WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976); Markovid, supra note 339, at 57.
455. Two of the most important statements in this regard were issued by the General
Assembly. See United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 35, U.N. Doe. A/5515
(1963) (every state "shall fully and faithfully observe the provisions of ... the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights") (adopted unanimously); Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960) (affirming states duty to "observe faithfully and
strictly" the provisions of both the Charter and the Universal Declaration) (also adopted
unanimously); see also Report of the Commission on Human Rights in the Twenty-Seventh
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constitutions, 45 and in practice invoked as if legally binding. 457
There are a number of other international, multilateral agreements on
human rights, 45 the most important of which are the International
Covenants, one on Civil and Political Rights459 and the other on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ' which reiterate and expand the
rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration and which became legally
binding on ratifying states in 1976.1'1 Among the many regional human

rights accords, the most effective is the European Convention on Human
Rights and its protocols, ' 2 which created a European Commission 3
Session, 50 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 4) at 5-52, U.N. Doc. E/4949, E/CN.4/1068 (1971)
(action against racism, racial discrimination, apartheid, nazism, and racial intolerance
required by the Declaration); Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial
Situation in the Union of South Africa, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53-119, U.N.
Doc. A/2505 (1953) (treating Declaration's protections for human rights as equally binding
as the United Nations Charter's more general protections); 3 U.N. GAOR Gen. C., at 3132 U.N. Doe. A/821 (1949) ("[T]he Declaration . . .[has] juridical import and force and
should be so interpreted .. .[t]he Declaration continued and, in a way, supplemented, the
Charter, and could not therefore be considered a mere resolution. ") (statement of Lebanon).
456. See, e.g., CAMEROON CONST. tit. 1,art. 1;RWANDA CONST. pt. II, § 1,art. 13.
At least 17 African states incorporated the Universal Declaration into their constitutions.
E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 51 (1964).
457. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3219, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 83, U.N. Doe.
A/9631 (1974) (urging "the Chilean authorities to respect fully the principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights"); S.C. Res. 246, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec.
(1387th mtg.), at 2, U.N. Doe. S/INF/23/Rev. I (1968) (reaffirming that "The continued
detention and trial and subsequent sentencing of the South West Africans constitute[s] an
illegal act and a flagrant violation of ... the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and
censuring South Africa for "its flagrant defiance . . . of the authority of the United
Nations"); G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 2-3, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966) (considering South Africa's "obligations" under, inter alia, the Universal
Declaration); 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2), at 20-43, U.N. Doc. A/5802 (1964) (urgently
requesting South Africa "to cease forthwith its continued imposition of discriminatory and
repressive measures . . .which are in violation of its obligations as a Member of the
United Nations and of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights") (draft
resolution submitted by Norway, U.N. Doc. S/5489).
458. For a comprehensive list and texts, see generally, L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL,
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).

459. International Covenant, supra note 33.
460. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
461. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force January
3, 1976, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1976.
462. See generally European Convention, supra note 34.
463. Id. §§ II-Ill.
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and Court on Human Rights ' to safeguard most, but not all, of the
rights guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. As noted above,' it has been accepted by, and is therefore
binding upon, the United Kingdom.
Accordingly, "[aIll the signatories of the United Nations Charter have
pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus,
no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its
citizens is solely its own business."'
The several international accords
on human rights carry considerable normative impact, as confirmed by
United Nations practice, which treats their provisions as legally binding.'
Consistent and systematic governmental breaches of this duty to
safeguard human rights justify "joint" action by United Nations member
states.'
To say that world peace and human rights are matters of international
concern, protected by mandatory international law, does not end the
debate, however. Just as the concepts of state sovereignty and "domestic
jurisdiction" do not automatically bar international intervention, neither do
threats to the peace or violations of basic rights automatically require
intervention. Before any institutional United Nations' effort can be
undertaken to end the bloodshed in the North of Ireland, the Security
Council, or, the General Assembly in limited circumstances, must
determine that the crisis in Ulster warrants international action. The
United Nations, in other contexts, has been reluctant to take action
because of its reticence to intrude in the allegedly internal affairs of a
sovereign state, even if the issue involved appears to be of international
dimensions, such as an apparent threat to or breach of the peace' or
gross violations of fundamental human rights. 4" Nevertheless, there are
strong precedential and policy arguments favoring United Nations'
intervention in Northern Ireland.

464. Id. §§ II, IV.
465.

See supra note 424 and accompanying text.

466. Address by Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance Before the University of
Georgia Law School, U.S. Dep't of Public Affairs Office of Media Services, Press Release
No. 194 (April 30, 1977) at 2 (quoting President Carter's March 1977 speech before the
United Nations) [hereinafter Vance Address].
467. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 404, quoied in Leary, supra note 343, at 20.
468. At the very least, such violations of the Charter, and, by extension, of any binding
resolutions or declarations approved under the Charter, may be the subject of joint action.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
469. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 294.
470. See L. HENKIN, supra note 404, at 110; R. LIWLCH & F. NEWMAN, supra note
409, at 487.

1990]

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL

IV. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT

As discussed in section III, there are at least two theoretical bases
upon which the United Nations could rely to justify intervention in the war
of Northern Ireland, despite its "civil" nature. Theory and reality,
however, are often at odds in the United Nations, and were the Ulster
crisis placed on the Security Council's agenda, 71 Great Britain would
471. The dispute could be put to the General Assembly initially, but under the Charter,
the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security," U.N. CHARTER, art. 24, par. I, so that the Assembly is likely to send the
issue to the Security Council. Once the issue is before the Council, the Assembly can take
no action unless the Council sends the dispute back to the full Assembly. See id. art. 12,
par. 1. Only the Council can order that peacekccping action be taken; the Assembly
merely can recommend such action. See id. arts. 10, 13, 39; see also D. ZIEGLER, WAR,
PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 310-1 1 (3d ed. 1984). The dispute can be brought
before the Council by any of the following: the General Assembly, U.N. CHARTER arts.
11-12; the secretary-general, id. art. 99, and any country that is a current member of the
United Nations, whether or not a current member of the Council, id. art. 35, para. 1.
Thus, Britain would not have to initiate the debate; either Ireland or the United States could
do so. Scholars have suggested that in the case of armed civil conflict, a request by the
rebels-in this case, the IRA-could be sufficient to trigger United Nations consideration
of a peacekeeping operation in that country, see, e.g., Sohn, The Role of the United
Nations in Civil Wars, 57 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 208, 215 (1963), although in practice
the participation of "other persons"-that is, non-states-can only occur by invitation from
the Council. The Charter makes no provision for participation of non-states, but Security
Council Procedure Rule 39 permits the Council to invite "other persons" whom it considers
competent to supply it with information or to give other assistance, see S. BAILEY, THE
PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 124, 131 (1988), and persons not representing a
recognized state who wish to address the Council may request such an invitation, as have,
for example, representatives of such groups as the Jewish Agency for Palestine before the
creation of the State of Israel, id. at 131, the Turkish community on Cyprus, id., and
various liberation movements. Id. Beginning in 1971, liberation movements were fairly
freely invited to participate in debates on issues with which they were directly concerned.
Id. at 139. Examples include Yassar Arafat, who was invited to address the General
Assembly on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1974 and did so a month
later, id. at 131 & n.152, and again in 1988 despite a negative vote by the United States,
see 43 U.N. SCOR (2780th-2784th mtgs.) at 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/INF/44 (.1988), as well as
several leaders of the anti-apartheid movement, who have been invited to speak to the
Security Council. S. BAILEY, supra, at 139. While the decision whether to extend an
invitation to address the Council is procedural, and therefore beyond the reach of a
superpower veto, see 5 U.N. SCOR (507th mtg.) at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.507 (1950)
(invitation to representative of China to attend Council meeting extended under article 32
of the Charter, one of four articles on Council procedure); 1 U.N. SCOR (50th mtg.) at
4, (1946) (same regarding invitation to Canada); S. BAILEY, supra, at 199 (invitation to
participate clearly procedural), the United States possesses an extra-organizational de facto
veto-it can prevent the invited party from appearing by denying him or her a visa to enter
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likely repeat its objection of 1969, when it argued that the conflict is a
matter of domestic concern and therefore not a proper target of international peacekeeping. 7
The point at which the importance of maintaining peace or protecting
human rights outweighs the countervailing norm of nonintervention in
what would otherwise be "domestic" affairs 4" has never been precisely
identified.474 Critics of the United Nations' ability or willingness to
designate Ulster a matter of international concern, and to take action
predicated upon that conclusion, have generally ignored the Security
Council's historic belief that it has an extremely broad mandate under the
Charter. 4" While precedents are hardly binding on a political body such
the country, as was the case in 1988 when it refused to allow Arafat to come to New York.

See Lewis, U.N. Ends Session in Geneva Passing Mideast 2Resolutions, N.Y. Times, Dec.
16, 1988, at A7, col. 1. In such a case, the only recourse open to the Council or Assembly
is to move the location of the meeting outside the United States, pursuant to articles 28(3)
and 20, respectively, as the Assembly did to circumvent the United States action against
Arafat. See Lewis, supra, at A7, col. 1. Whenever Council action is desired, the item
must be placed on the Council's provisional agenda; L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A.
SIMONS, supra note 329, at 272, and the agenda adopted by the Council. Id. at 273. In
adopting its agenda, the Council decides whether it will hear the disputes included therein.
Council practice has clearly defined this decision as a "procedural" one, S. BAILEY, supra,
at 199, and therefore a request to hear debate on an issue requires only the affirmative vote
of any nine of the 15 Security Council member states to be approved, U.N. CHARTER art.
27, para. 2, and cannot be single-handedly defeated by a permanent member veto. Id.
472. Britain failed to block Ireland's request for an urgent meeting in August 1969 to
consider the situation in Northern Ireland, despite arguing the strife was a matter of
domestic jurisdiction and thus beyond the Council's competence. 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d
mtg.) at 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1503 (1969); see S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 129-30;
Note, supra note 9, at 483-85; supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. As London's
failure indicates, it is extremely difficult for a Council member to muster the seven votes
needed to bar Council consideration of an issue sought by any United Nations member
state. It is not impossible, however; in the 1950s, for example, France persuaded the
Council, for the same reason raised by Britain, to deny requests from member states to
consider issues regarding French colonies in Northern Africa. See 7 U.N. SCOR (547th
mtg.) at 5-12, U.N. Doe. S/PV.574 (1952). It is nonetheless a rarely violated rule that the
Council will not remove an item from its agenda when challenged under the "domestic
jurisdiction" clause, but will hear debate and then decide whether the clause bars any action
the Council might contemplate taking. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS,
supra note 329, at 273-74 (discussing cases).
473. Cf. Hehir, The Ethics of Intervention: Two Normative Traditions, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 343, at 121, 132 (discussing conflicting
norms).
474. See J. TOMxO, THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES AND THE UNO 113

(1967).
475. The Charter delegates competence to the Council in rather sweeping terms: it has
the power to investigate, and by implication to discuss, "any dispute, or any situation which
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as the United Nations, 76 to the extent practice in the United Nations
takes on the sheen of customary international law"71 it cannot be ignored. At the very least, past practice is illustrative of how the Council
would treat a request for intervention in Northern Ireland. Significantly,
then, past practice reveals the persuasiveness of the state sovereignty
defense declines as the gravity of the situation increases47 and disappears altogether when the Council determines a threat to international
peace.
A. Why the Irish Conflict Constitutes a
"Threat to the Peace"
The importance of a Security Council determination that the Irish
conflict represents a threat to the peace cannot be overstated. Unlike a
finding of a "consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights," a
threat to the peace is not a matter of concurrent jurisdiction shared by
individual states and the international community. There is in the
Charter's treatment of threats to the peace no analog to article 56, which
permits "joint and separate action" by member states to promote human
rights. 79 Rather, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security," 4" and plenary
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," U.N. CHARTER, art. 34, and
the only meaningful limitations on this power are the domestic jurisdiction in article 2(7)
and the provision that in discharging its duties the Council "shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." Id. art. 24, para. 2. In practice, these
have proven limitations without much teeth; studies of Council voting patterns reveal that
members of the Council have "taken a broad view of the kinds of questions with which the
Council may concern itself," L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329,
at 207, and "have considered that any effort by the Council to resolve a dispute or ease a
situation is a legitimate exercise of its powers." Id. at 268-69. Despite appearances to the
contrary, this broad usurpation of power is not inconsistent with the Council's historic
reluctance to interfere in "domestic" affairs. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying
text. Rather, it reveals the political nature of Council decisionmaking. Once convinced
of the political correctness of addressing a particular, purportedly "domestic" situation,
Council members will go to great lengths to prevail, as illustrated by Council action on
Cyprus, the Congo, Rhodesia and South Africa.
476. See, e.g., 2 U.N. SCOR (160th mtg.) at 1377-78 (1947) (Soviet representative
arguing that the Council must make its determinations on a ase-by-case basis and cannot
bind itself in advance to consider some acts to be threats to the peace, or breaches of the
peace, or acts of aggression); see also 2 U.N. SCOR (159th mtg.) at 1353 (1947).
477. See supra note 380.
478.

L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 292-93.

479. U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (emphasis added); see id. art. 55, para c.
480. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
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power to determine whether a threat to the peace exists. 4"' Any situation that in the Council's opinion threatens the peace is so palpably a
matter of international concern that it constitutes a de facto exception to
the "domestic jurisdiction" clause of article 2(7),"' and empowers the
Council to take whatever measures it deems necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security,483 including peacekeeping.
Although there has been some debate over whether a situation must
constitute a "threat to the peace," a "threat to international peace," or
merely appear "likely to endanger" international peace, 4 in practice it
seems to have mattered little.485 Broadly speaking, there are at least
three ways in which internal strife can acquire Council recognition as a
threat to international peace: if it induces armed intervention by an
another nation, thus taking on the characteristics of an interstate war; if,
in the absence of outside aggression, it constitutes a prolonged civil war;
and if, though not a full-fledged civil war, it nonetheless possesses certain
features likely to create international friction, including significant
violation of human rights.
1. Armed Intervention
It is beyond dispute that the introduction of outside troops into an
existing internal conflict without the consent of the invaded government
On at least two
represents a serious threat to international peace. 4
481. See id. arts. 34, 37, 39. This does not mean the General Assembly has no role
to play. The Charter allows the Assembly to discuss, to consider, to call the Council's
attention to, and to recommend action on, a threat to the peace, id. arts. 11, 14, as long
as the Council has ceased to deal with the matter. Id. art. 12, para. 1. The Uniting for
Peace Resolution allows the Assembly to recommend collective measures in response to
threats to the peace, if the Council is paralyzed by superpower veto and transfers the matter
to the Assembly. See G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/ 1175 (1950); see infra notes 644-51 and accompanying text.
482. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 292.
483. U.N. CHARTER arts. 37, 39. Consequently, article 2(7) has had little practical
effect. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 292-93.
484. In one Council debate, for example, the United States argued that because article
39 did not specify that the threat must be to "international" peace, wholly internal
disturbances and rebellions could satisfy the requirement of a "threat to the peace," but the
United Kingdom argued to be cognizable by the Council any threats to the peace must be
threats to international peace. 3(2) U.N. SCOR (296th mtg.) at 2, 7 (1948).
485. See S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 240-44; see also L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO &
A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 296-97.
486. In fact, it would seem to present the more aggravated offense of breach of the
peace, see 2(2) U.N. SCOR (173d mtg.) at 1692 (1947) ("If military operations by one
country against another cannot be called a breach of international peace, then I am at a loss
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occasions-the Belgian invasion of the Congo to "restore law and order
and to protect Belgian nationals" and the Israeli invasion of southern
Lebanon following the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war-the Security Council
not only declared a threat to the peace,"" but also found the circumstances so threatening as to require physical United Nations intervention,
' and with
with a considerable peacekeeping force in the first instance 88
48
9
an interim force in the second.
It is less clear whether the unilateral introduction of British troops in
1969, without the approval of the Protestant government at Stormont, 4"
and their continuous twenty-one-year presence in the province, 9'
represent acts of outside aggression and therefore by definition a threat to
international peace. While the so-called Irish conflict is more accurately
defined as the Anglo-Irish conflict-since the principal combatants are the
IRA and the British security forces-London could, if it decides to dispute
United Nations jurisdiction or block Security Council action, argue that it
cannot be considered an "outside" intervenor in any affair within "the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland," as it is officially
described, for example, in the United Nations Charter. 4' This is
to know what could be called a breach of the peace.") (statement of Soviet Union), or even
represents an act of aggression, see G.A. Res. 498, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20A) at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/1775/Add. 1 (1951) (Chinese intervention "aggression in Korea"). The
Council, however, has been extremely reluctant to make either finding, in large part
because the repercussions are more serious than a finding of a threat to the peace. See L.
GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 297-300.
487. See S.C. Res. 145, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 19-20, U.N. Doe.
S/4389/Add.1-6 (1960) (Congo); S.C. Res. 425, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2047th
mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978) (Lebanon); see also G.A. Res. 1600, 15 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 17-18, U.N. Doe. A/4684/Add.l (1961) (Congo).
488. Created to provide the Congolese government with military assistance, see S.C.
Res. 143, 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev.1
(1960), Opiration des Nationas Unies au Congo (ONUC) at its peak would number nearly
20,000, the largest in United Nations history. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 215. For
more on ONUC, see supra note 357 and accompanying text; infra notes 833-34 and
accompanying text.
489. The United Nations interim force in Lebanon was established by S.C. Res. 425,
33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2074th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doe. S/INF/34 (1978) and
authorized to employ up to 7,000 soldiers. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 336.
490. See supra notes 2-11 & 90-93 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes I & 90-120 and accompanying text.
492. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 7. This is, of course, the exact argument Britain
raised in 1969 in its attempt to defeat Ireland's proposal for United Nations intervention at
that time. See 24 U.N. SCOR (1503d mtg.) at 1,U.N. Doe. S/PV. 1503 (1969) ("Northern
Ireland is and has long been an integral part of the United Kingdom. Events in Northern
Ireland are accordingly an internal matter for the United Kingdom Government.").
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especially true now that Northern Ireland is under direct political rule
from London.
This argument is probably invulnerable, even though it is at least
partially refuted by United Nations' precedent. The Congo had been
independent for only ten days when Belgian troops returned. 93 The
Treaty of Friendship between the two countries established Belgian bases
within the Congo and allowed Belgian troops to assist the Congolese
government in maintaining law and order.4" This did not prevent the
United Nations from treating the Belgian incursion as a threat to international peace, 9 ' and within forty-eight hours the first United Nations
In the case of Cyprus, the mere
peacekeepers landed in the Congo."
threat of a Turkish invasion was considered by the Council to be a
"likely" threat to international peace and security sufficient to justify
United Nations peacekeeping intervention,"' even though Turkey was
bound by treaties establishing the. Cypriot Republic to station troops on the
island and to intervene under certain conditions. 49
Distinguishing the Council resolutions on, and consequential peacekeeping operations in, the Congo and Cyprus from the Council's potential
treatment of Northern Ireland, however, is the crucial fact that neither
"invading" party in the prior cases, Belgian and Turkey, contested United
Nations intervention. If Britain did so in regard to Northern Ireland, it is
quite likely the Council would be reluctant to base action on British armed
intervention in the province"' and would require something more.

493. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 218.
494. Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Cooperation, June 29, 1960, Belgium-Congo,
arts. 2,6 appended to STAFF OF HOUSE COMM'N ON FOR. AFFs., 86TH CONG., 2D. SESS.,
MEMORANDUM ON THE REPUBL1C OF THE CONGO (Comm. Print 1960) (appendix A).
495.

See supra notes 487-88 and accompanying text.

496. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 222.
497. See S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (I 102d mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/I9/Rev. 1 (1964) (considering "the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely
to threaten international peace and security").
498. See Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Aug. 16,
1960, Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-United Kingdom, 5476 U.N.T.S. 10; Treaty of the
Guarantee, Aug. 16, 1960, Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-United Kingdom, 5475 U.N.T.S. 4;
Treaty Concerning the Alliance, Aug. 16, 1960, Cyprus-Greece-Turkey, 5712 U.N.T.S.

289.
499. France's ability to convince the Council not even to discuss the often violent
problems in its North African colonies, especially Algiers, is perhaps the best example, see
supra note 472, although the General Assembly's refusal to criticize the United States in
response to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba is also illustrative. See G.A. Res. 1616, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add. I (1961).
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2. Civil War
It would seem beyond dispute that, in the words of Louis Sohn,
"every civil war, if not ended quickly, is likely to become a threat to the
peace, and the United Nations would be entitled to step in to remove such
a threat. "'
Several empirical studies conducted during the 1970s
supported Sohn's theory. They revealed that the more intense the internal
conflict the more likely ultimate foreign military intervention, with a
consequential escalation of repression against internal opposition
groups." 1 It is simply unreasonable to argue that civil wars do not
carry international repercussions in an increasingly interdependent
world' awash with ideological, strategic and regional alliances implicated in most, if not all, civil conflicts.'
United Nations practice is in accord. While the original United
Nations foray into the Congo was in response to the Belgian incursion,
subsequent resolutions, and the continued presence of the United Nations
peacekeeping force even after Belgium withdrawal, were premised on the
threat to international peace presented by the ongoing civil war within the
Congo, including the secessionist activities in the Katanga province.0
Similarly, the United Nations refused to categorize the armed conflict
arising out of Biafra's attempts to secede from Nigeria as solely a matter
of domestic jurisdiction. 5 By most definitions except Great Britain's,
500. Sohn, supra note 471, at 215.
501. See Rasler, Internationalized Civil War.: A Dynamic Analysis of the Syrian
Intervention in Lebanon, 27 J.CONFLICT RESoLUTION 421, 422 (1983) (collecting studies);
see also 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 20 (noting eight examples in the post-World War
II era where "external intervention ha[d] the effect of making the [erstwhile internal]
conflict a matter of international concern").
502.

Rasler, supra note 501, at 421.

503. See generally S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 141-43 (showing how the world is
influenced by various ideological blocks).
504. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 161, 16 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (942d mtg.) at 2-3, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/16/Rev. I (1961); G.A. Res. 1600, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 17-18,
U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add. 1 (1961); see also BLUE HELMETS, supra note 2 1, at 231, 237-47.
505. The vast majority of countries to address the Nigerian civil war in General
Assembly debates called for international intervention to halt the slaughter. See, e.g., 24
U.N. GAOR (1760th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/PV.1753-1773 (1969) ("We must devise
means of restoring the peace . . . without infringing the right of non-intervention.")
(statement of Dominican Republic); id. (1763d mtg.) at 14 ("The United Nations has no
excuse for standing idly by.") (statement of Tanzania); id. (1765th mtg.) at II ("How can
we preserve the fiction of the internal nature of conflicts such as that between Nigeria and
Biafra . . . ?") (statement of Belgium); id. (1769th mtg.) at 8 ("The principle which
induces some countries to ignore this tragedy, on the pretext that it is simply a matter for
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the two decade-old conflagration in Northern Ireland is a civil war.'
The Institute of International Law has defined "civil war" as an armed
conflict between an established government and one or more insurgent
movements whose aim is to overthrow the government or the political,
economic or social order of the state."' Although mere disorders and
rioting are insufficient to qualify as civil war," ° the battle between the
IRA and the British army and British-backed militia and police, as well as
the Protestant paramilitarists, has involved numerous bombings, mortar
attacks, military ambushes and occupations of towns or sections of cities
by both sides.'
Simply put, representatives of a significant portion of
the minority community in Northern Ireland have arisen in arms against
the state, a classic condition of civil war,"1° and the interminable nature
of the uprising has placed it among the world's most notorious "war
zones. "511
It is therefore entirely plausible that the Security Council would
consider the Ulster crisis to be a civil war and, accordingly, a threat to
Africans, is unacceptable. This tragedy, by its scope and the number of its victims . . .
threatens international peace and security.") (statcncnt of Ivory Coast); id. (1781st mtg.)
at 11 ("Friends of Africa, help us to have peace.") (statement of Chad); id. (1784th mtg.)
at 19 (seeking "constructive efforts of the Organization of African States, supplemented by
those of the international community," to bring peace to Nigeria) (statement of Central
Africa Republic). But see id. (1769th mtg.) at 2 (Rwanda arguing that the United Nations
"is not entitled to intervene directly in the matter"). Although the United Nations clearly
felt itself competent to consider the Nigerian conflict, see also Fonteyne, The Customary
International Law Doctrine of Humnanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the
U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 240-41 (1974), the organization took no
significant measures to stop the war. This passivity has been severely criticized. See, e.g.,
id. at 237.
Regional organizations have also intervened in civil conflicts. See, e.g., A. FLORINI
& N. TANNENWALD, ON THE FRONT LINES: THE UNITED NATION'S ROLE IN PREVENTING
AND CONTAINING CONFLICT 42-44 (1984) (in 1979, the Organization of African Unity
established a peacekeeping force to halt the fighting in Chad and the first soldiers were
dispatched the following year).
506. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 33.
507. See 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 20 n.12 (citing J.VERZUIL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 513 (1978)).
508. Id.
509. See supra notes 132-35, 239-40 & 271-83 and accompanying text.
510. "It has been said that 'a civil war exists when two opposing parties within a State
have recourse to arms for the purpose of obtaining power in the State, or when a large
portion of a State rises in arms against the legitimate Government.'" Sohn, supra note
471, at 208.
511. See J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at xiv; Rasler, supra note
501, at 421-22.
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international peace.
3. Internal Friction Shy of Civil War
There is also widespread support for the proposition that internal strife
that has yet to ripen into civil war represents a significant threat to
international harmony under certain conditions fairly universal to most
modern insurgencies. The Office of the United Nations Legal Counsel has
identified seven factors, any one of which can thrust an internal conflict
into the international arena:
(1) the occurrence of major acts of
international outrage during the course of the conflict; (2) the size,
intensity and length of the conflict; (3) the likelihood of outside intervention; (4) the spillover of the dispute across international borders; (5) the
classification of the dispute as a colonial conflict; (6) the significant
violations of human rights; and (7) the subjection of some parts of the
dispute to international agreements." 3 United Nations practice has
affirmed most of these.
Perhaps the most significant Security Council action regarding an
internal disorder that may or may not have fallen shy of true civil war was
its reaction to the crisis in' Cyprus. In its earliest stages, when the
Security Council acted, that episode consisted of severe intercommunal
strife between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the form of rioting and other
disturbances,5 4 wholly contained on that island. 5 Prompted by both
concern for the serious violations of human rights occurring on the island
and by the likelihood of invasion by Turkish armed forces, the Security
Council declared a "likely" threat to the peace and, at Britain's urgent
request, created a peacekeeping force there. 6 Concern for human
rights has also been at the core of Security Council resolutions decrying
threats to the peace in South Africa5" 7 and Rhodesia. 1
Acts of inter512.

Szasz, supra note 404, at 346-50.

513. Id.
514.

See infra notes 845-53 and accompanying text.

515.

See infra notes 850-53 and accompanying text.

516. See S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec.
SIINFI191Rev. 1 (1964).

(1 102d mtg.) at 2-4, U.N. Doc.

517. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/INF/33 (1977) ("Considering that the policies and acts of the South African
Government are fraught with danger to international peace and security.") (emphasis in
original); S.C. Res. 392, 31 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1930th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/32 (1976) (strongly condemning South Africa's massive violence against and killings
of South African blacks).
518. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966) (condemning Rhodesia's white minority government's actions
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national outrage,. such as the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa," 9
have been determined by the Council to lead to "international friction"
and, if continued, to "endanger international peace and security. " "
Several internal disputes have spilled across international borders,
prompting Council resolutions condemning the act as a threat to the
peace, 52' and several of the previous United Nations peacekeeping forces
or observer missions were dispatched to internal disputes subject to
Since the 1960 adoption by the General
international instruments.Y
it is impossible for the
Assembly of its decolonization resolution,
United Nations to characterize any uprisings against colonial powers as
"domestic." A "colonial revolution is now legally as well as practically
a matter of concern to the whole community, "524 and its suppression a

threat to the peace as a matter of international law. 5z

To the seven factors set forth by the United Nations Legal Counsel
against the black majority as a "threat to international peace").
519. Described by the Council as "the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful
demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa."
S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (856th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doe. SIINF/I5/Rev. 1
(1960); cf. 15 U.N. SCOR (853d mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doe. S/PV.853 (1960) (statement of
Ghana in debate preceding adoption of resolution 134); id (851st mtg.) at 3 (statement of
France).
520. S.C. Res. 134, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (856th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/15/Rev.I (1960); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 392, 31 U.N. SCOR Rcs. & Dec. (1930th
mtg) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976) (strongly condemning the South African
government for the murder of schoolchildren).
521. Examples include Lebanon, which Syria and ultimately Israel invaded, S.C. Res.
425, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2074th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978), and
East Pakistan, which India invaded to forestall further atrocities by the Pakistani army. See
S.C. Res. 307, 26 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (1621st mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/27
(1971).
522. Examples include the United Nations Emergency Force, established by G.A. Res.
998 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. I (Supp. 1) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956), after
Israel, France and Great Britain invaded Egypt in violation of the General Armistice
Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, Israel-Egypt, 42 U.N.T.S. 251 (1949); the United Nations
Operation in the Congo, see supra notes 493-96 and accompanying text; and the United
Nations Force in Cyprus, see supra notes 497-98 and accompanying text.
523. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
524. Sohn, supra note 471, at 209.
525. See S.C. Res. 435, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2087th mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/34 (1978) (condemning South Africa's efforts to prevent Namibian independence).
"Since the adoption of the Declaration . . . there has been a tendency in the Assembly in
particular, to consider that no aspect of 'colonialism' should be treated as a matter falling
'essentially' within the domestic jurisdiction of a state." L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A.
SIMONS, supra note 329, at 70; see also Szasz, supra note 404, at 349-50.
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and upheld by practice, the Security Council has added an eighth. Early
in the organization's existence a majority of the Council members found
support by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for armed bands operating
inside Greece constituted a "threat to the peace," 5" indicating that
foreign support for guerrilla organizations operating within the country
threatens international peace. The following year the United States
reiterated this assessment during Council deliberations5 27 and this
interpretation has been expanded by an outside study reporting that
internal insurgency is especially likely to produce international fallout
when it is linked to a revolutionary movement."!
In an organization historically reluctant to intrude on allegedly
domestic domain, it is foolhardy to suggest that the existence of one,
some, or all of these eight factors would automatically result in the
Security Council finding a threat to the peace requiring United Nations
action. On the other hand, the greater the number of factors present in
any given internal conflict, the higher the international political pressure
upon the Security Council not to wish it away as a matter essentially of
domestic concern. It should be significant, therefore, that the conflict in
Northern Ireland bears all eight characteristics.
Major acts of international outrage have become almost commonplace
in the War of Ireland. 29 The related second and sixth factors-the size,
intensity, and length of the conflict and its consequences for human rights,
respectively-are clearly extant in this latest round of Northern Ireland's
troubles, with its twenty-one years, 3,000 deaths, 30,000 injuries and
countless abuses of human rights. 5" As for the third and fourth characteristics, it is by now well-accepted that serious escalation of the fighting
in the North would force the Irish Republic to intervene by sending troops
526. See 2(2) U.N. SCOR (170th mtg.) at 1604 (1947); 2(2) U.N. SCOR (188th mtg.)
at 2098 (1947).
527. See 3(2) U.N. SCOR (298th mtg.) at 7-9 (1948) (statement of the United States
representative).
528.

F.S. NORTHEDGE, THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115-16

(1974); see also I S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 20-21 ("[I]ntemational peace has often
been endangered by ... dissident political organizations, insurgent groups, liberation
movements, communal minorities and the like.").
529. A far-from-exhaustive list would include: the Battle of the Bogside; internment;
Bloody Sunday; Bobby Sands and the prison hunger strike deaths; revelations of the use of
torture by security force personnel; the Birmingham Six, Guilford Four and MeGuire
Seven; innumerable IRA attacks; Protestant death squad atrocities; shoot-to-kill; the
Brighton Hotel; the Stalker Affair; Enniskillen; Gibraltar; the 1988 funeral slayings. See
supra notes 1-3, 29-42, 101-11, 118-19, 132, 160-62, 169-75, 181-83, 208-12 & 271-74
and accompanying text; infra notes 566-72 & 684 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 12 & 149-229 and accompanying text.
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across the border,"' a border that has been consistently violated by the
IRA, the RUC and the British army. 32 Indeed, the European Court on
Human Rights has already concluded that border raids conducted by the
IRA pose a threat to international peace.533
The Irish conflict has also spawned a series of grisly attacks on the
English mainland and the European continent, 53 one part of what many
Catholics believe is a struggle to end more than 800 years of colonial
oppression. 35 Beyond the conventions and declarations that the United
Nations has promulgated, the Northern Irish situation is subject to two
other international agreements. The European Convention constrains
Britain's treatment of the rebellious population and the rebels themselves,
as the opinions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
condemning British practices makes clear,5 36 and the 1985 Hillsborough
Treaty between Ireland and Britain is directed specifically at resolving the
Anglo-Irish conflict.5 37 Finally, leaders of the provisional republican
movement have reportedly met with leaders of the Basque Revolutionary
Party and the Portuguese Workers' Unitary Organization to draw
guidelines for a revolutionary strategy to combat NATO and the European
531.

See R. ROSE, supra note 3, at 374; see also notes 295-308 and accompanying text.

532. See, e.g., K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 190-92, 248, 367 (British army); Hearst,
Urgent Talks as IRA Pierce Security Net, The Guardian (London), July 25, 1988, at 1,col.
1 (IRA).
533. The Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56 (1961) (IRA raids threatened
not only peace within Northern Ireland, but also the external relations of the Republic of
Ireland, and thus constituted a threat to the life of that nation).
534. See, e.g., J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 212 (describing 1982 Hyde and Regents
Parks bombings that killed II soldiers and seven horses); C. MULUN, supra note 181, at
1-7 (describing 1974 Birmingham pub bombing that killed 21 and injured 162); infra text
accompanying note 684 (discussing 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing that narrowly missed
killing Prime Minister Thatcher); 3 British Servicemen Killed, supra note 38, at AI, col.
6 (reporting bombing in Netherlands); Rule, Tory Legislator, Foe of the I.R.A., Is Killed
by Bomb, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1990, at AI, col. 3 (reporting London bombing that killed
close Thatcher ally); Rule, Four I.R.A. Suspects Seized in Europe, N.Y. Times, June 20,
1990, at A3, col. 4 (reporting recent attacks in West Germany, Netherlands and England);
Whitney, supra note 284, at Al, col. 3 (reporting mortar attack on office of British prime
minister); Schmidt, supra note 284, at Al, col. 3 (reporting rail terminal bombings in
London).
535. After bombing a British base in central England in February 1989, the IRA
announced that, "[wlhile Britain maintains its colonial grip on the north of Ireland, the
I.R.A. will continue to strike at those who oversee and implement British Government
policy in our country." Rule, British Base Is Bombed; Soldiers Unhurt, N.Y. Times, Feb.
21, 1989, at A3, col. 4; see also supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
536.

See supra notes 108-09 & 208-11 and accompanying text.

537.

Hillsborough Treaty, supra note 230.
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Economic Community.538 They have also drawn support and shelter
from extremist groups in West Germany and Belgium,539 and have
received huge munitions shipments from Libya,' including anti-aircraft
missiles and Czech-made Semtex explosives, the vast volume and
enhanced efficiency of which have armed the IRA with the terrifying
potential to markedly escalate and extend its offensives."1 The avowedly Marxist Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) has been linked to the
Soviet Union, received arms exclusively from Soviet bloc countries and
apparently pooled information with terrorist organizations in West
Germany, Holland and Italy, 2 developments one British researcher
called "cause for concern" and "the catalyst for internationalising the Irish
conflict.""
On the Protestant side, the British recently uncovered a
plot by South African diplomats to sell arms to unionist paramilitarists. 54
Under United Nations policy and precedent, then, it simply cannot be
denied that the troubles of Northern Ireland, whether "war" or something
less, present a clear and present danger to peace among, and within,
nations. The evidence is overwhelming that in Northern Ireland the
primary objective of United Nations peacekeeping-to promote conditions
for pacific settlement by preventing the conflict from attracting foreign
involvement1 5 and thereby precluding an otherwise localized struggle
from potentially evolving into broader, even international, conflict '5 cannot be assured absent United Nations intervention.
Yet, political concerns often cloud policy and precedent and blind the
538. Janke, supra note 44, at 14.
539. See Raines, supra note 39, at A4, col. 5; 3 British Servicemen Killed, supra note

39, at AI, col. 6.
540. Northern Ireland: Coming Closer to Home, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1988, at 65.
541. See id.; Mallie, supra note 132, at 7. The British government expressed alarm at
the weaponry provided to the IRA by Libyan leader Col. Moammar Khadafy, Northern
Ireland secretary King explaining that "[tihe interjection by Colonel Khadafy of more
powerful explosives and additional weapons may have given some people the idea that
somehow violence can actually win." IRA's New Bombing Threat, San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 26, 1988, at A22, col. 1.
542. Janke, supra note 44, at 23-24.
543.

Id. at 23.

544. Jackson, Britain Ousts 3 S. Africans, San Francisco Exam., May 5, 1989, at A20,
col. 3.
545.

D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 321.

546. See Claude, supra note 338, at 52. This is especially true in Northern Ireland
because the mere continuance of the conflict prolongs the very real threat that one of
Ulster's periodic escalations might exceed internal control and force the Republic of Ireland
to intervene, as it nearly did in 1969.
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Council, or some of its members, to the evidence. It is worth emphasizing, then, the extent to which the current situation in Northern Ireland is
unacceptable if for no other reason than the human rights violations
occurring there.
B. Human Rights Abuses in Northern Ireland
Demand United Nations Attention

Violations of human rights, even on a mass scale, have never alone
been sufficient to provoke the Security Council or the General Assembly
to invoke the peacekeeping alternative. Although preventing further
deprivation of basic rights undoubtedly played a significant role in
prompting United Nations intervention in Cyprus, the Congo and, much
belatedly, Bangladesh, 7 these actions were all justified primarily by
foreign aggression or other threats to the peace. When faced with severe
abuses of fundamental rights absent such aggression or threats, the
Security Council and General Assembly have limited themselves to
attempting to coerce compliance with international law through external
measures, such as embargoes and sanctions," which have proven
largely
ineffective in curbing such abuses in any sort of timely man49
ner. 5
The point of this portion of the Article is not that the United Nations
should invoke peacekeeping in response to every widespread violation of
human rights, although a strong argument can be made that such a step is
necessary and proper, at least where practicable, to allow the United
Nations to fulfill its mandate of promoting universal respect for human
rights. 5" Neither do I suggest that the current situation in Northern
547. Neither the Council nor the Assembly took any action on East Pakistan until eight
months after the slaughter of Bengalis and four days after war had broken out between
India and Pakistan over what India had already formally recognized as the separate state
of Bangladesh. See G.A. Res. 2793, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 3, U.N. Doe.
A/8429 (1971) (calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops). The
Security Council finally took a stand two weeks later. See S.C. Res. 307, 26 U.N. SCOR
Res. & Dee. (1621st mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doe. S/INF/27 (1971) (demanding a durable ceasefire). For more on the United Nations inaction with respect to the human rights abuses in
East Pakistan, see R. LILLCH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 487-91.
548. See supra notes 415-20 (Rhodesia), 42 1-22 (South Africa) and accompanying text.
549. For example, 28 years after voluntary economic sanctions were slapped on South
Africa, see G.A. Res. 1761, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 9-10, U.N. Doe. A/5217
(1962), and 13 years after the arms embargo became mandatory, see S.C. Res. 418, 32
U.N. SCOR Res. & Dee. (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doe. S/INF/33 (1977), South Africa
remains an apartheid state. But see Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Inproving
the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAUF. L. REV. 1159, i 171-80 (1987) (arguing that
several United States-imposed sanctions achieved their stated goals).
550. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, & arts. 55-56; see supra notes 430-68 and
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Ireland is likely in the near-term to provoke the Republic of Ireland to
send its troops across the border; clearly Ireland has no intention of doing
so absent considerable escalation of the violence.55 Rather, my purpose
is simply to point out that deprivation of fundamental human rights will
continue on a significant scale in Northern Ireland absent United Nations
intervention and that these violations cannot be justified by the British
government as required by the exigencies of the situation.
1. Nonderogable Rights
There are, of course, "a number, albeit a small one, of international
obligations which, by reason of the importance of their subject-matter for
the international community as a whole, are-unlike the othersobligations in whose fulfillment all States have a legal interest."552
These have been described by the International Court of Justice, in the
phrase made famous by the Barcelona Traction case,553 as "droits
fondamentaux de la personne"551-the
basic rights of the human person.
Despite their differences, the secretaries of state for both the Nixon and
Carter administrations agreed that there are standards below which no
government can fall without offending fundamental values, such as
genocide, officially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment or murder, or the
comprehensive denial of basic rights to racial, religious, political or ethnic
groups. "Any government
engaging in such practices must face adverse
5
international judgment. " 11
accompanying text; see also H. WISEMAN, INTRODUCTION TO PEACEKEEPING: APPRAISALS
& PROPOSALS at xii (H. Wiseman ed. 1983).
551. See S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xvi. For overviews of how the Republic's
economic and political self-interest dictate a restrained role in the North's affairs, see S.
BELFRAGE, supra, at xv-xvi; K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 359-62.
552. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on Its Twenty-Eighth Session, [1976]

2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2, at 99, U.N. Doe. A/CN/SER. A./1976/Add. 1,U.N.
Sales No. E.77.V.5 (Part !I); cf. Universal Declaration, supra note 32, preamble
("recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace"); International
Covenant, supra note 33, preamble (same); European Convention, supra note 34, preamble
(reaffirming a "profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation
of justice and peace").
553. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4
(Judgment of Feb. 5, 1970).
554. Id. at 32.
555. Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger before the OAS General Assembly, 75
DEP'T ST. BULL. 1, 3 (1976) [hereinafter Kissinger Statementl; cf. Vance Address, supra
note 466, at I (included among essential human rights are "the right to be free from
governmental violation of the integrity of the person" and "the right to enjoy civil and
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Neither the International Covenant on Human Rights nor its European
counterpart countenance suspension of certain of these rights even in times
of war or national emergencies.'- Immune from state violation under
any conditions are the right to life;117 freedom from torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; 5. freedom from slavery or servitude;55 and prohibitions against ex post facto laws or punishment,"W
among others."
Conversely, both the international and the European covenants allow
derogation in times of emergency from a state's obligation to protect
individual liberty by allowing states to conduct arbitrary arrests, detentions
and irregular trials. 2 While a strong case can be made that certain
minimum due process protection should be nonderogable,"5 it is enough
political liberties .

").

556. See International Covenant, supra note 33, art. 4; European Convention, supra
note 34, art. 15.
557. See International Covenant, supra note 33, arts. 4, 6; European Convention, supra
note 34, arts. 2, 15 ("except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war").
558. See International Covenant, supra note 33 arts. 4, 7; European Convention, supra
note 34 arts. 3, 15.
559. See International Covenant, supra note 33, art. 4 & art. 8, para. 1; European
Convention, supra note 34, art. 4.
560. See International Covenant, supra note 33, arts. 4, 15; European Convention,
supra note 34, arts. 7, 15.
561. The International Covenant also forbids derogation from the freedom from
imprisonment for failing to fulfill contractual obligations, International Covenant, supra
note 33, art. 11; the right to be recognized as a person before the law, id., art. 16; and
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, id., art. 18, para. I.
562. See id., arts. 4, 9; European Convention, supra note 34, arts. 5, 15.
563. The loophole allowing derogation has been much criticized, for it is during
episodes of internal crisis that the rights to liberty and security are most vulnerable. The
most frequently invoked rationale for derogation from due process obligations has been
internal political unrest, see, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/6/Add.
10 (1983) (notification by Dominican Republic of intent to derogate from International
Covenant) (citing "widespread acts of terrorism"); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/2/Rev. I at 40-42 (1976, 1984) (notifications by Chile of intent to derogate from
International Covenant) (citing "extremist seditious groups whose aim is to overthrow the
established Government"), including Britain's derogation in Northern Ireland, id. at 57
(1976) (notification by Britain of intent to derogate from International Convention) (citing
"campaigns of organized terrorism related to Northern Irish Affairs"); Whitney, supra note
212, at 4, col. 1 (announcing derogation from European Convention) (citing "the threat of
terrorism in Northern Ireland"). Yet denial of fair hearings to those charged with security
offenses or tried before nontraditional tribunals, such as the Diplock courts, see supra notes
188-89 and accompanying text, and maltreatment of those arrested, detained and imprisoned
under such circumstances, "are among the most pervasive abuses during [these] states of
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for purposes of this Article to recognize that under international law,
detention in a manner requiring derogation from the human rights
covenants is only permissible if "the person concerned constitutes a clear
and serious threat to society" and that threat "cannot be contained in any
other manner.'
2. Nonderogable Rights Are Violated in Ulster
The evidence suggests that the British have reneged on their obligations to refrain from murder, torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary and
Great Britain has also
unlawful denial of liberty in Northern Ireland.'
emergency." Hartman, Working Paper for the Committee of Experts on the Article 4
Derogation Provision, 7 HUM. RIS. Q. 89, 120 (1985). Thus minimum due process is
widely considered essential during states of siege to prevent murder, torture and other illtreatment of prisoners and detainees. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 702 comment n, Reporter's Note 10 (Tent. Final
Draft 1985) [hereinafter DRAFT RESTATEMENT] (listing the right to be free from "prolonged
arbitrary detention" among preemptory norms such as the rights to be free from murder and
torture); The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 12 (1985)
(Principle 70); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 224, at 424-31; see also R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 203-04 (1977); J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at 42,
52, 111; H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 19-21 (1980); Bcitz, Human Rights and Social Justice,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 343, at 45, 51-61; Meron, On
a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1986); Hartmann,
supra, at 120; Kissinger Statement, supra note 555, at 3; Vance Address, supra note 466,
at I (violations "of the integrity of the Person" include "arbitrary arrest or imprisonment").
564. The Campora Schweizer Case, HRC/66/1980, U.N. Doe. A/38/40 Annex VIII at
122 (1983). The extent of Britain's derogations in Northern Ireland, especially of the rights
to free speech, association and political participation, seems to exceed the proportionality
See International
requirement of both the International and European Conventions.
Covenant, supra note 33, art. 4, para. I (derogation only proper to the extent "strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation"); European Covenant, supra note 34, art. 15,
para. 1 (same). For example, there is no evidence that banning interviews with republican
politicians is "strictly required by the exigencies of the [Northern Irish] situation."
Actually, the nearly universal opinion of those outside the British government is that such
a measure, and others directed at limiting or eliminating political representation for the
Northern Irish who support the republican movement, will only help the IRA. See
Northern Ireland: Whose Oxygen?, supra note 199, at 63. But see Wilkinson, Northern
Ireland: Freedom vs. Law and Order, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at A27, col. 4.
565. See supra notes 10 1-19, 149-89, 208-12 & 220-29 and accompanying text. Other
rights, such as the right to be free from discrimination, the right to speak and associate
freely, and the right to participate in the political decisionmaking are also denied in
Northern Ireland. See, e.g., Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act, 1989 (political
participation); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, pt. I
(association); K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 76 (political participation); J.
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proven incapable of protecting the Northern Irish from widespread acts of
murder, torture and inhuman treatment perpetuated not by the government,
but by individuals and private groups aligned either with the government
or against it. ' Given Britain's unwillingness to accede to repeated calls
by Amnesty International to review and revise its laws so as to better
safeguard basic human rights of security and liberty, 7 its insistence that
security forces are neither guilty of rights abuses nor of sparking abuses
by the paramilitaries on both sides568 and recent actions by the Thatcher
administration and Parliament designed to further curtail the enjoyment in
Ulster of basic rights,"W there is strong reason to believe, as Amnesty
International concluded in 1988, that human rights violations will continue
to occur in Northern Ireland.57 The British government attempts to
justify the deprivation of basic rights within Northern Ireland on grounds
National security, however, can never justify
of national security.
unlawful killings. 571 Few of the killings committed by the security
forces, and none of the killings and maimings carried out by republican
or Protestant paramilitarists, are lawful. Any killing, even ones in defense
of "national security," violates the European Convention unless the
consequence of a lawful act of war,57 - or of a lawful "use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary" to prevent unlawful arrest,
CONROY, supra note 3, at 14 (discrimination); id. at 183 (speech); K. KELLEY, supra note
*, at 365-66 (discrimination); North Ireland: Whose Oxygen?, supra note 199, at 62-63
(political participation & speech); BBC: Censorship on Northern Ireland?, INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP, Sept. 1988, at 32 (speech); Wilson, supra note 198, at 33 (speech).
566. See, e.g., Aitken, The Handbag Diplomat's Obsession, Manchester Guardian
Weekly, Dec. 11, 1988, at 6 (John Hume, head of the Catholic SDLP, calling the IRA the
greatest violator of human rights in Northern Ireland). Beyond the murderous sectarian
warfare that has killed hundreds of combatants, and caught hundreds of civilians in the
crossfire, see supra notes 112-20, 160-62, 236-40, 263-65, 272-83 & 529-34 and
accompanying text; infra note 811 and accompanying text, "paramilitary gun squads
throughout the province have shot more than 1,500 people and in other ways assaulted at
least another 850 as punishment for 'anti-social behavior"' as the Catholic and Protestant
paramilitaries act as unofficial but brutal police forces in their respective communities.
Pogatchnik, Harsh Brand of Justice in Belfast, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 5, 1990, § Z-1,
at 1, col. 1; see infra note 822 and accompanying text.
567. See AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, at 2, 59-60,
83 & app.; AMNESTY INT'L, ALLEGED TORTURE, supra note 223, at ii; AMNESTY INT'L,
N. IR. MISSION, supra note 225, at 70.
568. See infra note 595 and accompanying text.
569. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
570. See AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, at 2.
571. See International Covenant, supra note 33, arts. 4, 6; European Convention, supra
note 34, arts. 2, 15.
572.

Id. art. 15, para. 2.
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to effectuate a lawful arrest, prevent an unlawful escape or lawfully quell
an insurrection. 53 The shooting of unarmed suspects is unlawful under
both domestic and European human rights law.574 The International
Covenant is far more restrictive; it admits of no exemption from the
government's responsibility to prevent the violent death of its residents,
save only for lawful executions of death penalties pursuant to final
judgments of a competent court.575
The covenants also forbid derogation from the prohibition against any
form of torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or maltreatment, of prisoners.576 Therefore, while the prohibition against arbitrary
arrest, detention and other denials of due process is derogable, 57 the
573.

Id. art. 2, para. 2.

574. British law violates Britain's obligations under the European Convention by
allowing the use of force not only where absolutely necessary, as required by article 2(2)
of the Convention, but also where "reasonable in the circumstances," a less exacting
limitation on the official use of force. See Criminal Law Act, § 3, para. I (N. Ir. 1967);
Stewart v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 162, 170-71 (1982) (European
Commission on Human Rights noting that "absolutely necessary" is more strict than
"reasonable"). Northern Irish courts have held army and police use of lethal force is
reasonable if a person suspected of a minor, non-violent offense refuses to stop for
questioning, as long as the soldier or police officer believes the failure to stop indicates the
individual might commit more serious crimes at some point in the future. See AttorneyGeneral for Northern Ireland's Reference (No. I of 1975), [1977] H.L. (N.I.) 105, 135,
138 (per Lord Diplock); Lynch v. Ministry of Defense, [19831 N.I. 216 (Q.B.D.). Worse,
Ulster's courts have held that circumstances to be considered in determining whether the
use of force was reasonable includes the "general wartime situation," the local terrain, that
the area was hostile to the security forces, evidence of IRA activity and the likelihood of
ambush. R. v Jones, [1975] 2 N.I.J.B. at 18. Moreover, a soldier's or police officer's
testimony that he believed his actions required by his sense of duty is considered
compelling evidence of reasonableness. Id at 22; see Jennings, supra note 31, at 111.
Thus, under the law, soldiers and police are "encouraged to make a 'pre-emptive strike'
G. HOGAN & C. WALKER,
rather than to await the threat of imminent violence."
POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND 66 (1989). Even under this
relaxed standard of reasonableness, many of the alleged shoot-to-kill incidents involved use
of excessive force, unreasonable under the circumstances, and therefore unlawful. The
Gibraltar Three, for example, were apparently attempting to surrender, and were not
attempting to flee, when shot and killed. See supra note 38; see also AMNESTY INT'L,
KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, at 3, 59-60. For those who wish to draw
their own conclusions, see concise summaries of the circumstances surrounding 32 alleged
shoot-to-kill incidents, involving 49 victims, in id. at 17-58. Of course, if these killings
were unreasonable, they could not have been "absolutely necessary," and thus violated the
European Convention.
575. International Covenant, supra note 33, art. 4, para. 2 & art. 6.
576. See supra note 558 and accompanying text.
577. Derogation is valid only upon immediate and proper notification. International
Covenant, supra note 33, art. 4, para. 3; cf. art. 15, para. 3 (requiring full notification);
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rights of these detainees to security of the person are not. The evidence
indicates not only that Britain was guilty in the past of severe maltreatment
The Lawless Case, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (1961) (implying that European
Convention requires notification be "without delay"). The British recently took steps-after
the European Court's ruling in Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom finding that detention
as used in Northern Ireland violated international law-to derogate from its obligations
under the European Convention to forbid unlawful detention. See supra note 212 and
accompanying text. The European Convention permits derogation in cases of a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation," European Convention, supra note 34, art.
15, and the Northern Irish crisis likely qualifies. See Lawless, I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 472-74
(defining public emergency as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community
of which the State is composed"); Whitney, supra note 212, at 9, col. 3 ("Thatcher's
Government argues that I.R.A. terrorism is such a threat and it is treated as such in the
British press."). By requiring immediate notification, however, both the drafters of the
International Covenant and the justices of the European Court perceived a need to guard
against arbitrary and ex post facto. justifications offered by a government for depriving its
citizens of liberty and other basic rights. Hartman, supra note 563, at 99-100; see Lawless,
1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 62 (finding sufficient a notice of derogation filed within 12 days of
nonconforming act coming into force). Britain's belated notification of its derogation from
the European Convention's prohibition against lengthy detentions seems violative of-this
requirement. Similarly, Britain's 1977 derogation notice to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee regarding Northern Ireland stated:
The Government of the United Kingdom has found it necessary (and
in some cases continue to find it necessary) to take powers, to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, for the
protection of life, for the protection of property, and the prevention of
powers of arrest and detention and exclusion. In so far as any of these
measures is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 9, 10.2, 10.3,
12.1, 14, 17, 19.2 [right to freedom of expression], 21 [right of
peaceful assembly] or 22 [right to freedom of association) of the
[International] Convention, the United Kingdom hereby derogates from
its obligations under those provisions.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rcv. I at 57 (1976). This notification was
not only six years late, but it has been criticized as "wholly inadequate" because it gave
"no explanation of the extent, duration, or scope of the limitations." Hartman, supra, at
100. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has on several occasions refused to
treat as legitimate any derogation not supported by "submissions of fact or law to justify
such derogation." The Garcia Case, HRC/8/1977, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP. 1, at 48; The
Weinberger Case, HRC/28/ 1978, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP. I, at 60; see also The Salgar
de Martejo Case, HRC/64/1979, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP. 1, at 129 ("[Tlhe Committee is
of the view that the State party, by merely invoking the existence of a state of siege, cannot
evade the obligations which it has undertaken by ratifying the Covenant. Although the
substantive right to take derogatory measures may not depend on a formal notification being
made pursuant to article 4(3) of the Covenant, the State party concerned is duty bound .
. . to give a sufficiently detailed account of the relevant facts to show that a situation of the
kind described in article 4(1) of the Covenant exists in the country concerned.").
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of prisoners and detainees, but also that such violations continue. 578
Moreover, the British government does not usually present evidence
establishing that those detained in derogation of the European and
international covenants "consitute[ I a clear and serious threat 5to
79 society"
or that this threat "cannot be contained in any other manner."
3.

The Persistent Violations of Rights in Ulster Breach Britain's
International Obligations

The United Nations Charter mandates international protection of
fundamental rights 5 ° and in 1968, the British representative, in arguing
for a United Nations response to an escalation in the then four-year-old
Cyprus crisis, told the General Assembly that "Article 56 of the Charter
makes it clear that no country can say that the human rights of its citizens
are an exclusively domestic matter. A country that denies its citizens the
basic human rights is by virtue of Article 56 in breach of international
obligation."581
The International Court of Justice has said that the
"basic rights of the human person" create obligations erga omnes, to be
protected by states regardless of the nationality of the victim.582 The
United Nations' subcommittee on human rights has proclaimed "consistent
patterns of gross violations of human rights" to constitute violations of
customary international law,5 83 and the draft Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, expounding on the United Nations'
position, recognizes that "some rights are fundamental and intrinsic to
human dignity, and consistent patterns of violations of such rights as state
policy may be deemed 'gross' ipso facto." 5s
More specifically, the International Court has considered the Iranian
government to be bound not to take internal action against United States
citizens at odds with the "imperative character of [its] legal obligations,"" 5 a United Nations report has indicated that Chile cannot allow
the deaths of detainees at the hands of government officials to go
578. See supra notes 108-09 & 220-29 and accompanying text.
579. The Campora Schweizer Case, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 Annex VIII at 122.
580. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1,55, 56.
581. 23 U.N. GAOR (1693d mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1693 (1968).
582. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Beig.v.Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,32
(Judgment of Feb. 5).
583. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No.IA) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.
1 (1970).
584. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 563, § 702 comment.
585. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff inTeheran, (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3,42 (Judgment of May 24, 1980).
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unpunished without violating its "international responsibilities, especially
in regard to the Geneva Convention, ' 58 6 and the International Law
Commission has drafted articles on state responsibility which provide that
"a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness

. . .

if the international obligation with which the

act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a preemptory norm of
general international law."587

These statements indicate that when a government carries out
counterinsurgency measures over a sustained period of time that result in
frequent violations of the right to security and liberty or other fundamental
rights, as the British government has done in Northern Ireland, then that
government stands in breach of customary international law,58 8 and of
its obligations under international agreements to which it is a party.58
4. The Inadequacy of Internal Safeguards in Northern Ireland
It has been argued that international intervention is unwarranted if
there is evidence indicating that internal change or non-intrusive external
forces might ameliorate an abusive internal situation.59 Whatever the
merits of this argument, the evidence with respect to Northern Ireland
offers little hope for either alternative.
The Northern Irish have repeatedly employed means of self-help in
attempts either to end the conflict or to eradicate its roots and have
repeatedly been rebuffed by force and by fierce hatred. The civil rights
movement of 1968-69 provoked extreme, violent Protestant reaction but
produced only limited reforms.5 ' The 1976 nonviolent Peace People
Movement attempted to end the Irish conflict, but floundered within
592
months of the Nobel Peace Prize being bestowed upon its founders.
In the last two years, sectarianism has been blamed for the breakdown in
secret talks between Protestant and Catholic politicians that were intended
to pave the way for negotiations aimed at eventually ending the stalemated
586. 34 U.N. GAOR at 1, 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/34/5831Add. 1 (1979) (report of the
Economic and Social Council transmitted to the 34th Session of the General Assembly).
587. Suminary Records of the 32nd Meeting, art. 33, [19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
30, 33, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/L.319.
588. See Meron, supra note 563, at 6.
589. See supra notes 446-65 and accompanying text.
590. Cf. J. NICKEL, supra note 343, at 114-15.
591.

See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.

592. S.BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 186-88; Clines, The Laurels of Peace Were Green
(for a Season), N.Y. Times, May 2, 1988, at A4, col. 1. For a more detailed review of
the Peace People Movement, founded by two Belfast women, Mairead Corrigan Maguire,
and Betty Williams, see K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 252-57.
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situation.5" It therefore is not remarkable that when asked in a recent
poll "are there any events that now give you hope for the future here,"
fully two out of three Northern Irish surveyed could think of no hopeful
indicia whatsoever. 5
The sheer length of the conflict, the inability of Great Britain to curtail
the causes of the conflict or its casualties and the unwillingness of the
Thatcher government to abide by minimum international standards of
behavior-indeed, its insistence in the face of overwhelming evidence that
its actions are consistent with those standards-reveal not only that the
British regime is unlikely to end the crisis on its own within the near
future, but is also unlikely either to end its own consistent policy and
practice of abuse or to prevent violent acts by Catholic and Protesant pamiliriss. 1
593. See Prokesch, Peace Hopes Dim in Londonderry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1990, §
1, at A15, col. 1;Rule, Hopes for Thaw in Ulster Politics Appear Dim, N.Y. Times, Feb.
18, 1989, at A4, col. 1;Whitney, Ulster Protestants and Catholics Talk Secretly, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1989, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
594. Wilson, Poll Shock for Accord, supra note 252, at 6. Aware, perhaps, that the
aforementioned "talks about talks" would bear little fruit, only II % thought them to be an
optimistic event. Id.
595. See AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42, app. (letter
from the secretary of state for Northern Ireland insisting British policy conforms to
international law and denying any need for further safeguards in respect to security force
killings in Northern Ireland); AMNESTY INT'L, N. JR. MISSION, supra note 225, at 4-7
(RUC maintaining that allegations of abuse of prisoners was nothing more than a
concoction of the IRA); Clines, supra note 175, at 1, col. 4 (chief of the RUC charging
that John Stalker's revelations of an RUC cover-up of potential shoot-to-kill incidents were
"untruths and distortions").
As noted above, supra note 163-75 and accompanying text, the security forces are
utterly unwilling to police themselves; nor are the courts likely to curtail administrative or
legislative excesses. According to Richard Shepard, a Conservative Party member of
Parliament, "What I'm wary of is that our courts have lost their feel for being a check on
government actions, and that there really aren't any others." Whitney, supra note 205, at
2, col. 1. The European Court's decision against the government in Brogan "very clearly
shows that there's no machinery in our own country to insure such rights, or redress for
their violation." Whitney, European Court Finds British Law on Detention a Breach of
Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, at Al, col. 5. In one case, for example, the trial
judge acquitted three RUC officers charged with murdering three unarmed Catholic men,
whose car the officers sprayed with 56 bullets (out of 109 fired by the policemen), after the
trial judge held the policemen "absolutely blameless" and commended the officers for
"courage and determination in bringing the three deceased men to justice, in this case, to
the final court of justice." R. v. Montgomery & Others, [1984] 4 N.I.J.B. 65. Perhaps
the most blatant example of the courts' unwillingness to check security force abuse was
given by Lord Justice Denning, who rejected pleas by the Birmingham Six that the Court
of Appeal allow the Six to present new evidence that they had been assaulted during police
interrogation because:
If the six men win, it will mean that the police were guilty of perjury,
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Economic sanctions would seem to offer no better chance of success.
The Thatcher Government proved itself largely immune to international
pressure regarding human rights in Northern Ireland. 5" Moreover, it
is all but certain that key nations such as the United States and France
would refuse to partake in such punitive action. If the United Nations has
a difficult time enforcing sanctions against a pariah nation such as South
Africa,597 it is difficult to believe it would fare better taking on a
that they were guilty of violence and threats, that the confessions were
involuntary and were improperly admitted and that the convictions
were erroneous. That would mean the Home Secretary would either
have to recommend they be pardoned he would have to or remit the
This is such an appalling vista that
case to the Court of Appeal ....
every sensible person in the land would say: It cannot be right that
these actions go any further. They should be struck out . . . . [T]he
actions should be stopped.
Mcllkenney v. Chief Constable, [198012 All E.R. 227, 239-40; [19801 I Q.B. 283, 323;
aff'd, Hunter v. Chief Constable, [1982] A.C. 529 (H.L.); see Ross, Strife Tests British
Justice, San Francisco Exam., Jan. 30, 1989, at Al, col. 4. Indeed, when it comes to
suspected Irish terrorists, it appears British courts are unwilling to throw out the convictions
of clearly innocent defendants unless and until the govemmentfirst concedes the convictions
are too tainted to stand. See R. v. Richardson, [19891 C.L.Y.B. 752 (convictions of socalled Guildford Four-three Irishmen and a woman imprisoned since 1974 for bombings
they did not commit-quashed, but only after the government's home secretary conceded
evidence had been "fabricated by the police"); Toolis, supra note 182, at 32, 62 (noting
that Guildford Four's original appeals were denied, and their convictions upheld, because
"'[tihe judges could not bring themselves to believe that the terrorists could tell the truth
and the police could tell lies"') (quoting Guildford Four's solicitor); Mills & Jones, supra
note 183, at 1, col. 1 (home secretary, not a court, announced convictions of Maguire
Seven could not be allowed to stand because they had been convicted on the basis of
discredited Guildford Four confessions and other tainted evidence); AMNESTY INT'L,
BIRMINGHAM SIX APPEAL, supra note 8 1, at 7 (expressing "the most grave doubts" about
the Court of Appeal's denial of the 1988 appeal because "even though according to the
Court the prisoners' convictions rested on their confessions, the testimony of every fresh
witness in support of the submission that the confessions were involuntary, was dismissed
as being either dishonest or mistaken or irrelevant"); Prokesch, supra note 18 1, at A3, col.
4 (only after government prosecutors conceded evidence was insufficient to support
Birmingham Six convictions did it appear the men would be freed by the Court of Appeal);
Routledge, British Justice Facing a Crisis of Confidence Over 4 IRA Trials, San Francisco
Exam., Sept. 4, 1990, at A9, col. I (noting that government's 1990 referral of Birmingham
Six case back to Court of Appeal brings to four the number of cases involving Irish
suspects in which the judicial system had been called into question since 1989); see supra
notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
596. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, GIBRALTAR INQUEST, supra note 38, at app. A (letter
from Thatcher's office rejecting out of hand Amnesty's demand for a public inquiry into
Gibraltar killings); Atlas, Thatcher Puts a Lid on: Censorship in Britain, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 5, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 36-38; Whitney, supra note 205, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
597. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2671, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 31-34, U.N. Doe.
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permanent member of the Security Council strongly allied with the two
other Western superpowers. In such a situation, peacekeeping enjoys two
considerable advantages over coercive measures such as embargoes or
sanctions. First, peacekeeping need not be characterized as punishment,
but rather may be viewed as international assistance with an intractable
dilemma, as in Cyprus,5 9 the Congo" and, most recently, Iran-Iraq"
and Namibia."I Second, as will be shortly explained, peacekeeping
would represent a fiscal boon to Great Britain.'
In sum, the ineffectiveness of sanctions in this context, and the
absence of internal protections, underscore the severity of the threat to
human rights, and, by extension, to international peace, in Northern
Ireland. It is not this Article's purpose to identify with any certainty the
point at which that threat supersedes state sovereignty from international
intervention, a task difficult at best. Wherever that line might be drawn,
however, clearly the crisis in Northern Ireland long since crossed it.
United Nations' intervention in the Northern Irish conflict is therefore
warranted under international law.
V.

OBTAINING UNITED NATIONS APPROVAL FOR A
PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

On a number of previous occasions the United Nations has dispatched
peacekeeper or observer missions where the crisis both endangered
Indeed, such a
international peace and encumbered human rights.'
A/8028 (1970) ("Strongly deplorfing] the continued co-operation by certain States and
foreign economic interests with South Africa .... ") (emphasis in original); G.A. Res.
2396, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 19-21, U.N. Doc. No. A/7218 (1968)
("Condemn[ing] the actions of those States, particularly the main trading partners of South
Africa, and the activities of those foreign financial and other interests, all of which, through
the political, economic and military collaboration with the Government of South Africa and
contrary to the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, are
encouraging that Government to persist in its racial policies") (emphasis in original).
598. See infra notes 740-41 & 852-57 and accompanying text.
599. See 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/4382 (1960) (host
state requesting "urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance").
600. See 43 U.N. SCOR (2823d mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/44 (1988) (statement
of secretary-general announcing Iran and Iraq had agreed to cease-fire monitored by United
Nations observers).
601. 33 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June) at 17-19, U.N. Doe. S/12636 (1978) (letter
from representatives of several countries recognizing independence of Namibia could not
occur absent United Nations peacekeeping).
602. See infra notes 685-87 and accompanying text.
603.

Examples include Cyprus, the Congo, West New Guinea and Namibia.

Future
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situation would seem to present the greatest need for United Nations
intervention. Yet even were the Security Council to determine that
Northern Ireland constituted such a crisis, practical constraints might
preclude United Nations involvement. Although policy and precedent
would seem to demand peacekeeping intervention in Northern Ireland,
politics dominate the United Nations. The type of decisionmaking
undertaken by the Security Council is not the jurisprudential balancing of
so-called "neutral principles," but rather is an essentially political
activity, 04 heavily influenced by strategic, ideological and regional
alliances.' °
In the United Nations, as in other such bodies, political cards are often
played in the form of procedural devices. Some authorities believe Great
Britain has two trump cards, either of which would prevent a United
Nations peacekeeping force from undertaking operations in Northern
Ireland. First, as a permanent member of the Security Council, Great
Britain could employ the "superpower veto" to kill any Council resolution
creating such a force. Second, even if an Ulster peacekeeping resolution
passed the Security Council, or the General Assembly by way of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution,' Great Britain could refuse to grant the
force permission to deploy in Northern Ireland.
These authorities may be wrong.
The superpower veto is not
absolute, but instead is dependent upon the Charter basis for the resolution
at issue and upon the political willpower of the Security Council and the
General Assembly. Furthermore, Britain's unwillingness to consent to
United Nations peacekeeping is far from certain, given Ulster's high cost
to the British people in lives, liberties, economic resources and international prestige.
A. Avoiding the Superpower Veto
Any of the Security Council's five permanent members-the United
States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France-can
prevent the Council from adopting a substantive proposal simply by voting
no, even if the Council's fourteen other member nations cast votes in the
resolution's favor.W7 This superpower veto" is frequently used,"
examples may include the contemplated United Nations forces for Palestine and Central
America.
604. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 380, at 56; L. HENKIN, supra note 404, at 112.
605.

See generally S. BAiLEY, supra note 471, at 141-43 (discussing political influence

on Security Council policy).
606. See infra notes 644-51 and accompanying text.
607. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
608. The Soviet Union has called this the "unanimity rule," see 1 S. Bailey, supra note
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especially on the most politically sensitive or embarrassing proposals
involving a permanent member or a key ally. 1' Britain and the United
States might well perceive a proposal for United Nations peacekeeping
troops in Northern Ireland as an attack on British ability and objectivity
and attempt a veto. There are, however, procedural and political reasons
why such an attempt might not be possible, and even if possible and
undertaken, might not succeed.
1. Britain's Obligation to Abstain from Voting
Under article 27(3), any member of the Security Council-permanent
or not-"shall abstain from voting" on certain substantive proposals
relating to the peaceful settlement of a dispute to which that nation is a
party.6 11 Although the Charter requires nine affirmative votes for a
resolution to pass the Council,612 including the affirmative vote of all
five permanent members, 6 3 the "obligatory abstention" of a permanent
member under article 27(3), cannot defeat a proposal that garners eight
Council votes and is not vetoed by another permanent member, because
obligatory abstentions are treated as a form of concurrence. 1 4 While
304, at 45, but this Article adheres to the more common "veto."
609. A total of 242 times in the first 41 years of the United Nations. S. BAILEY, supra
note 471, at 201-09 (table 12) (listing these vetoes).
610.
(United
(2682d
vetoing

See, e.g., 41 U.N. SCOR (2718th mtg.) at 51, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (1986)
States vetoing resolution regarding intervention in Nicaragua); 41 U.N. SCOR
mtg.) at 43, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2682 (1986) (United States, Britain and France
resolution criticizing United States attack on Libya); 38 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-

Sept. 1983) at 53-55, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2476 (1983) (Soviet Union vetoing resolution
criticizing Soviet shooting down of Korean airliner).
611. This article reads, in pertinent part, "Decisions of the Security Council on all other
[than procedural] matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter
VI . . . a party to dispute shall abstain from voting." U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3.
612. Id.
613. Id.
614. During the United Nations Conference on International Organizations, held in San
Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945 to prepare, approve and sign the United Nations
Charter, the view was expressed by the United States that obligatory abstentions under
article 27(3) could not block otherwise-valid resolutions. See Doc. 967, 111/1/48, 11
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 513 (1945). This view prevailed. In 1960, for example, Argentina,
then a member of the Council, abstained from voting on its own resolution condemning
Israel's capture of Nazi Adolf Eichmann as a violation of Argentine sovereignty which, if
repeated, would threaten international peace and security. The resolution passed with only
eight affirmative votes; the obligatory abstention from Argentina supplied the deciding vote.
See S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (868th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doe. S/INF/15/
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the obligatory abstention rule has not been rigidly enforced, it is a
guideline that member states have been reluctant to ignore.'5 When the
issue arises, the Council members who are parties to a dispute generally
abstain if a proposal is taken to a vote,616 as has the United Kingdom on
occasion.617
This limitation on the superpower veto only applies, however, to
proposals brought under chapter VI of the Charter,61 and whether a
peacekeeping operation can be founded upon chapter VI remains unclear.
When the Security Council has in the past established peacekeeping
contingents, it has not explicitly stated the Charter provisions upon which
its action was based. Although article 42, in chapter VII, authorizes the
use of land forces as an enforcement measure to maintain or restore
international peace, it contemplated use of a permanent armed United
Nations force that has never been created, 19 and therefore article 42 has
never been applied by the Council and is now considered a dead letter. 6' Moreover, in the seminal opinion on the constitutional validity
of United Nations' peacekeeping, the International Court of Justice
distinguished between "peace-keeping operations" and "enforcement
action" under article 42 and concluded that the former "did not involve
'preventive or enforcement measures' against any state under Chapter
VII. "62
Yet the court stopped short of determining from where,
Rev.1 (1960).

615. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 229.
616. See S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 225-31 (listing the Soviet-Iranian dispute of
1946, in which the Soviets abstained from or did not attend substantive votes; the IndianPakistani question of 1948 to 1952, in which both countries abstained; and the 1960
Argentine-Israeli dispute over Eichmann).
617. See id. at 226-28 (listing the 1947 Corfu Channel incidents, in which the United
Kingdom voted on the procedural question of whether a subcommittee should be established
to report on the situation, but abstained from the vote on the composition of the
subcommittee-considered to be substantive-and abstained from two clearly substantive
votes, and the 1947 complaint by Egypt regarding the incursion of British troops into Egypt
and the Sudan, in which the British abstained from voting on all proposals and amendments).
618. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. It also applies to resolutions for pacific
settlements by and through regional arrangements under article 52(3), see id., a provision
inapposite to the present discussion.
619.
620.

See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 314-17.

See id. at 317; BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 6-7.
621. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 177 (advisory
opinion). Although only seven of the nine judges who concurred in the court's judgment
expressly joined this portion of the opinion-only half of the court's 14 sitting judges-the
General Assembly accepted the court's opinion by a 76-17 vote, considerably more than
a two-thirds margin. G.A. Res. 1854, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 54-55, U.N.
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exactly, peacekeeping drew its Charter support, leaving unresolved
whether non-enforcement provisions in chapter VII or the measures for
pacific settlement outlined in chapter VI were more appropriate constitutional foundations. 6'
Early in the history of United Nations' peacekeeping, the secretarygeneral on several occasions opined that a peacekeeping contingent is a
non-fighting force and therefore its constitutional basis is found not in
Chapter VII, which authorizes the use of force, but in Chapter VI, which
seeks to prevent or end international strife through peaceful means. 6'
Doc. A/5217 (1962).
622. The court hinted that the former might be a more correct reading of the Charter,
noting, "Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter speak of situations and it must lie within
the power of the Security Council to police a situation even though it does not resort to
enforcement action against a state." Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J.
at 167. But the court did not elaborate sufficiently to allow a definitive conclusion to be
drawn.
623. In his 1958 report on the United Nations' first peacekeeping operation, the
Emergency Force in the Middle East, the secretary-general distinguished between combat
operations against an aggressor state and peacekeeping of the type undertaken by UNEF
and said the former "would require a decision under Chapter VII of the Charter and an
explicit, more far-reaching delegation of authority to the Secretary-General than would be
required for any of the operations discussed here." 13 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item
6(c)) at 31, U.N. Doe. A/3943 (1958). In his 1957-58 annual report, Hammarskjold was
more explicit:
It should, of course, be clear that any such Force, unless it were to be
called into being by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
Charter, must constitutionally be a non-fighting force, operating on the
territories of the countries concerned only with their consent and
utilized only after a decision of the Security Council or the General
Assembly, regarding a specific case, for those clearly international
purposes relating to the pacific settlement of disputes which are
authorized by the Charter.
13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. IA) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/3844/Add. 1 (1958). Speaking to the
General Assembly on November 5, 1958, Hammarskjold went on to confirm the
implication of his written report, stating that a peacekecping force of the type employed to
end the Suez crisis could have a legal basis in chapter VI of the Charter. 13 U.N. GAOR
Special Political Comm. (100th mtg.) at 63, U.N. Doec. A/SPC/SR.100 (1958). A decade
earlier, a memorandum from the Secretariat suggested that where the United Nations
employs force pursuant to international obligations, such an operation "would not be one
in the sense of Chapter VII of the Charter." 3 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar.) at 14, 23,
U.N. Doe. AIAC.21/13 (1948). That Hammarskjold later described the Congo operation
"as implicitly adopted under Article 40 [of Chapter Vll]," I U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I)
at 27, U.N. Doec. A/4800 (1960); see also Nathanson, Constitutional Crisis at the United
Nations: The Price of Peace-Keeping, 1, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 621, 653 n.82 (1965)
[hereinafter Nathanson I], is not to the contrary, but indicates peacekeeping is an ad hoe
exercise and its constitutional basis may depend in large part on the nature of the operation
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A similar belief has been expressed by member states during debate on the
constitutional underpinning of peacekeeping, 24 although it has by no
means enjoyed unanimous support."
If chapter VI may provide the basis for a peacekeeping resolution, the
most likely source within that chapter is article 36(1), which allows the
Security Council to respond to any dispute or situation "likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security" by recommending any
"appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment."62 Several nations,
including the United States, 627 have voiced the view that the Security
Council's powers under this subsection are sufficiently broad to allow it
to request states to undertake the same type of "provisional measures" that
article 40 allows the Council to require states to employ,6 28 while both
the United Kingdom and the United States have argued that article 36(1)
permits the kind of coercive measures, short of force, explicitly authorized
under article 41.6' This is significant because both article 40 and 41
and the circumstances it faces in the field.
624. Canada, which has taken a leading role in United Nations peacekeeping operations,
argued during debates over financing of the Cyprus operation that peacekeeping is
"undertaken under Chapter VI." 20 U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (3d mtg.) at 7,
U.N. Doe. No. A/AC. 121/SR.3 (1965). During that debate Canada was joined by Mexico,
which argued that peacekeeping is not grounded in chapter VII, see 20 U.N. GAOR Special
Polial Comm. (2d mtg.) at 12-13, U.N. Doe. No. A/AC. 121/SR.2 (1965), and by Sweden,
which observed that "[tihe expression 'peace-keeping operations' . . . did not include
decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter." 20 U.N.
GAOR Special Political Comm. (3d mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.121/SR.3 (1965).
625. The Soviet block and France were the most vocal during the 1965 debates in
criticizing the view that peacekeeping could be disassociated from chapter VII. See 20
U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (8th mtg.) at 7-1I, U:N. Doe. No. A/AC. 121/SR.8
(1965) (Soviet Union); 20 U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (3d mtg.) at 17, U.N.
Doe. No. A/AC. 121/SR.3 (1965) (Czechoslovakia); 20 U.N. GAOR Special Political
Comm. (7th mtg.) at 5-6, U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.121/SR.7 (1965) (France).
626. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 1. Under this article, "[tlhe Security Council may,
at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like
Id. Article 33
nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment."
refers to "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security." Id. art. 33.
627. See 11 U.N. SCOR (743d mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doe. S/PV.743 (1956).
628. The representative from Belgium noted that there is "no legal problem about
applying" the concept of provisional measures from chapter VII "to the matters referred
to in Chapter VI," I1 U.N. SCOR (743d mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doe. S/3654 (1956), a position
also taken by Peru. Id. at 15.
629. See 18 U.N. SCOR (1056th mtg.) at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1056 (1963) (United
Kingdom); 18 U.N. SCOR (1078th mtg.) at 11-16, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1078 (1963) (United
States). See generally L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 31214.
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have been identified as the most likely foundations within chapter VII for
peacekeeping operations in the vacuum created by the premature death of
article 42,61 and this has been especially true of article 40.31 The
broad interpretation of article 36(1) is supported by the resolution creating
the peacekeeping operation most analogous to one that might be deployed
in Northern Ireland, the United Nations Force in Cyprus, for it relied on
the Council's power to "recommend" action, 2 which mirrors article
36(1), rather than its power to demand action under article 40.
This application of chapter VI, through article 36, to Northern Ireland
would allow the Council to recommend that the United Nations create and
dispatch a peacekeeping force in a resolution that could not be subject to
a superpower veto by Britain, since it is a party to the dispute and thus
barred from voting. 631 Even if the Council's resolution draws on article
36, however, Britain would have an effective veto, for actions under that
provision still must obtain the consent of the parties; that is, article 36
does not provide for coercive measures.634 The arguments that might
630. See, e.g., Sohn, The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a
Permanent United Nations Force, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 229-30 (1958) (identifying articles
41-42 as potential sources of peacekeeping authority).
631. U.N. CHARTER art. 40. Article 40, which allows the Security Council to call upon
the parties to a situation before the Council to comply with such provisional measures as
the Council deems necessary or desirable, has been cited as a basis for the Congo
peacekeeping operation by the secretary-general, see 16 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-Mar.
1961) at 71, U.N. Doc. S/4651 (1961) (letter discussing Belgian bases in the Congo); see
also L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 310; Halderman, supra
note 332, at 988. In 1985, the United Nations Department of Information wrote, in regard
to "peace-keeping operations," that "[t]hese operations can be considered as based on
Article 40 of the Charter." BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 6-7.
632. S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (I102d mtg.) at 2-4, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/19/Rev. 1 (1964). The resolution "recommends the creation, with the consent of
the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus" and
"recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of preserving
international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting
and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and
a return to normal conditions." Id. (emphasis in original); cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 36,
").
pam. I ("The Security Council may . .. recommend appropriate procedures ....
633. Conversely, if the Council wished to order the creation of such a force, it could
not do so under article 36, but would have to invoke article 40 and thus subject the order
to a British veto.
634. See S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (I 102d mtg.) at 2-4, S/INF/19/
Rev. I (requiring "the consent of the Government of Cyprus" before the force could be
created); 20 U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (3d mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 121/
SR.3 (1965) ("operations undertaken under Chapter VI . . . are not of a coercive
character"); 20 U.N. GAOR Special Political Comm. (3d mtg.) at 4-5, U.N. Doe. No.
A/AC.121/SR.3 (1965) (Sweden arguing that peacekeeping is not a chapter VII operation
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induce British consent are discussed below; 5 for now it is enough to
note that if the Council wished to pressure Britain into accepting a
peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland its best strategy would be to
invoke article 36(1), so that Britain could not veto the idea at its inception.
Once a resolution recommending a United Nations force for Northern
Ireland passed the Council, the political situation, and.any momentum
gathering behind a new hope for Ulster, would make it more difficult for
Britain to refuse to comply.
2. The Prospects of a United States Veto
Whether a resolution creating a Northern Ireland force was premised
on chapter VI or on chapter VII of the Charter, the United States could
veto the proposal, because it is a permanent member of the Security
Council and not a party to the Ulster crisis. The United States has not
been shy about exercising its veto power; its fifty-seven vetoes through
1986 are second only to the Soviet Union among the five superpowWhether it would do so to kill a chance to bring peace to
ers. 6'
Northern Ireland is a difficult question. On the one hand, the United
States' historic alliance with the United Kingdom on votes within the
Council indicates it would do so, at least if the resolution appeared to cast
Britain in a negative light and the British communicated their displeasure
with the resolution. 37 On the other, the United States has refused, on
admittedly rare occasions, to veto Council resolutions highly critical of
staunch allies when the evidence could not be ignored, or when countervailing political considerations dictated, even when the allies objected
vehemently." 5 In fact, it was the United States which responded to the
British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt by submitting the proposal that
eventually led to the withdrawal of the objecting allies, under withering
international pressure, in favor of the United Nations' first peacekeeping
force. 9
and therefore "could only be undertaken at the request of, or at least with the consent of,
the country where [the operations] were to take place").
635. See infra notes 683-728 and accompanying text.
636. S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 209.

637. See, e.g., 37 U.N. SCOR (2373d mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doe. S/15156/Rev.2 (1982)
(United States, with United Kingdom, vetoing resolution calling for immediate cease-fire
in the Falldands War).
638. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 607, 43 U.N. SCOR (2780th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doe. S/INF/44
(1988) (United States voting in favor of resolution "[ejxpressing grave concern" over Israeli
acts in occupied territories); S.C. Res. 592, 41 U.N. SCOR (2727th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/42 (1986) (United States abstaining where resolution "strongly deplore[d]" acts by
Israeli army).
639. See infra notes 729-37 and accompanying text.

In another example, the United

19901

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL

Moreover, there is strong sympathy for the plight of Northern Ireland
in general, and its Catholic population in particular, among the estimated
forty million United States citizens who claim Irish blood,' many of
whom have family in the troubled province."' The Bush administration
is heavily dependent on the white ethnic vote, causing the administration
at least to pause before casting a veto that might alienate such a central
component of the Bush electorate. More plausible, perhaps, would be
voluntary abstention, to which the United States has resorted when it
decided not to veto certain Council resolutions pertaining to Israel and
Britain.' 2 Like obligatory abstentions, voluntary abstentions have been
treated since 1949 as concurring votes. 3
3. The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution
Even if a veto killed a Security Council resolution calling for or
recommending a United Nations force in Northern Ireland, a mechanism
exists by which the other members of the Council and the General
Assembly could resurrect it. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of
States responded to Israel's 1978 invasion of Lebanon by submitting a proposal adopted by
the Council, calling on Israel to cease all military activity north of its border and
establishing the United Nations interim force in Lebanon. See S.C. Res. 425, 33 U.N.
SCOR Res. & Dec. (2074th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doe. S/INF/34 (1978). For the background
to and consequences of the United States proposal and the Security Council's adoption of
it, see BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 108-55.
640. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990,
§ 1, at 42 (110th ed.) (table 48); see A. GUELKE, supra note 127, at 128 (in the 1980
census, nearly one-in-five Americans-19%-identified themselves at least partially of Irish
descent).
641. D. CLARK, supra note 44, at 71-72.
642. For example, the United States abstained on S.C. Res. 66, 1 U.N. SCOR (396th
mtg.) at 30-31, U.N. Doe. S/INF/2/Rev. I (II!) (1948), critical of the United Kingdom's
actions in Palestine, and S.C. Res. 608, 44 U.N. SCOR (2781st mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/44 (1988), critical of Israel; see supra note 638; see also Bailey, New Light on
Abstentions in the UN Security Council, 50 INT'L AFFS. 554, 564-73 (1974).
643. In 1946, the Soviet Union became the first permanent member of the Security
Council to express a preference to abstain rather than to veto, and the other members did
not object. See I U.N. SCOR (39th mtg.) at 243 (1946). By the end of 1948 all the other
permanent members had followed suit. See I S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 47 & n.98
(citing examples). In 1971, the International Court of Justice noted that the procedure of
treating these abstentions as a form of concurrence "has been generally accepted by the
Members" and is evidence of "a general practice" within the United Nations. Namibia
(S.W Africa Advisory Opinion), 1971 I.C.J. 3, 22; see also I S. BAILEY, supra, at 47.
By the end of 1979 the permanent members had cast some 200 voluntary abstentions. S.
BAILEY, supra note 471, at 225.
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1950,' devised by the United States to circumvent Soviet opposition to
United Nations intervention in Korea" and based on the United States'
constitutional system for overriding presidential vetoes:'
[1If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making the appropriate
recommendations to members for collective measures,
including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to
maintain or restore international peace and security." a
The constitutional basis of this resolution was subsequently affirmed
by the International Court of Justice, which recognized that article 24
confers on the Security Council "'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace,"' but noted that this authority was "not
exclusive. ""
644.

G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/ 1175 (1950).

645. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 122; Editorial
Comment, The "Uniting For Peace" Resolution of the United Nations, 45 AM. J.INT'L L.
129, 131 (1951).

646. D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 311-12.
647.

G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/ 1175 (1950).
If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in
emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request
therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested
by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a
majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Id.
648. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (advisory opinion)
(quoting article 24). For this conclusion the court primarily relied on Article 14, under
which:
[T]he General Assembly may recommend measure for peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare
or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from violating
of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 14. Foremost among these purposes, of course, is the maintenance of
international peace and security. Id. art. 1, para. 1.The court apparently adopted in large
measure the argument made by United States secretary of state Dean Acheson in submitting
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The terms of the resolution are not unlimited; they do not, for
example, empower the Assembly to recommend collective peacekeeping
in response to violations of human rights not considered a threat to the
peace. 9 In such a situation, the resolution would have to pass the
Council. And unlike the Council, the Assembly cannot require action; it
can only, by a vote of at least two-thirds of the Assembly, recommend
This,
collective peacekeeping in response to a threat to the peace.'
however, seems a semantic distinction, for when the General Assembly,
acting pursuant to Uniting for Peace Resolution, "requested" the
Secretary-General to draw up plans for an emergency force to contain the
Suez crisis, despite Security Council vetoes by Britain and France, both
of which had invaded Egypt, the plans were ready within a day and within
three the force was authorized by the Assembly.651 At the very least,
an overwhelming General Assembly vote to recommend peacekeeping in
Northern Ireland would "serve as a rallying point for voluntary collective
action. "652
It seems likely a peacekeeping proposal in Northern Ireland could
the proposal to the General Assembly:
Article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and this is the way it should be.
But if the Security Council is not able to act because of the obstructive
tactics of a permanent member, the Charter does not leave the United
Nations impotent. The obligation of all Members to take action to
maintain or restore the peace does not disappear because of a veto.
The Charter, in Articles 10, 11, and 14, also vests in the General
Assembly authority and responsibility for matters affecting international
peace. The General Assembly can and should organize itself to
discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security
Council is prevented from acting.
5 U.N. GAOR (279th mtg.) at 24, U.N. Doe. A/PV.279 (1950). It thus has been said that
"Ltlhe Uniting for Peace resolution proclaimed the paramountcy of the purpose of the
United Nations as stated in Article 1(1): 'To maintain international peace and security,"'
which cannot be abridged by superpower veto. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS,
supra note 329, at 124.
649. The resolution allows such action in response to "a threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression." See G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at
10, U.N. Doe. A/1175 (1950).
650. D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 311. But the General Assembly must act within
24 hours of the issue being sent to it from the Security Council. See G.A. Res. 377, 5
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doe. A/l 175 (1950).
651. See G.A. Res. 1001 (ES-I), 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1 (Supp. I) at 3, U.N.
Doe. A/3354 (1956); G.A. Res. 998 (ES-I), 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. I (Supp. 1)at
2, U.N. Doe. A/3354 (1956). The first UNEF troops were in place eight days later, BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 21, at 43-50.
652. Editorial Comment, supra note 645, at 134.
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garner the necessary two-thirds vote in the Assembly, at least if the
Republic of Ireland supported it. As a neutral country, party to neither
NATO nor the Warsaw pact, 3 the Irish Republic is part of a bloc of
more than 120 nonaligned nations." 4 Although this bloc is not monolithic, it tends to take a common position on three issues that form the
priority agenda of Third World concerns, two of which-ending colonialism and instituting self-determination for all people6' 5-are implicated
in Northern Ireland. The preeminent concern of these countries is to
ensure superpower respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.'
The colonial cast to the British presence in the North of Ireland" 7 would likely lead the nonaligned bloc to support a resolution
calling for British withdrawal in favor of United Nations peacekeeping.65
Additionally, some of the twelve formerly communist bloc
countries6" are now democratically socialist and thus still likely to
support any proposal considered favorable to the socialist IRA. Those
non-socialist former communist countries-such as Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Nicaragua-are third world in nature, still suffering the effects of
foreign domination and likely empathetic with the Ulster minority. In any
event, the third world and socialist countries combined still exceed by a
comfortable margin a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly,'
and this count excludes certain western countries that have been critical of
Britain's handling of the Ulster crisis, or have suffered violence within
their borders as a consequence of the conflict, or have strongly supported
previous peacekeeping efforts."'
653. Since its inception, the Republic has maintained strict neutrality in order to fulfill
a self-appointed role as a "link between the Western bloc and the Third World."
K.
BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 104.
654. See McHenry, Remarks Delivered on the Occasion of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary
of Fordham Law School October 1, 1980, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1980).

655. Id. The third issue is realignment of the global economy to ensure a fairer
allocation of resources to all nations. Id.
656. Id. at 8. For example, the invasion of Soviet tanks into nonaligned Afghanistan
sparked a furor among the nonaligned nations and an emergency session of the General
Assembly, which overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from that country. See G.A. Res. ES-6/2, 35 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 6
(Supp. 1) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/ES-6/2 (1980); see MeHenry, supra note 655, at 5.
657. See supra notes 53-74 & 535 and accompanying text.
658. Cf. D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 312 ("[E]ven fundamental questions of war and
peace are of less interest to [the non-aligned] bloc than colonialism and distribution of
global resources.").
659.

Cf id.

660. As of January 1, 1987, the United Nations included 159 member states, see S.
BAILEY, supra note 471, at 142 (table 8) (two-thirds equals 106 members).
661. This would include Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Spain and the
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Consequently, it seems probable proponents of a Northern Ireland
peacekeeping force could override the threat of a superpower veto.
B. Obtaining British Consent to a Peacekeeping
Force in Northern Ireland
Assuming the Security Council or General Assembly approved an
Ulster peacekeeping resolution, Britain could play a final card to block
United Nations intervention. The "Guiding Principles" for United Nations
Peacekeeping authored by then-secretary-general Hammarskjold in 1956,
explained that while the Assembly can establish the force, it cannot "be
stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent
of that country.""2 This edict, that the Assembly cannot require any
state to accept a United Nations force within its borders, has become a
touchstone of the law, such as it is, governing peacekeeping.' As will
be seen, it also appears host state consent is required for Council-created
forces, as well. Yet it is far from certain Britain would block deployment
of a United Nations peacekeeping force once created.
1. The Requirement of Consent
Whether under the Charter consent is conditio sine qua non for
deployment of forces created by the Security Council is an issue of heated
Some scholars argue that if the Council finds the threat to
debate.'
international peace and security sufficiently grave, articles 41 and 42 allow
the Council to deploy a contingent regardless. 5 This argument has
which
been significantly undermined by the demise of article 42,'
allowed the Council to employ force without regard for claims of domestic
Others, however, point to articles 25 66 and 40,1
jurisdiction. 7
Scandinavian countries.
662. 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/3302 (1956); see Higgins, A
GeneralAssessment of United Nations Peace-keeping, in UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING:
LEGAL ESSAYS 5 (A. Cassesse ed. 1978) [hereinafter U.N. PEACE-KEEPING]; Sohn, supra
note 630, at 238.
663. See Garvey, United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 241, 241 (1970); Comment, The United Nations Emergency Force-Legal Status,
57 MICH. L.R. 56, 60 (1958).
664. See, e.g., Ciobana, The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peace-keeping
Operations, in U.N. PEACE-KEEPING, supra note 662, at 37-41.
665. See id.; D.W. BowEr, supra note 402, at 413-17; D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471,
at 308, Higgins, supra note 662, at 5.
666. See supra note 620 and accompanying text.
667. The principle of non-intervention "in matters which are essentially within the
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which together require all member nations to "accept and carry out" all
Council decisions, including those for collective measures, as evidence of
the binding nature of Council resolutions, which renders consent
unnecessary.'
There is some support for the latter position in United Nations'
history. Hammarsjkjold, in the same "Guiding Principles" discussed
above, did not exclude the possibility of the Council stationing or
operating a force even absent host state consent.67' More importantly,
the United Nations' force in the Congo "appears not to [have been]
predicated on the consent of the host state."'67 Although the enabling
resolution referred to the consent of the Congolese government, 6 3 in
fact the force operated independent of, and often at odds with, that
nation's officials, and engaged in occasional military operations against,
domestic jurisdiction of any state," is limited under the Charter so that it does "no

prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII," such as those
prescribed in article 42. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
668. This article stipulates: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Id. art. 25.
669. Under this article:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the
rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security
Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such
provisional measures.
Id. art. 40.
670. See Miller, Legal Aspects of U.N. Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15
(1961); Sohn, supra note 630, at 238.
671. See II U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1, at4, U.N. Doe. A/3302 (1956).
672. See Miller, supra note 670, at 15. But see Nathanson I, supra note 623, at 652
(ONUC and other early peacekeeping efforts "introduced with the general consent of all
the contending parties and with the specific consent of the state upon whose territory the
force was to be stationed.").
673. The Security Council authorized the secretary-general:
[T]o take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of
the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such
military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of
the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United
Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the
Government, to meet fully their tasks.
S.C. Res. 143, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (873d mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev. 1

(1960).
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and firefights with, the Congolese army." 4 In response, the Security
Council passed a resolution to remind the Congo, as well as Belgium,
whose troops were aiding the secessionist movement in the Katanga
province, of their obligation, "in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of
the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by
the Security Council." 675
Nonetheless, the deployment of a peacekeeping force against the host
state's will is highly unlikely to occur. A clear mandate of support from
the parties involved is considered essential for the mission to succeed.676
Taking such a drastic step against the expressed will of a permanent
member of the Security Council, such as Britain, seems unfathomable.
Since its inception the United Nations has been loath to challenge any of
the major powers on military matters.67 7 In practice, every peacekeeping effort since the Korean War has been initiated only at the request or
consent of the host state, 67 even the Congo force. 6'
Subsequent
events in that fractured country may be better understood as standing for
the proposition that the host government cannot unilaterally terminate the
peacekeeping effort, at least not where its action stems from the unwillingness of the United Nations force to act as an arm of that government.'t
Thus Britain, even after a force has been established, can deny it
permission to deploy within Northern Ireland. This need not prove fatal.
There is nothing in the Charter or in United Nations' practice that
674. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 224-27, 231-33, 245-46.
675. See S.C. Res. 146, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (886th mtg.) at 6-7, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/15/Rev. 1 (1960). Although the resolution was directed at "member states," and

the Congo had not yet joined the United Nations, it had previously agreed to accept article
49 as a prerequisite to United Nations involvement. See Miller, supra note 670, at 15 &

n.63; see also BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 224-25.
676. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 4; Nathanson I, supra note 623, at 653;
Comment, supra note 663, at 60-61 (quoting 12 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1, at 24, U.N.
Doe. A/3302/Add.4/Rev. 1 (1956)).
677. Indeed, the Charter, especially in installing the superpower veto mechanism in

article 27(3), seems to recognize that the United Nations cannot challenge, effectively, a
superpower bent on war or war-like designs. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A.
SIMONS, supra note 329, at 11.
678. INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, PEACEKEEPER'S HANDBOOK 22 (1984); Nathanson I,
supra note 623, at 652.
679. ONUC was created and dispatched at the request of the Congolese Government.
See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 218, 222-27.
680. See Miller, supra note 670, at 15; Sohn, supra note 630, at 239-40. Hammarskjold emphasized that United Nations peacekeepers may not take any action which would
make them a party to internal conflict in the country. See 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (JulySept. 1960) at 18-19, U.N. Doe. S/4389 (1960).
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conditions the creation of a peacekeeping force on host state consent; it is
only the deployment of that force which cannot be undertaken absent such
consent."' Were the Assembly or Council to establish a peacekeeping
force for Northern Ireland, it would certainly increase the political
pressure upon Britain to allow the force to deploy and, perhaps, induce
consent."*
2. The Pressure on Britain to Consent
The pressure on Britain is already considerable. There are those who
believe Britain for years has been seeking a way to disentangle itself from
the Ulster brier patch without pricking itself on the thorns of apparent
defeat, humiliation or deeper civil war.0 Thatcher's personal vendetta
against the IRA, stemming, understandably, from the guerrillas' nearly
successful attempt to kill her in the Brighton hotel bombing of 1984,6"
might well have led her to bar United Nations involvement; with Thatcher
now out of power, there is substantial evidence that the British might
welcome "withdrawal with honor." Economically, the cost of maintaining
an armed presence in Northern Ireland through 1980 topped £499 billion,
and from 1980 through 1985 ran between £111 million and £149 million
each year. 5 Total British financial support for Ulster from 1968
through 1985 exceeded an astronomical £13.65 billion, 6 and the annual
outlay has skyrocketed from £1.671 billion in the 1984-85 fiscal year to
up to £4 billion in more recent years. 6 7
Thatcher's singleness of purpose also led to a sacrificing of civil
681.

See Sohn, supra note 630, at 238-39 ("if consent should not be given, the Force

would not be entitled to enter the territory of that state"); Comment, supra note 663, at 6061. At least one member of the United Nations has expressed a contrary view, however.
See 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1,at 23-24, U.N. Doc. A13302/Add. 4/Rev. 1 (1956)
(India) ("It is understood that the Force may have to function through Egyptian territory.
Therefore, there must be Egyptian consent for its establishment.").

682. See W. FRYE, supra note 356, at 7; Comment, supra note 663, at 61.
683. See J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 211; Wheatcroft, Pessimism About Ulster, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 18, 1985, at A31, col. 2.; Lewis, A Wee Hope for Ulster, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 1985, at A35, col. 5.
684. See, e.g., Atlas, supra note 596, at 38.
685. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 15.
686. Id.

687. Compare id. (1984-85) with S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xiv (estimates as of
1987). Of course, this annual outlay curtails by a like amount the federal funds available
for financing government programs on the mainland. See P. HAIN, POLITICAL TRIALS IN
BRITAIN 226-27 (1984) (Ulster "affects political priorities [in Britainl-for example,
military and public spending in the North could be said to be at the expense of public
projects in Britain's strife-tom inner cities.").

19901

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PROPOSAL

liberties in the name of national security.68 While this fallout might
bring little discomfort to British politicians if confined to Ulster, 6s9
Britain itself has not escaped unscathed. According to some accounts,
Ulster has become Britain's Vietnam,' at once both a testing ground
for the latest devices and strategies in counter-insurgency warfare 69 which has brought Britain widespread condemnation at home and
abroad69-and a bloody quagmire that through late 1988 had claimed
the lives of 850 British soldiers, local militia and police. '
As one Labour Party spokesman reported, "Northern Ireland is being
used as a laboratory for draconian measures to be used later in other parts
of the United Kingdom."'
Apparently the tactics used to obtain
confessions from detainees has been long since imported to the mainland;
688. See supra notes 149-229 and accompanying text.
689. Irish republicans have difficulty informing the British public of their complaints
with the central government. See J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 215; Northern Ireland:
Whose Oxygen?, supra note 199, at 62-63. Under new legislation, no person can rn for
elected political office unless s/he first takes an oath disavowing support for any proscribed
organization, including the IRA. Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act, 1989, §§ 5-8
& sched. 2. Moreover, proscription laws have allowed police to imprison members of
legal non-proscribed organizations if, for example, they raised money to support nonviolent republican activities and for selling republican newspapers. See C. WALKER,
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 50 (1986).

Broadcast interviews with

republicans have also been banned under the Broadcast Act of 198 1.Broadcast Act, 198 1,
§ 29; see Hillyard & Percy-Smith, supra note 198 at 538; Boudin, supra note 196, at AIS,
col. 2; Whitney, supra note 14, at AS, col. 4; see also supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
690. See, e.g., D. DOUMrrr, supra note 132, at 228.
691. See A. SAMPSON, THE CHANGING ANATOMY OF BRITAIN 250-51 (1982); J.
FEEHAN, supra note 76, at 56-57.
692. See, e.g., Murdoch, Rights of Public Assembly and Procession, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
FROM RHETORIC TO REAUTY 193 (T.Campbell ed. 1986) ("British civil liberties are in
a state of moral crisis"); see also infra notes 704-20 and accompanying text; supra notes
108-09, 205-11, 223-28, 567-70 & 595 and accompanying text.
693. Police statistics through 1988 listed 850 military and police deaths from political
violence. IR. INFORMATION PARTNERSHIP, supra note 12, at 14 (table 1); see Whitney,
supra note 14, at AS, col. 6.
694. Radio Interview of Kevin McNamara, Labour Party spokesman, quoted in Britain
Moves to End Right of Silence by Irish Suspects, San Francisco Exam., Oct. 20, 1988, at
A2, col. 3; see K. KELLEY, supra note *,at 367 ("[Diemocratic accountability in Britain,
corroded by the long and ugly experience in the North of Ireland, gives way to an
authoritarian secrecy."); Jennings, supra note 150, at 140 ("[lIt has been argued for a
number of years that Northern Ireland serves as a training ground for British security
forces, who might need to apply the same techniques of population control in Britain.").
See generally P. HAIN, supra note 687, at 226-28, 233-36 (detailing Northern Ireland's
"Impact on the British Mainland").
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in early 1988 Amnesty International released a report on Alleged Forced
Admissions During Incommunicado Detention, which "questioned the
fairness of British trials" on the mainland."S This problem is also
illustrated not only by case of the Birmingham Six,' but also by the
cases of the Guildford Four and McGuire Seven, in which the eleven
defendants served more than fourteen years in prison-for crimes the
government now concedes they did not commit-on the strength of
confessions obtained under duress and evidence fabricated by the
The Thatcher government also planned to extend to England
police.'
and Wales the decree eliminating a suspect's right to remain silent,s
and introduced paramilitary-style policing of black and Asian neighborhoods.6
In addition to restricting media coverage of Northern Ireland and
attempting to ban or discredit reports with which the prime minister
disagreed, the Thatcher government launched an extraordinary offensive
The 1986
against the freedoms of speech and press on the mainland.'
Public Order Act introduced broad restrictions on the right of public
protest, criminalizing, inter alia, mere speech if it is insulting or
Home Secretary Douglas Hurd's recent
disagreeable to another."0
White Paper, Reform of Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act of 1911,'
was enacted as the Official Secrets Act of 1989 and criminalizes, on
penalty of imprisonment, disclosure of governmental information even if
doing so is in the public interest.'
695. Amnesty Int'l, Alleged Forced Admissions During Incommunicado Detention,
Press Release No. EUR 45/01/88 (Feb. 1988).
696. See supra notes 181 & 595 and accompanying text.
697. See R. v. Richardson, [19891 C.L.Y.B. 752 (Court of Appeals quashing Guildford
Four convictions); Mills & Jones supra note 183, at 1, col. I (British government
announcing McGuire convictions 'cannot stand'); G. MCKEE & R. FRANEY, TIME BOMB:
IRISH BOMBERS, ENGLISH JUSTICE AND TlE GUILDFORD FOUR 142-51 (1988); Toolis, supra

note 182, at 32.
698. See A Half-Bill of Rights supra note 205, at 15-16; Atlas, supra note 596, at 37;
Jenkins, supra note 219, at 17, 23; Whitney, supra note 205, at 2, col. 1.
699. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 366. The government also has authorized the use of
plastic bullets by mainland police to squelch dissent on the mainland. P. HAIN, supra note
687, at 228; Jennings, supra note 150, at 141.
700. See BBC: Censorship in Northern Ireland, supra note 565, at 32; Gibraltar

Shootings, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept. 1988, at 35; K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 366;
Atlas, supra note 596, at 37; Wilson, supra note 198, at 33.
701. Public Order Act, 1986, § 5; see Douzinas, Homewood & Warrington, The
Shrinking Scope for Public Protest, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept. 1988, at 12, 15; Atlas,
supra note 596, at 37.

702. CMND. 408 (1988).
703. Official Secrets Act, 1989, §§ 1-6; see Hennessy, Not by Teabags Alone: British
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The government's curtailment of fundamental rights in England
sparked loud internal criticism. "The intensification of authoritarian rule
in the United Kingdom has only recently begun," announced Charter 88,
a manifesto issued by 250 members of England's intelligentsia who intend
"The
to pressure the government into enacting a written constitution.'
time has come," they wrote, "to demand political, civil and human rights
in the United Kingdom." 5 The Index on Censorship, a British publication previously devoted to monitoring suppression of speech in such places
as eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, in 1988 released the first issue in its
seventeen-year history devoted to suppression in a Western democracy .7
"Liberty is ill in Britain," begins Ronald Dworkin's keynote
article in the Index.'7 "The sad truth is that the very concept of liberty
.. .is being challenged and corroded by the Thatcher government. " '
The conservative
Nor are only left-leaning intellectuals concerned.
Sunday Times ofLondon opined that "'the defense of personal freedom has
now slid alarmingly low in the priorities of Mrs. Thatcher's government,'"'
and the Economist decried Thatcher's trampling on the
liberties of the subject.71
As noted, Amnesty
International pressure is also increasing.
International in 1988 issued three well-documented reports of violations
in Northern Ireland and England;"' the European Court of Human
Rights found Britain's detention laws in violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights;7 2 the New York Times ran an editorial,
headlined "Mrs. Thatcher's Muzzle," decrying Britain's recent crackdowns on fundamental freedoms as "spectacularly wrong," 71 3 and
printed an opinion piece on "The Appeal of a British Bill of Rights"; 714
and the New York Review of Books featured a cover story on "Not-so Free
Secrecy and the Proposed Reform of the Official Secrets Act, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept.
1988, at 9-12; Atlas, supra note 596, at 37; Jenkins, supra note 219, at 22.
704. Ainsworth, British Group Starts Pushing for a Written Constitution, San Francisco
Chron., Dec. 10, 1988, at A14, col. 3.
705. Atlas, supra note 596, at 36.
706. Hoffman, Why Britain?, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept. 1988, at 2.
707. Dworkin, Devaluing Liberty, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Sept. 1988, at 7.

708. Id.
709. Quoted in Atlas, supra note 596, at 37, col. 2.
710. A Half-Bill of Rights, supra note 205, at 15.
711. See supra notes 42, 168, 181, 595 & 695 and accompanying text.
712. Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); see
supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
713. Mrs. Thatcher's Muzzle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, at A30, col. 1 (editorial).
714. Whitney, supra note 205, at 2, col. 1.
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715

Speech in Britain."
Once the connection is made between the War in Ireland and
economic and political consequences in England, pressure at home and
abroad may shift toward a call for withdrawal, if feasible, from Northern
Ireland. This is all the more so because the cost in British lives and
suffering has been equally high. Nearly half of the 850 security force
personnel that have been killed as a consequence of the Anglo-Irish
conflic 16 have been British,717 and thousands more soldiers have been
wounded.7 18 In the first ten years alone in Ulster, the British army
suffered heavier casualties than it had during operations in Aden, Borneo
or Cyprus. 719 For every casualty there are relatives such as John
Winter, father of one of the British soldiers killed in the summer
bombings of 1988, who ask: "Why do we keep our forces in Northern
Ireland? Why are our young men getting killed like this? Just what are
we trying to achieve and is it really worth it? It is an unnatural war and
the worst kind of war. "m
With answers to these questions not apparent, the British public has
shown little enthusiasm for the War of Ireland. Polls reveal a majority of
English citizens desire withdrawal and would approve a pull-out initiative
on the ballot."1 London's policy of Ulsterization, by which the number
of British troops are reduced as the RUC and UDR become the frontline
fighters, has been called an attempt at a compromised form of withUlsterization succeeded in lowering army strength in Ulster
drawal.'
from a peak of 23,000 in 1973 to 9,000 in 19 8 4 .' Yet in the broader
715. Jenkins, supra note 219.

716. See supra note 693 and accompanying text.
717.

K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 14.

718. In the first decade of the conflict, the number of British army and UDR wounded
Jenkins, Political Constraints: London, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
totalled 3,062.
NORTHERN IRELAND 167 (D. Watt ed. 1981).
719. Janke, supra note 44, at 24.
720.

What Is King's Answer?, SPECTATOR, Aug. 27, 1988, at 5, col. 1.

721. In the later 1970s, British polls showed 53% of Britons favored withdrawal and
only 30% opposed it. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 198. By February 1987 a Daily
Express survey revealed the percentage advocating withdrawal had risen to 61%. S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xiv; see K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 368. A 1988 MORI
poll found only 35% of the British public supported the British military presence in Ulster.
Backing of One in Five for Ulster Pullout Now, The Times (London), Mar. 25, 1988, at
24, col. 5 (finding 21% desired immediate withdrawal and 29% favored phased withdrawal
within a preset time, while 14% expressed no preference).
722. See J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 200.
723.
col. 3.

K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 70; Thomas, supra note 161, at A2,
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sense, this strategy has failed; when violence escalates, London has no
choice but to commit more troops, as it did, for example, in January
1986,7 increasing to 16,000 the number of soldiers in Northern
Ireland.'
The Hillsborough Treaty itself illustrates the lengths to which the
British government is willing to go in an attempt to rid itself of its "Irish
problem." In 1984, Thatcher cried "Out! Out! Out!" to the proposals
of the New Ireland Forum in Dublin, rejecting any diminution of British
sovereignty over the North that the concepts advocated by the Forum-a
unitary state, or a federal state, or joint authority' -might entail. 727
Yet one year later Thatcher signed a treaty granting the Irish Republic a
watered-down version of joint authority, revealing that her government
was willing to defy even its allies, the unionists, in exchange for an
opportunity to begin the process of disentanglement."' In light of the
pact's failure to remove the need for a British military presence in the
North, and with international and internal criticism mounting, new prime
minister John Major and his ministers might view a United Nations' force
as the last chance for Britain to exit Ulster with some dignity intact.
It would not be the first time Britain reluctantly accepted United
Nations' peacekeeping as the only avenue out of internationally disfavored
military action. In late 1956, the United Kingdom joined France and
Israel in an air and land assault on large portions of Egypt directed at
gaining control of the Suez Canal and deposing Egyptian President
Nassar.'
A draft Security Council resolution presented by the United
States-calling for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of Israeli
troops and the termination by all parties of resort to force-was vetoed by
Britain and France,7' as was a similar resolution by the Soviet Union."3 After the matter was removed to an emergency session of the
724. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. In late 1990, the British government
was forced to escalate its troop-strength yet again to an anticipated IRA winter offensive.
Violence in Ulster, supra note 12, at 3, col. 1.
725. O'Malley, supra note 315, at 29.
726. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 28-32.
727. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at xv; K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at
28. Thatcher's exact words were: "'I have made it clear that a unified Ireland is out. A
second solution was confederation-that is out. A third solution, joint authority, that is out
.... " K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 368 (quoting Thatcher).
728. What is King's Answer?, supra note 720, at 5, col. 3.
729. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 41-43; 1 S. Bailey, supra note 304, at 120.
730.

!1 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1956) at 110, U.N. Doc. S/3710 (1956).

731. Id.at 112.
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General Assembly under the Uniting For Peace Resolution, 732 a similar
resolution was overwhelmingly adopted, with Britain among the dissenters,733 and the next day the Assembly approved a resolution requesting
the Secretary-General for the first time to prepare "an emergency
international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation
of hostilities." '
Although the resolution specifically linked "setting up" the force to
"the consent of the nations concerned," 735 in fact none of the parties
involved voted for the resolution. 736 The shift in the Anglo-Franco
position from outright rejection of United Nations' intervention to
reluctant acceptance of UNEF and subsequent withdrawal of British and
French troops has been credited to the political pressure created by the
high-profile United Nations concern over, and rejection of, the AngloFranco invasion. 37
Other examples exist. Belgium, acceding to considerable international
pressure, accepted United Nations' peacekeeping in the Congo, despite
explicit United Nations condemnation of the Belgian invasion of its former
colony. 738 Similarly, Indonesia accepted United Nations' temporary
political and security force control over West New Guinea-after its
unilateral military action against Dutch rule in the territory provoked
international concern-largely due to the persuasive efforts of SecretaryGeneral Thant.739
But perhaps the most apt analogy to Northern Ireland also involves
Britain. When in 1964 interethnic hostilities escalated on Cyprus, a tiny
republic bitterly divided into two communities, one a distinct minority," Britain deployed its own peacekeeping contingent on the island.
Only after this force came under attack did London admit it could not
handle the deteriorating situation alone and urgently seek United Nations'
732. 11 U.N. SCOR (751st mtg.) at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.751 (1956).
733. G.A. Res. 997 (ES-I), II U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. .1 (Supp. 1)at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/3354 (1956). The vote was 64-5, with six abstentions and Israel, France, Australia and
New Zealand also in opposition. Id.
734. G.A. Res. 998 (ES-1), 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. I (Supp. 1) at2, U.N. Doc.
A/3354 (1956).
735. Id.
736. 11 U.N. GAOR E.S.S. No. 1,at 71, U.N. Doe. A/3276 (1956). The vote was
57-0, with 19 abstentions, including Egypt, Israel, France and Britain. Id.
737. See I S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 120 nn.48-49.
738. See 15(1) U.N. SCOR (173d mtg.) at 36-37, U.N. Doe. S/PV.850 (1960).
739. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 303-05.
740. See, e.g., FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AM. UNIV., CYPRUS: A COUNTRY STUDY, xiv,

207-13 (F. Bunge ed. 1979); Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1024-43.
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assistance.74 If British soldiers could not keep the peace in a country
of 600,000 where they were regarded as neutral, it makes little sense for
Britain to argue that British soldiers can restore peace to a province of 1.6
million where they are definitely not considered neutral by a sizable
minority of the population.
All things considered, if sufficient political pressure was brought to
bear within the United Nations, it does not seem beyond possibility that
Britain would consent, albeit reluctantly, to deployment of a United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Northern Ireland, especially if that force
had already been created by either the Security Council or the General
Assembly.
VI.

THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING
IN NORTHERN IRELAND

There remains one considerable concern, voiced not infrequently by
commentators, regarding the potential for United Nations peacekeeping in
Northern Ireland: could it work?.742 Prior 1988, the United Nations had
invoked its peacekeeping power in response to thirteen different crises,
seven of which entailed substantial military operations.74 3 While it is far
too early to judge the effectiveness of recently established United Nations
forces,'" it is undeniable that certain of the previous peacekeeping
741. See 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-June 1964) at 66, U.N. Doc. S/5543 (1964); R.
DENKTASH, THE CYPRUS TRIANGLE 28 (1982); 2 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 676;
Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1044-47; see also supra note 318 and accompanying text; infra
notes 851-53 and accompanying text.
742. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 39; P. O'MALLEY, supra note 44,
at 250-51.

743. The first was the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1), which
patrolled the Egypt-Israel sector from November 1956 through May 1967. Then came the
United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC), deployed in what is now Zaire from July
1960 through June 1964; the United Nations Security Force in West Iran (then West New
Guinea) (UNSF), from September 1962 through April 1963; and the Second United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF II), from October 1973 through July 1979. Three other forces
remain in operation: the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),
established March 1964; the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),
established in the Syrian Golan Heights May 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFL), established March 1978. The remaining six were observer missions:
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (1948) (Palestine); the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) (1949); the United
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) (1958); the United Nations Yemen
Observation Mission (UNYOM) (1963); the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation
Mission (UNIPOM) (1965); and the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General
in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) (1965). BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 8.
744. The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group was created Aug. 9, 1988
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forces proved ill-advised, in large measure because they were deployed
where conditions conspired against successful operations on the
ground" or because they were dispatched to "political graveyards" 7"
where there was little chance of achieving a negotiated resolution of the
of communal peacekeeping at times
strife. Consequently, the propriety
747
has been severely undermined.
Although the Security Council has the authority to investigate any
to protect the ceasefire. S.C. Res. 619, 43 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (2824th mtg.) at 11,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/44 (1988); see U.N. DEP'T PUB. INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW
OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 325-29, U.N. Sales No. E.90.1. 18 (2d rev. ed 1990)

[hereinafter BLUE HELMETS II]; Rule, supra note 20, at Al, col. 1. The United Nations
Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan was created April 14, 1988, in Kabul
and Islamabad, to monitor Soviet troop withdrawal. 43 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June),
U.N. Doe. S/19834 (1988); S.C. Res. 622, 43 U.N. SCOR (2828th mtg.) at 14, U.N.
Doe. S/INF/44 (1988); see BLUE HELMETS II, supra, at 317-18; Rule, supra, at A7, col.
1. The mission was also intended to monitor compliance with the 1988 Geneva accords
calling for a permanent ceasefire and political settlement. See BLUE HELMETS II, supra,
at 316-17; Lewis, U.N. Secretariat is Reorganized, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at A5,
col. 5; Lewis, U.N. Strains to Meet the Demandfor Peace, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1988,
§ 4, at 3, col. 1. The Soviet withdrawal led to an Afghan civil war, however, the
resolution of which cannot be predicted as this Article goes to press. The United Nations
mission's mandate expired March 15, 1990. BLUE HELMETS II, supra, at 322. Finally,
the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), which includes 4,350
peacekeeping soldiers, established pursuant to S.C. Res. 435, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec.
(2082d mtg.) at 13, U.N. Doe. S/INF/34 (1978), began in April 1989 its task of overseeing
Namibia's transition from South African colony to independent state. See S.C. Res. 632
(2848th mtg.) (Feb. 16, 1989), Journal of the United Nations, No 89/34 (pt. II) at 5 (Feb.
17, 1989) (implementing Res. 435); BLUE HELMErS II, supra, at 350-53; Wren, Did
Naribia Rebels MisreadAccord?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1989, at A3, col. 1. UNTAG was
aided by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, established by S.C. Res. 626,
43 U.N. SCOR (2834th mtg.) at 19, U.N. Doe S/INF/44 (1988), which monitored Cuban
military withdrawal from Angola. See BLUE HELMETS II, supra, at 338-40. Despite early
difficulties, when pitched battles between South African and Namibian independence forces
threatened the procession toward Namibian independence, see id. at 361-67, UNTAG
eventually implemented a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces, and Namibian independence
became official March 21, 1990. See id. at 365-84.
745. This was especially true in Lebanon. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 11429, 135-47; Wretched Are the Peacekeepers, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1988, at 34.
746. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 39.
747. Through 1988, 733 peacekeeping soldiers had been killed, Lewis, U.N. Chief
Warns of Costs of Peace, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at 4, col. I, of which 163 died in
Lebanon alone in the past 11 years, including 29 Irish soldiers. Hijazi, Mine Kills 3 Irish
U.N. Soldiers in South Lebanon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at A 1l, col. 1. Some
500,000 soldiers from 58 nations have worn the blue helmet during the first 40 years of
United Nations peacekeeping. Nobel Honors U.N. Foot Troops, San Francisco Chron.,
Oct. 1, 1988, at A14, col. 1.
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dispute or situation into which the United Nations might send a peacekeeping contingent, this fact-finding power has been underutilized in the
past, 748 occasionally leading the Council or the Assembly to underestimate the might and ability of the antagonist forces749 or to miscalculate
the structural causes of the conflict and the prospects for pacific settlement. 7 ° The result has been mistakes in attitude and approach that have
profoundly impaired the subsequent conduct of certain operations. 5
Admittedly, the possibility of similar errors in regard to Northern Ireland
is not minimal; while some international organizations-most notably
Amnesty International-have undertaken investigations of the situation
there as recently as last year, these have focused on isolated aspects of the
dispute, 752 and none have addressed the unique question of whether
conditions in Northern Ireland auger ill or well for peacekeeping in the
province.
As one scholar put it, "[k]nowledge of the essential facts is a
prerequisite of wise diplomacy." 753 Accordingly, the Security Council
should invoke its investigatory authority and call for a fact-finding mission
to Northern Ireland, prior to consideration of possible peacekeeping there.
The following discussion provides a brief overview of the legal basis and
political advantages of this proposal, a suggested mandate for the mission,
and an analysis of the mission's likely findings and conclusions.
A.

The Legal Basis and PoliticalAdvantages
of a Fact-finding Mission

Among its procedural powers, perhaps the Council's most potent is its
authority to "establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions, " " which, according to the Repertory of
United Nations Practice, includes the power to create "commissions "7or
committees which deal with particular questions in the field. 1
Moreover, article 34 bestows on the Council broad substantive power to:
748.

See

D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 318.

749. See I S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 75.
750. INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, supra note 678, at 25.

751. Id.
752. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES, supra note 42.
753. 2 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 44; see also R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra
note 409, at 266.
754. U.N. CHARTER art. 29.
755. 11 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 115 (1955) (citing as examples the
Committee of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents and the United Nations
Commission for Indonesia).
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[I]nvestigate any dispute, or any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. 7
Nowhere does the Charter preclude the Council from undertaking
investigations not explicitly contemplated in article 34, nor does it specify
how the Council should conduct its inquiries. In this vacuum, the Council
has considered itself competent to question the parties directly, 75 7 to

or to request that the secreestablish subsidiary investigative organs,
tary-general do so. 7' The Council has twice instructed the secretarygeneral to investigate and recommend appropriate marching orders for
peacekeeping forces,7 ' but has not investigated to determine if peacekeeping was a viable option before dispatching the troops. The General
Assembly also possesses general investigatory power, 6 which it in 1967
underscored in an influential resolution stressing the importance of the
fact-finding function.762
756. U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
757. See, e.g., 19 U.N. SCOR (1143d mtg.) at 112, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1143 (1964)
(questioning representatives from Cyprus and Turkey); see also 1 S. BAILEY, supra note
304, at 44.
758. See, e.g., 14 U.N. SCOR (848th mtg.) at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.848 (1959)
(establishing subcommittee to investigate the situation in Laos); S.C. Res. 39, 3 U.N.
SCOR (230th mtg.) at 143 (1948) (India-Pakistan) (invoking article 34); S.C. Res. 19, 2
U.N. SCOR (114th mtg.) at 2-3 (1947) (Corfu Channel incidents); S.C. Res. 19, 2 U.N.

SCOR (87th mtg.) at 6 (1946) (Greek border incidents) (citing article 34); see also 1 S.
BAILEY, supra note 304, at 44; Ermacora, InternationalEnquiry Comnissions in the Field
of Human Rights, I HUM. RTS. J. 180, 185 (1968).
759. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR (1382d mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/PV. 1382 (1967) (Palestine); S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR (I102d mtg.) at I, U.N.
Doe. S/PV. 1102 (1964) (Cyprus); S.C. Res. 179, 18 U.N. SCOR (1039th mtg.) at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. S/PV. 1039 (1963) (Yemen); see also 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at 44.
760. See S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR (l102d mtg.) at 1; S.C. Res. 179, 18 U.N.
SCOR (1039th mtg.) at 2-3.
761. The Assembly used this power to dispatch a Special Committee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights of the population of the Occupied Territories, see
G.A. Res. 2443, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4) at 50, U.N. Doe. A/7433 (1968), and to
send a fact-finding mission to investigate allegations that the South Vietnamese government
was persecuting Buddhists. See G.A. Res. AIL.425 & Add. 1, 18 U.N. GAOR (1239 mtg.)
(Agenda Item 77), U.N. Doe. A/7149 (1963).
762. G.A. Res. 1967, 18 U.N. GAOR (1281st mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5671 (1963).
This resolution spawned the Report of the Secretary General on Methods of Fact-Finding,
U.N. Doe. A/5694 (1964), which helped pave the way for the routine establishment of
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If the proposal for such an investigation were to originate in the
Security Council, it would immediately enjoy important political advantages over a Council proposal to create a peacekeeping contingent.7"
While the Charter basis for peacekeeping is somewhat amorphous-and it
is therefore unclear whether chapter VI may or may not be invoked for
this purpose 7 -Council fact-finding may undoubtably be based on
article 34 of chapter VI. 76 Under article 27, paragraph 3, then, Britain
as a party to the dispute could not vote on any resolution ordering a
chapter VI investigation into the situation in Northern Ireland, 7" while
it could veto a peacekeeping
resolution if it was based on chapter VII
7 67
rather than chapter VI.
Alternatively, the Council could create a fact-finding commission
under article 29, so that the vote would be a procedural rather than a
substantive one, thus prohibiting not only the United Kingdom, but also
the United States from exercising the superpower veto to kill it.7 6' The
investigatory commissions. See Ermacora, supra note 758, at 181. In response to the
Assembly's influential 1967 resolution, the United Nations Economic and Social Council
reversed its highly restrictive 1959 directive allowing the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights no power to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human
rights, E.S.C. Res. 728 § F, 28 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1)at 19, U.N. Doe. E/3290
(1959), and instead delegated to the Commission authority to study situations which reveal
a consistent pattern of violations of human rights, E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. I) at 17-18, U.N. Doe. E/4393 (1967), a mandate broadened in 1970-71 to
allow investigation into any reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. IA) at 8-9, U.N. Doe.
E/4832/Add.l (1970); see also Res. 2[XXIV], U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070, E/LN.4/Sub.
2/323, at 50 (1971). The primary restrictions on this otherwise-broad authorization are that
the complainant must have exhausted domestic remedies, see id. § 4(b); E.S.C. Res. 1503
at § 6(b)(i), and that the complaint not relate to a matter pending before any other United
Nations or regional body, such as the Security Council and the European Commission on
Human Rights, respectively. See id. § 6(b)(ii).
763. Another advantage is that the Council itself may take the initiative to seek an
investigation into a particular situation or dispute; it need not await the request of a
concerned party. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 329, at 286;
cf supra notes 757-60 and accompanying text.
764. See supra notes 618-32 and accompanying text.
765. See supra notes 754-60 and accompanying text.
766. Britain has recognized this limitation. In 1947, when Australia proposed that a
subcommittee be appointed to investigate incidents in the Corfu Channel, the British
representative acknowledged that, "[als a party to this dispute, I am deprived of my vote
under Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter when it is a matter of decision under Chapter
VI." 2(1) U.N. SCOR (I 14th mtg.) at 425 (1947).
767.

See supra notes 611-35 and accompanying text.

768. Article 29 is one of four articles governing Council procedure.
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The four
Council's practice, however, has been inconsistent.'
sponsoring governments of the United Nations prepared a statement in
1945 concerning Security Council voting procedure, which asserts that the
principle of "unanimity of the permanent members applies" to those
"investigations" which "initiate a chain of events which might, in the end,
require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of
enforcement under [the Charter]."' 7 This statement supports the view
that the vote would be procedural and thus shielded from the veto."'
As peacekeeping is a provisional measure," an investigation into the
conditions in Northern Ireland would not "initiate a chain of events"
leading to "measures of enforcement," and hence should be treated as
procedural and not subject to the superpower veto. 3 Equally significant, it is widely believed that fact-finding does not constitute intervention
into domestic affairs and consequently does not require host state
769. In 1948, a proposal that a subcommittee of inquiry be established in response to
the Czechoslovakian coup was treated as substantive, and vetoed by the Soviet Union, over
the protests of the United States and the United Kingdom. See 3(2) U.N. SCOR (303d
mtg.) at 4-29 (1948); 3(2) U.N. SCOR (300th mtg.) at 30-43; 3(1) U.N. SCOR (288th
mtg.) at 19. Yet both before and after the Czechoslovakian question the Council treated
votes on similar commissions of inquiry to be procedural. In 1947, Britain was allowed
to vote, but had no veto, on the resolution establishing a subcommittee to investigate the
More
Corfu Channel incident. See 2(1) U.N. SCOR (I14th mtg.) at 425-26 (1947).
importantly, in 1959 on a proposed subcommittee "to conduct such inquiries as it may
determine necessary" into the situation in Laos, all members of the Council save the Soviet
Union twice voted that the proposal was procedural, so that the Soviet's negative vote on
the resolution itself did not constitute a veto. See 14 U.N. SCOR (848th mtg.) at 12, 22,
U.N. Doec. S/PV.848 (1959).
770. Doec. 852, III/l/37(l), 11 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 710-14 (1945) [hereinafter the "San
Francisco Statement"].
771.

Id.

772.

See supra notes 621-32 and accompanying text.

773. Cf. S. BAILEY, supra note 471, at 222. Under the San Francisco Statement,
however, if a Council member submits a motion that a proposal is procedural rather than
substantive and it is put to a vote, that preliminary question is subject to a superpower veto.
See also id. at 215. A successful negative vote on the preliminary question would force the
proposal creating the fact-finding body to be treated as substantive, which could then be
vetoed, as well. This "double veto," as it is known, can be avoided if the resolution
creating the commission of inquiry is submitted without a preliminary question and the
President of the Council then rules that the proposal is procedural; that ruling cannot be
defeated by a superpower veto, but can only be successfully challenged by vote of nine
members of the Council. Id. This procedure allowed the Laos investigative committee to
be established despite negative votes by the Soviet Union on both the question of whether
the matter was procedural or substantive and also the question of whether the committee
should be created. See 14 U.N. SCOR (848th mtg.) at 12, 22, U.N. Doe. S/PV.848
(1959).
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consent. 4 This position has been borne out in practice, although where
consent to enter the country is withheld the investigation must be
conducted from a neighboring nation. " 5
While on-site examination is preferable, the information the United
Nations requires can be obtained through hearings held elsewhere-the
Irish Republic, for instance-and thus British consent is not essential to
creation and operation of a fact-finding commission on Northern Ireland." 6 Moreover, there is some support for the proposition that if
either the Council or Assembly decides it needs to order an investigative
committee into an area under article 34 to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger international
peace, then the host government could not lawfully deny that committee
entry into the country.'
774. This position can be traced as far back as 1947, when the United States announced
it during debates on the Greek Case. 2(2) U.N. SCOR (61st, 63-64th mtgs.) at 1423,
1523, 1540-41 (1947). In 1953, a United Nations commission issued a report, 8 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 16-22, 114-19, U.N. Doe. A12505 (1953), that adopted as
consistent with the view held by "the majority of the Members States" a definition of
intervention as entailing only "dictatorial interference," so that "Article 2(7) can in no
event exclude the study of a problem brought before the United Nations, the submission of
the relevant reports, and the formulation of recommendations, since none of these acts
constitutes intervention in the strictly technical sense." Id. at 17.
775. See 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 6), at 77, U.N. Doc. E/4322 E/CN.4/940
(1967). When the Human Rights Commission, pursuant to a request from the General
Assembly, established "an ad hoc working group of experts" to investigate allegations of
torture and ill-treatment in South Africa, consent was neither sought nor given. Id. The
mission subsequently operated without South African consent, holding hearings outside
South Africa. See Ermacora, supra note 758, at 188. Similarly, both the Commission and
the Assembly employed fact-finding bodies to investigate alleged human rights violations
by Israel, see supra note 761 and accompanying text, although Israel withheld consent and
denied the missions access to the affected areas. See R. LILuCH & F. NEWMAN, supra
note 409, at 315; Miller, United Nations Fact-Finding Missions in the Field of Human
Rights, [1970-73] AUSTRL. Y.B. INT'L L. 40-49. The Commission's working group on
human rights in Chile conducted a thorough investigation despite the withdrawal of consent
by the Chilean government, which prevented the investigative mission from entering the
country. See R. LILuCH & F. NEWMAN, supra, at 298-303, 315 (collecting United
Nations documentation on the Chilean investigation).
776. But see HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN
POLICY 26 (1979) (Niall MacDermot, then-secretary-general of the International
Commission of Jurists, arguing that for an investigation to be successful "[t]here must be
a real possibility of seeing and hearing evidence on the spot").
777. See Sohn, supra note 630, at 238-39. As one commentator said, "[in United
Nations circles, it has long been held that a mere investigation of facts alone does not
constitute an intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of any State." Miller, supra note
775, at 48. But see Leary, supra note 343, at 21 ("The sending of a fact-finding
commission into a country without its permission would appear to be unwarranted
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Finally, the findings of a United Nations' investigative commission on
Northern Ireland, if consistent with this report, could significantly increase
pressure upon Britain to accept United Nations peacekeeping as an
alternative to the current unsatisfactory situation.778 Previous factfinding bodies have, in some cases, noticeably influenced governmental
behavior by focusing international attention on the problem.' 7
B. A ProposedMandatefor a United Nations
Fact-finding Mission

To adequately analyze the propriety and practicability of communal
peacekeeping in Northern Ireland, a United Nations' fact-finding mission,
however created, must carry a broad mandate to determine, after full and
fair examination of all relevant information:
1. Whether the crisis in Northern Ireland currently endangers or
is likely to threaten international peace and security;
2. Whether, and to what extent, human rights are violated in the
course of the Ulster conflict, with special consideration of:
a. whether, and to what extent, the non-derogable rights
to life and to freedom from torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment of the person are violated;
3. Whether, and to what extent, such violations are in whole or
intervention .. .

778. See van Boven, Human Rights Fora at the United Nations. How to Select and to
Approach the Most Appropriate Forum. What ProceduralRules Govern?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 343, at 83-92.
779. "Indisputably, this process can be productive," argue Lillich and Newman:
Throughout the world there is proof that, partly because of UN and
related international pressures, some death sentences have been voided,
individuals have been freed from jail, fairer trials often have been
procured, some governments (e.g., Greece and Pakistan) have been
deposed, and many governments have become less shameless and less
arrogant as to torture, oppression, starvation, and comparable evils.
R. LILLCH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 409, at 303. This is true even where the
investigative commission is not allowed access to the country, as in the case of Chile,
where the pressure applied by the Unite Nations fact-finding mission led to a considerable
curtailing of the violence the Chilean junta committed against its own people. Id.; see

Halderman, Advancing Human Rights Through the United Nations, 43 L. & CONT. PROB.
275, 284 (1979) ("Public opinion is important since ... the consensus must be
formed-the necessary consistency of thought patterns-which is the necessary substructure
of any system capable of maintaining peace and security as well as assuring generally
acceptable observances of human rights.") (emphasis in original).
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in part the responsibility of the British government, either by
positive acts of the security forces under its command or by
negative acts, such as the failure to prosecute security force
violations and the failure to prevent civilians and paramilitarists
from violating human rights, with special consideration of:
a. whether, and to what extent, governmental derogation
from its international obligation to protect human rights
is justified "by the exigencies of the situation," and
b. whether, and to what extent, governmental derogation,
even if justified, is likely to increase violations of the
rights to life and to freedom from torture and inhuman
treatment;
4. Whether, and to what extent, governmental violations, either
positive or negative, are likely to increase tensions, escalate
hostilities, and heighten the threat to international peace;
5. Whether political solutions are possible, and if so, whether
they are likely, absent withdrawal of British troops;
6. Whether, and to what extent, any United Nations' peacekeeping force that might be deployed in Northern Ireland could be
expected successfully to keep or restore the peace within the
province, with special consideration of:
a. the level and nature of hostilities the force could be
expected to face, and
b. the tasks the force could be required to undertake and
the extent to which these tasks could successfully be
completed;
7. Whether, after peacekeepers were deployed, negotiations could
be initiated and, if so, the likelihood of whether such negotiations
might succeed.
This Article has already attempted to predict, with the evidence
available to it, the likely answers a fact-finding mission would supply to
the first four of these questions. 7" Following are analyses of the last
three.
1. The Possibility of Political Situations
It seems likely that a United Nations' fact-finding mission would
discover what a United States congressional fact-finding expedition learned
a decade ago: that leaders on both the Catholic and Protestant sides of the
Ulster conflict believe a permanent political solution cannot be designed
780. See, respectively, supra notes 484-546; 101-19, 149-89, 208-12, 220-29, 565; 14648, 160-62, 564-95; & 149-285 and accompanying text.
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while England's army remains west of the Irish Sea. As one member of
the 1978 United States fact-finding delegation declared, "We have heard
everywhere from 781
persons requesting that the British withdraw from
Northern Ireland.
Moderate Catholics call British withdrawal "an essential precondition
to peace in Ireland." 7" London's ill-conceived strategy has led the
British to employ wartime tactics against the noncombatant portion of the
minority community ,7 leading to deep-seated animosity within the
Catholic population toward British policy and the soldiers who enforce
it. 7 1 Until Britain's troops exit Ulster they will continue to supply the
IRA with a justification for its campaign and a rallying cry-"Brits
out"-to bolster recruitment78 and to solicit financial assistance from
Irish descendants in the United States.78 6
Even some Protestant leaders also call for British withdrawal.7 7
The rationale of the extremists, such as the UDA, is that eventually British
troops will be used to enforce unification, so it is preferable that Ulster
become independent.788 They also recognize what London apparently
will not, that the army only serves to foster support for the IRA."5 9
More moderate Protestants emphasize that the backing the unionist
paramilitarist receive from the British army deters Protestants from
seeking a realistic political solution.'
If there were any doubts that the British presence and policy have
created a climate in which negotiated solutions are next to impossible,9
they were dispelled in 1989 when preliminary talks between Protestant and
781.

Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 202.

782. So spoke Pat Fahy, Catholic member of the non-sectarian Irish Independence
Party, in an interview with two United States Congressmen during their fact-finding
expedition to Northern Ireland. Id. at 137.
783.

See supra notes 29-42, 146-59 & 219-29 and accompanying text.

784. See supra notes 145-48, 190-92, 254-60 & 288-89 and accompanying text.
785. See supra notes 95-96, 132 & 320 and accompanying text.
786. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
787. See, e.g., Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 70.
788. See id. at 69.

789. Id.
790. "[T]he presence of Britain and the presence of the troops ... in a sense undergirds
the intransigence of the Loyalist politicians," according to Reverend William Arlow
Anglican clergyman and former secretary of the Irish Councils of churches. Id. at 114.
John Turnley, moderate Protestant political activist, concurs: "We believe that if the British
bayonets are taken from the backs of these people-in other words, they are not getting the
military backup-they will be much more willing to talk with Irish throughout Ireland,
North and South." Id. at 133.
791.

See supra notes 253-70 & 591-93 and accompanying text.
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Catholic politicians, designed to do nothing more than find a way to create
ongoing dialogue between the two sides, were scuttled by intransigent
sectarianism.'
Just as many had predicted, with British troops to
support them, militant unionists such as Paisley perceived no pressure to
compromise and refused to remove the threshold barrier to further
dialogue, their demand that the Anglo-Irish accord be suspended prior to
substantive negotiations.
Ironically, while British officials welcomed
the negotiations,7 British military policy and presence in Northern
Ireland helped destroy any chance for their success. To quote a recent
British editorial, "British [policies] in Ulster are [supposed] to help
moderates, but as they invariably agitate the agonizing question of
allegiance, they always help extremists."795
2. The Role of the Peacekeepers in Northern Ireland
There are two significant indicators of a region's susceptibility to
successful peacekeeping. Both exist in Northern Ireland. First, the
hostilities have not escalated or fractured to such a point that peacekeeping
becomes difficult if not impracticable. Second, and in part as a result of
the first, the tasks which the peacekeepers would be called upon to
undertake, while taxing, are not beyond their capabilities, at least on an
interim basis.
a. Northern Ireland Is Ripe for Peacekeeping
Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of the situation in Northern Ireland
is that it has not engulfed the entire island in a war on the scale of
Lebanon. Peacekeeping functions best if employed before hostilities
explode into such full-intensity warfare.' M Not coincidentally, the most
troubled and controversial United Nations' peacekeeping efforts were the
operations in the Congo and Lebanon, both of which were precipitated by
foreign incursion into a deteriorating civil war. 97 Repeated violations
792. See Rule, supra note 593, at A4, col. 1.

793. Id. This frustrating scenario replayed itself in 1990. See infra notes 908-10 and
accompanying text.
794. See Whitney, supra note 593, at 13, col. 1.
795. Wthat Is King's Answer?, supra note 720, at 5, col. 3.
796. "[A] civil war [is] the worst possible situation in which a United Nations peacekeeping force could find itself." BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 272.
797. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 108, 219. Lebanon probably represents the
nadir of international peacekeeping. It was certainly the least effective effort undertaken
by the United Nations. See generally J. BROWN & W.P. SNYDER, THE REGIONAUZATION
OF WARFARE 80 (1985).

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. I1I

of the peacekeeping agreement by the invading countries, Belgium and
Israel, made effective peacekeeping impossible in certain regions of the
invaded countries"9 and, in the case of Lebanon, proved insurmountable. Those who doubt the efficacy of sending United Nations' troops into
Ulster are correct to argue that once the violence escalated to the point
that Ireland and Britain were thoroughly engaged militarily, a United
Nations' force would be of little use.7
That, of course, is the very
point of deploying peacekeepers now, before war eventually engulfs the
entire island, for the very intent of peacekeeping is to prevent such a war,
not to end it by forcing one side or the other to agree to terms.'
The advantage presented by a relatively low level of armed aggression
might be lost if either side thought it could defeat the other through
military means, for peacekeeping is best able to achieve its goals if both
sides recognize they are incapable of imposing their terms upon the
other.'" As long as the Belgians believed they could force the Congolese government to accept Katangese succession, or the Israelis insisted
they could control the political demographics of southern Lebanon, United
Nations' troops were hard pressed to prevent either army from violating
the ceasefire arrangements.'
Despite Thatcher's rhetoric, there is
substantial evidence that both sides recognize the Northern Irish conflict
is stalemated.'
Lebanon presented an additional impediment to peacekeeping not
found in Northern Ireland. The Lebanese puzzle is one of many pieces
and repeated efforts to achieve something more than partial and inevitably
brief ceasefires collapsed due to the United Nation inability to control the
activities of the many factions engaged in the hostilities. But where there
were more than ten different armed parties battling for control in
Lebanon,' a United Nations' force in Northern Ireland would have to
798. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 112-20, 125-29, 131 (Israel); id. at 237-39
(Congo); Draper, supra note 432, at 403 (Belgium).
799. See, e.g., K. BOYLE &T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 39; O'Brien, Scenariosfor
the Future: The Best and Worst Alternatives, in C. CARLTON, supra note 46, at 149-50.
800. Claude, supra note 338, at 52 ([Pleaeekeeping "represents an effort, not directly
to promote settlement of disputes, but to arrest or prevent their degeneration into violent
conflicts, and thus to restore or to maintain the possibility that peaceful solutions may be
found. ").
801.

See D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 324-25.

802. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 117-18, 120, 125-29, 131, 237-39;
Schachter, Preventing the Internationalization of Internal Conflict: A Legal Analysis of the
U.N. Congo Experience, 57 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRO. 216, 222-24 (1963).
803. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
804. The primary combatants were four: Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel and Syria. In addition, the Israelis armed and to some extent controlled the
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monitor the activities of only three once the British army withdraws: on
the Catholic side, the IRA; 5 on the Protestant, the paramilitary
UDAI and the official security forces."'
b. United Nations Forces Could Achieve Their Goal
Peacekeeping is not a panacea. The goal of peacekeeping is not to
attempt to aggressively impose a settlement, but to provide a buffer
between hostile communities while a settlement is sought." ° It is an
interim measure, a holding action, designed to give the antagonists time
and a relatively stable climate in which to meet at the bargaining table
and, perhaps, to achieve a pacific solution. This Northern Ireland needs.
One Protestant leader has pled for "referees . . . What we are saying
There are two
to people who have listened to us is, 'we need help.' '
reasons why British soldiers cannot fulfill the referee function. First, they
are not perceived by the Catholic community to be neutral, the essential
missing ingredient without which Ulster's violence will continue to
recycle."' 0 Second, they have proven largely ineffective at preventing
cross-communal violence, and for any peacekeeping effort to succeed in
reducing tension in Northern Ireland it must reduce the number of
paramilitary victims on both sides; the paramilitarists' murderous policy
of "tit-for-tat" is a constant source of escalating animosity."'
"

Christian militias led by Major Haddad, and later in the conflict began arming newly
emergent militias. The PLO was allied with the Lebanese National Movement, "a loose
association of Lebanese Moslem and leftist parties," but was often confronted with
breakaway dissident groups, such as the one led by Ahmed Jebril. Syria, meanwhile,
supported Amal and other Shiite Moslem paramilitarists. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note
21, at 114, 119-20, 134-35, 141.
805. The INLA, the Marxist splinter group, always has been little more than a fringe
player-albeit one capable of occasional violent acts-and it was largely eliminated by a
murderous internecine feud late in 1986. See K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 373; see also
J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 58.
806. It bears repeating that the UFF, which is often blamed for Protestant paramilitary
atrocities, is in fact the UDA operating under an assumed name. See supra note 161 and
accompanying text. The UVF is still active, but much less so than the UDA, J. HOLLAND,
supra note 7, at 220, and, in any event, operates in the same two parts of the province as
the UDA-greater Belfast and Armagh-Tyrone. Violence in Ulster, supra note 12, at 3,
col. 1;see also Protestant Group Admits Killing 4, supra note 284, at A8, col. 4.
807. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
808.

See Claude, supra note 338, at 53, 59.

809. Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 69-70.
810. See supra notes 145-94 and accompanying text.
811.

See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 71.

In one recent example:
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i. United Nations Forces Are Neutral
There is every reason to believe that. a properly established United
Nations' force would be considered neutral.
"Peace-keeping is a
neutralizing function," Inis Claude writes, "to be exercised by neutralist
states under the auspices and direction of a neutral organization."" 2 Its
troops should be, and generally are, drawn from "smaller" nations,
uninterested in solidifying a particular sphere of influence.8 3 The
peacekeeping effort that most blatantly violated this basic tenet was not a
United Nations-sponsored effort, but rather was the United States-initiated
multinational force in Beirut, in which the United States Marine Corps
played such an unfortunate role. 81 4 The spectacular and very bloody
failure of this force should reinforce in the United Nations the elementary
peacekeeping principle of "keep the major powers out." 8" 5 As in
Lebanon, they lose their neutrality by supporting one side, or appearing
to; in either case, the effectiveness of the unit is greatly diminished.
Moreover, because they are considered allies of one party, to the other(s)
they become "a continuing invitation to attack ....
81
The United Nations seems to have heeded the lesson of Lebanon. Its
recently created Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, for example, consists
Masked gunmen in Northern Ireland killed a Roman Catholic man in
front of his wife last night in what appeared to be a sectarian "tit-fortat" slaying. Police said the gunmen used sledgehammers to smash
down the victim's front door, shot him at point-blank range and fled
in a stolen car. No group immediately claimed responsibility for
shooting 42-year-old civil servant Niall Davies in Glengormely, three
miles north of Belfast, police said. He was not thought to have had
any connection with Republican paramilitary organizations. The St.
Patrick's Day incident came just 24 hours after Irish Republican Army
gunmen shot and killed Jackie Irvine, a prominent Protestant extremist,
on the doorstep of his Belfast home.
Vicious Slaying in Ulster, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 18, 1989, at A12, col. 4. Davies
was one of 12 such victims during a period of less than two weeks. See Rule, supra note
16, at A3, col. 1.
812. Claude, supra note 338, at 54.
813. See id.; D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 321.
814. This contingent, which was not attached to the United Nations mission in southern
Lebanon, was the result of an agreement among Lebanon, the United States, France and
Italy. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 144.
815. D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 321.
816. Critics of United States involvement in Lebanon complained that the United States
role changed from neutral peacekeeping to active military support of the Gemayel
government. See, e.g., Magnuson, Nothing But Quicksand, TIME, Jan. 2, 1984, at 55.
817. id. at 57.
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of representatives from twenty-four mostly nonaligned countries, the most
powerful of which might be Canada or Australia. 8 ' There is no
indication a United Nations peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland would
be any different."1 9 Yet as the British army learned in Northern Ireland,
it is as important to maintain an appearance of neutrality as it is to be
welcomed as neutral upon arrival. Whether a United Nations force could
do so in Northern Ireland would turn, in large part, on whether the force
could carry out whatever functions it would be called upon to perform
without appearing to take the government's side, or, conversely, to be
The most difficult task facing the United Nations
fighting against it.'
in this, and perhaps any, respect is the rather daunting prospect that the
peacekeeping soldiers would have to assume regular police operations. As
Professor Greer of the Queen's University of Belfast suggests, reducing
tension within Northern Ireland "is not simply a matter of replacing the
British. "821

ii. The United Nations Could Effectively Police Ulster, Temporarily
The overwhelmingly Protestant RUC and UDR have so completely
lost credibility within the Catholic community that the IRA now operates
as the lone police force within certain Catholic wards,822 further enhanc818. The 24 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia and
Zambia. Rule, supra note 744, at A7, col. 1.
819. Professor Newman advocates that a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in
Northern Ireland should be comprised of troops from countries that are "very carefully
picked so that they don't look British." Newman, supra note 321, at 342.
820. See, e.g., 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 18-19, U.N. Doc. S/4389
(1960) ("The authority granted to the United Nations Force cannot be exercised . . . either
in competition with the representatives of its Government or in co-operation with them
"); 15 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1960) at 54-55, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.896 (1960)
....
(secretary-general instructing United Nations representatives to avoid any action by which,
directly or indirectly, openly or by implication, they would pass judgement on the stand
taken by either one of the parties in the Congo.).
821. Letter from Professor D.S. Greer to the Author (May 10, 1988) (on file with the
Professor Greer goes on to pose the following
author) [hereinafter Greer Letter].
questions: "Would the Royal Ulster Constabulary also be superseded? If so, could a UN
force both keep the peace and operate an effective police service?" Id.
822. Since the 1969 erection of the barricades and creation of "No Go" areas, the
RUC-which played a violent role in invading and terrorizing the Catholic neighborhoods
and has yet to live down its reputation in the eyes of many Northern Irish Catholics-has
been effectively excluded as a normal police force in the Catholic quarters of Belfast and
Derry. See P. BEW & H. PATTERSON, supra note 79, at 26; J. CONROY, supra note 3, at
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ing the minority community's reliance on the gunmen. Moreover, since
these homegrown security forces are almost entirely Protestant, they are
inviting targets for the republican guerrillas.'
Either the RUC must be
disarmed, disbanded and reinstituted as nonsectarian,S24 with considerably more success than were the notoriously and violently sectarian
B-Specials in the early 1970s,' or their movements must be restricted
to wholly Protestant areas and a separate but official Catholic force
recruited and established to police minority enclaves."
The United
Nations is not without experience in supervising such reorganizations of
internal security
forces, having done so in both the Congo and West New
Guinea." 7

35-36, 67-92; J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 34-41; K. KELLEY, supra note

*, at 121-22,

148-50; 289-92, 372-73; Pogatchnik, supra note 566, at 1, col. 1.

823. See IRA: Going Soft, supra note 194, at 44-45; Rule, supra note 16, at A3, col.
1. The RUC is approximately 90% Protestant. Walker, Police and Community, 41 N. IR.
L.Q. 105, 117 (1990).
824. The UDR, which is 97% Protestant and whose members have been found guilty
of numerous sectarian attacks, should simply be disbanded.
See Arnold, Crime,
Ulsterisation and the Future of the UDR, FORTNIGHT, Oct. 1985, at 4-5; Thomas, supra
note 161, at A2, col. 3. Due to their reputation for anti-Catholic violence, the UDR is a
favorite target of the IRA; through early 1990, at least 187 members of the force had been
killed since 1969. Prokesch, A Huge Bomb Kills Four British Soldiers in Ulster, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3, col. 1. A United Nations force could monitor the territory
now patrolled by the UDR. See infra note 888.
825. After the B-Specials engaged in considerable violence against civil rights marchers
and other Catholics in 1968-69, a government tribunal of inquiry in October 1969
recommended its disbandment, see HUNT REPORT, supra note 77, at 42, 46, which was
accomplished within months. The UDR, however, which was envisioned as a non-sectarian
civilian militia to replace the B-Specials, "was really only a face-lift for the Ulster Special
Constabulary [the B-Specials]. . . . Many former B-men joined the U.D.R. and carried
on, undisturbed by the British, with their sectarian mode of defending a deeply sectarian
state." K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 123.
826. The IRA might decry Catholic participation in what would be an arm of the
governing authorities, but it would be unable to target these men and women without losing
nearly all its support within its own constituency. Cf J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 68
(while the Protestant RUC police are considered by the IRA to be legitimate targets,
Northern Irish firemen are not because there are "Catholics on the fire department, and
firemen perform[] their duties as if there was no difference between a Protestant fire and
a Catholic one.").
827. In the Congo, the peacekeepers disarmed overly zealous elements of the Congolese
army, official militia and private forces and in this vacuum assumed policing duties for
much of the country. See, e.g., BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 226, 240-41; Miller,
supra note 670, at 18-20. In West New Guinea, the United Nations supervised the creation
and buildup of a viable indigenous police force after the Dutch withdrawal. See BLUE
HELMETS, supra, at 307.
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Whether the existing security apparatus in Northern Ireland is either
completely dismantled and rebuilt or merely reorganized, the United
Nations force would be called upon to perform the policing task on at least
an interim basis in some parts of the province during the change. The
policing of Northern Ireland, albeit temporarily, with a neutral United
Nations force has certain advantages. Although United Nations troops
would have investigative powers, they use no covert methods to gather
although they would likely possess the power to arrest
intelligence;'
they would have no authority to interroarmed paramilitarists,'
gate;8 ° and although they have the authority to use force, they can do
so only in self-defense and as a last resort." These restrictions would
help to assure the Catholic community of the peacekeepers' objectivity and
go far toward reducing Catholic reliance upon and support for the IRA.
As this is likely to translate into fewer deaths at the IRA's hands, it should
also undercut Protestant sympathies for their paramilitarists. "2
Policing is not a job with which the United Nations is unfamiliar. The
United Nations' force in the Congo was "an 'essentially internal' police
operation,"8 33 responsible for normal police functions in certain portions
In Cyprus, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force
of the country.'
828.

INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, supra note 678, at 39.

829. See S.C. Res. 169, 16 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (982d mtg.), at 4, U.N. Doe.
S/INF/16/Rev. 1 (1961) (authorizing the "immediate apprehension, detention pending legal
action and/or deportation of all mercenaries" in the Congo); see also BLUE HELMETS, supra
note 21, at 242; Miller, supra note 670, at 18-20.
830. See INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, supra note 678, at 300 (the role of civilian police in
peaeekeeping operations is generally limited to observation, liaison, advice and negotiation).
831. See, e.g. S.C. Res. 161, 16 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (942d mtg.), U.N. Doc.
SIINF/16/Rev.1 (1961); cf. INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, supra note 678, at 298 (peacekeeping
civilian police are precluded from the use of force and enforcement measures).
832. Cf. J.L. ANDERSON & S.' ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 3 ("The continued
presence of British forces, the power of both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary
organizations, and the lack of movement towards a political settlement have insured the

violence continues today.").
833. Halderman, supra note 332, at 990. As Professor Miller explains:
The kind of military action which the [Security] Council authorized in
the Congo was restricted essentially to the maintenance of internal law
and order, the purpose of which was to enable the Belgian troops to be
speedily withdrawn. While this was a use of armed force, it was
essentially of a police or 'criminal law' character ...
Miller, supra note 670, at 8.
834. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 225-26. Indeed, the force "had the
authority to enforce the ordinary criminal laws applicable in that country," Halderman,
supra note 332, at 989, to such an extent that for a time the United Nations was running
the country. D. ZEIGLER. supra note 471, at 323.
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in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in April 1964 received its own United Nations'
civilian police force (UNCIVPOL), which, among other duties, staffed
police posts in certain sensitive areas where the tension might be alleviated
by its presence and undertook investigations into cross-communal
incidents. 5 In West New Guinea, the United Nations Security Force
(UNSF), was the "police arm" of the United Nations provisional
government, which ruled the territory under a ceasefire arrangement from
The UNSF successfully maintained
October 1962 until April 1963.'
internal law and order until administration of the territory was transferred
to Indonesia." 7
Policing, however, also is not a job with which the United Nations is
entirely comfortable. There is, as Professor Miller observed, a "delicate
line between the maintenance of order and intervention in internal
More concretely, "[tihe Gilbertian maxim that 'a policeconflict.""
man's lot is not a happy one' was amply confirmed by the experience of
the United Nations in the Congo,"83 9 where 234 peacekeepers died'
while attempting to maintain law and order.
Nonetheless, the Congo operation, from a security standpoint, fulfilled
its goals"' and all subsequent policing operations were largely, if not
entirely, successful." 2 The United Nation's faith in its policing abilities
835. See 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (No. 1) (Apr.-June 1964) at 107, U.N. Doe. S/5679
(1964). In many of these areas UNCIVPOL took over most of the functions of a neutral
police force after Turkish officers withdrew from the Cypriot police. INT'L PEACE
ACADEMY, supra note 678, at 299-300; see also BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 270-71.
836. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 307.
837. Id. at 307, 310.
838. Miller, supra note 670, at 15. This does not mean the Congo episode exceeded
United Nations international jurisdiction. As the Security Council asserted in its resolution
of July 22, 1960, "the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo
would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security." See
S.C. Res. 145, 15 U.N. SCOR Res. & Dec. (879th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doe. S/INF/15/Rev. 1

(1960).
839. Claude, supra note 338, at 60. The United Nations itself conceded that "[t]he
maintenance of law and order was the heaviest of all the tasks falling upon ONUC," BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 21, at 225, and that, "[t]hinly deployed throughout the country, the
United Nations Force had great difficulty in coping with its overwhelming tasks." Id. at
232.
840. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 344.
841. Law and order were restored; rebellious elements were brought under control and,
in many cases, disarmed; mercenaries were arrested and deported; tens of thousands of
civilian lives were saved, considerable property was protected, and, in the end, ONUC was
able to leave domestic policing in the hands of an integrated, if inexperienced, force. See
BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 226, 228, 232-33, 237-38, 242-43, 255-56.
842. See supra note 835 and accompanying text (Cyprus); supra notes 836-37 and
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prompted the Security Council to agree to send a 500-member police force
to maintain law and order in formerly South African-controlled Namibia
while Cuban and SWAPO troops withdrew under the supervision of nearly
5,000 United Nations' peacekeepers. u3 If the United Nations is competent to police a vast expanse of southwestern Africa as part of the Namibia
peace accord,'" it also should be capable of policing, temporarily,
Northern Ireland.
iii. United Nations Cyprus Experience Predicts Success for
Northern Ireland
There is substantial evidence, based on the United Nations efforts in
Cyprus, that the organization could effectively undertake both the police
and peacekeeping functions in Northern Ireland, and not only eliminate the
violence perpetrated by the withdrawing British army, but also sharply
curtail violence between the Protestant and Catholic communities. The
parallels between the Cypriot and Ulster crises are striking. Prior to
gaining independence in 1960," 5 Cyprus was, like Northern Ireland
today, governed by the British. After independence, the roots of Cyprus'
strife were nearly identical to those of Ulster's-conflict between the
arising out of the majority
government and a dissident minority,'
community's control of a government openly hostile to the minority
population" 7 and out of the long history of enmity between the two
groups. "
The consequence of the majority's grip on government was a vesting
of ninety percent of Cyprus' wealth in the hands of the majority, leaving
the minority in an economically subordinate position."' Though citizens
accompanying text (West New Guinea).
843. See Lewis, Deal Seen on Smaller U.N. Forcefor Namibia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,
1989, §1, at 8, col. 1.
844. See Wretched Are the Peacekeepers, supra note 745, at 34. Indeed, the primary
problem facing the Congo force in its efforts to serve as policeman was the very size and
population of the war-torn country. See BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 225.
845. After a campaign "of terrorism and violence," Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1039,
led by EOKA, the Greek "terrorist" National Organization of Cyprus Fighters. Id. at 1030

& n.36.
846. Turks comprised 18-20% of the population.
5; Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1024 & n.3.

See I S. BAILEY, supra note 304, at

847. See McCallion Statement, supra note 321, at 512-13.

848. See D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 89-90.
849. Professor Ziegler reports:
[The Turks] had poorer jobs and lived in poorer housing. Greek
village mayors drove cars, Turkish village mayors rode bicycles. The
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of one island, the majority Greek and minority Turkish communities on
Cyprus, as in Northern Ireland, cling to different faiths, cultures,
languages and philosophies," in a country that had been created but
was never independently viable; like Ulster, the artificial nature of the
state became a principal source of internal turmoil.851 In a foreshadowing of what would follow in Ulster a few years later, the spark that
detonated the Cyprus crisis was excessive force by majority security
personnel against minorities, setting off widespread rioting in a major city
that spread quickly to other towns and erupted into a civil war that
threatened to become international. 852
Before the peacekeepers were sent in, hundreds were killed or
wounded.853 Despite the intensity of antagonistic sentiments on both
sides, the United Nations' force provided a moderating influence,
primarily because it never associated itself with the official view of the
majority government that the minority constituted a rebellious, unlawful
group.'
In early 1964, the international press corps reported that
majority fanatics "appear bent on a policy of genocide. " 55 The United
Nations' force could not prevent occasional attacks by either community
on the other, but minority leaders later wrote that UNFICYP prevented
minor clashes and local incidents from escalating and deterred Greek
The peacekeepers
Cypriots from committing greater atrocities.856
returned "a relative, if uneasy, calm on the Island" and "restored at least
Greeks admitted that they produced 90 per cent of the wealth on
Cyprus but argued that they did so because they were a more dynamic
people. Some people suspected the president of Cyprus (a representative of the Greek community), Archbishop Makarios, of following a
strategy of slowly strangling the Turks economically, forcing them out
of productive activity and government jobs until they would no longer
be able to resist Greek control.
Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
850. See Z. M. NEJATIGIL, THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS IN
PERSPECTIVE 3 (1985).
851. See R. DENKTASH, supra note 741, at 13.

852. See 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1964) at 298, U.N. Doe. No. S/5950 &
Add. 1 & 2 (1964); Z.M. NEJATIGIL, supra note 850, at 4-5; 2 S. BAILEY, supra note 304,
at 670; Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1046-49.
853. Five hundred Turkish Cypriots were reported killed, more than 1,000 wounded and
another 203 missing. R. DENKTASH, supra note 741, at 39. Some 103 Turkish villages
were totally or partially destroyed and about 25,000 Turks became refugees in their own
country. Z.M. NEIATIGIL, supra note 850, at 5; see Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1051-52.
854. McCallion Statement, supra note 321, at 513.
855. R. DENKTASH, supra note 741, at 40.
856. Id.
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a semblance of normality. "857
The United Nations' force did not prevent partition in 1974 after the
Turkish invasion, but its job was not to prevent partition, which the Turks
always considered their primary political solution. 58 Peacekeepers did
buy Cyprus ten years to negotiate a settlement that would have avoided
partition; to the extent the negotiations failed, it was the fault of diplomats
and politicians on both sides, not the United Nations contingent. Since
partition, peacekeepers have patrolled the border between north Turkish
Cyprus and the southern Greek Republic, allowing the Turkish Cypriots
to luxuriate "in a sense of security which, to them, means more than
anything else."8 59 In contrast, British soldiers have been unable to bring
security to either segment of Northern Ireland's divided society.
Professor Greer argues that Cyprus is an imperfect analogy to
Northern Ireland, "because the [former] island was in effect partitioned
geographically; that cannot be done in Northern Ireland.""
Flowing
from this assessment is the conclusion that peacekeeping's significant gains
on Cyprus do not indicate similar success in Northern Ireland. Professor
Greer's analysis fails, however, because his premises are incorrect; he
overstates the extent to which Cyprus was segregated and understates the
extent to which Northern Ireland is.
Taking the former first, "[o]ne of the factors that made the Cyprus
problem so difficult was that the Turkish minority was not concentrated
in one part of the island,"861 but rather was "scattered in enclaves
throughout."2 Pre-1974 Cyprus was "an ethnographical fruitcake in
which the Greek and Turkish currants were mixed up in every town and
village and often in every street. "863 This integration of the combating
communities forced UNFICYP to deploy its men throughout the island,
in each district on Cyprus8" and to undertake frequent patrols to ensure
safety on roads and within towns and villages in sensitive areas;' to
prevent armed cross-communal infiltration; and to protect minority
857. Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1051; see also Theodorides, supra note 402, at 775-76,
783 (1982).

858. See Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1030-33.
859. Northern Cyprus: Divided We Stay?, ECONOMIST, June 28, 1986, at 47-48.
860. See Greer Letter, supra note 821.
861.

D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at 93.

862. Id. at 89.
863. C. FOLEY, LEGACY OF STRIFE: CYPRUS FROM REBELLION TO CIVIL WAR 87

(1964).
864.

BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 268.

865. Id. at 270.
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enclaves and villages against attacks by the majority national guard."s
These tasks required UNFICYP to "bec[o]me involved, from its inception,
in carrying out a vast array of activities that affected almost every
conceivable aspect of life in Cyprus." 67 For a decade, the United
Nations successfully maintained this broad-based brand of peacekeeping
in a largely nonpartitioned country; it was not until after the Turkish
invasion of 1974 and the resettlement, voluntary and involuntary, of tens
of thousands of members of both communities,"' that Cyprus became
the highly partitioned state Professor Greer describes. Only then was
UNFICYP's task reduced to patrolling a buffer zone along the ceasefire
line between two segregated communities. "
That Cyprus was not partitioned until the mid-1970s does not mean it
was fully integrated, either. Even before the Turkish invasion, "Turkish
and Greek Cypriots lived in separate villages or separate sections of the
larger municipalities, shopped at separate stores, worked in separate
businesses, were born in separate hospitals and buried in separate
cemeteries.""'
In short, when United Nations peacekeepers landed in
Cyprus, its demographics were similar to, if not as segregated as,
Northern Ireland is today.
Like Cyprus, the majority and minority community are dispersed
throughout Ulster;87 however, with the exception of Belfast, Catholics
are concentrated in the border areas, Protestants in the northeastern
portion of the province."' Like Cyprus, to the extent members of the
one community are distributed in regions of Northern Ireland dominated
by the other, they are highly concentrated and segregated." t In Ulster's
866. Id. at 273, 276, 285.
867. Id. at 272.
868. Within two days of its July 20, 1974 invasion, Turkey controlled much of northern
Cyprus, but 60,000 Turkish Cypriots remained outside their reach, while a number of

Greek enclaves were within it. Eventually, more than 180,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the
Greek-held southern part of the island and only 10,000 Turkish Cypriots were left outside
what became an autonomous Turkish Cypriot state. See D. ZIEGLER, supra note 471, at

92-94.
869. BLUE HELMETS, supra note 21, at 290; Theodorides, supra note 402, at 783.
870. Ehrlich, supra note 318, at 1039.

871. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 34-36. The 1981 census revealed that
Catholics constituted no more than 74% and no less than 8% in any one of Northern
Ireland's 26 council districts. Id.
872. Id. The six districts on or near the border are between 75% and 45% Catholic,
id., and in the three counties nearest the border Catholics enjoy a 2-1 majority. Id. at 115
n.6. Conversely, in the 13 districts in the northeast, Protestant majorities range from 62

to92%. ld. at34&n.3.
873. See id. at 34-35.
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two largest cities, Belfast and Derry, where Catholics and Protestants live
in close proximity, not only do they live in separate parts of the city, 74
but the Catholic quarters are at least partially walled off from the
Protestant in what "has been called the 'Warsaw ghettoization' approach."1 7 This policy, demanded in Belfast by the British army as
part of its security measures,876 coupled with the increasing migration
of "families mov[ing] to seek the protection of their own kind,"s" has
"[Slegregation is worse now
further isolated the two communities.""
879
than it was twenty years ago.
Like Cyprus, the segregation of Northern Irish life is almost complete.
"It is perfectly possible, and quite normal, to live a full and varied life in
Northern Ireland without having any real contact with people from the
other community."s"I Discrimination and fear have forced Catholics and
874. As a governmental enquiry reported in 1969, it could not ignore "the segregation
in housing which exists and persists." CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
875. This phrase was coined to describe the "ring of very permanent-looking security
gates and a corrugated steel wall which divides the Catholic districts from their nearby
loyalist neighbors" in Belfast. CONROY, supra note 3, at 9. One commentator likened the
"forbidding concrete barrier, 20 feet high in some places, [which] cuts through workingclass Belfast, separating not political ideologies but Protestants and Roman Catholics" to
the Berlin Wall. Marshall, supra note 139, at 1, col. 4. Belfast is not the only city in
Northern Ireland so divided:
The City of Londonderry is now compassed about with a very strong
wall, excellently made and neatly wrought, being all of good lime and
stone; the circuit whereof is two hundred and eighty-four perches and
two-thirds, at eighteen feet to the perch; besides the four gates which
contain eight-four feet, and in every place of the wall is twenty-four
feet high and six feet thick.
J.URIs & L. URIS, IRELAND: A TERRIBLE BEAUTY 207 (1975). Although this report was
written in 1618, see id., Catholics are still unwelcome within what remains of those walls,
see id. at 209; cf CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 16, and are forced to live in the
boglands beyond them. J. URIS & L. URIS, supra, at 211.
876.

See J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 8.

877. La Guardia, Living in the North . . ., SPECTATOR, Sept. 17, 1988, at 14, 15; see
also K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 35. Both Catholics and Protestants
welcome and defend segregation as a safeguard against sectarian attacks. See, e.g.,
CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 14; J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 9.
878. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 8; La Guardia, supra note 877, at 15.
879. J. CONROY, supra note 3, at 9. "[AInd the government has given up all thought
of housing working-class Protestants and Catholics in the same neighborhood." Id. at 9;
see also La Guardia, supra note 877, at 15 ("Protestant areas have become more Protestant
and Catholic areas have become more Catholic.").
880. K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 57; see also La Guardia, supra note
877, at 15 ("[lit is not surprising that youths in loyalist areas, such as the village on the
other side of the motorway from Catholic west Belfast, only know Catholics from the hours
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Protestants to work with and for their own to an extreme degree."'
Add the extensive segregation in education-of the nearly 350,000
school-aged youth in Northern Ireland, only slightly more than 1,000
attend integrated schools 5 -as well as in social and sporting activities," and "the extent to which Northern Ireland really is a divided
society""' becomes clear. Of all the problems the British army faces
in Northern Ireland, finding ways to interpose itself between the two
communities is not one of them, 85 and there is no reason to believe the
United Nations force would be any different.
What might be different is the reception the United Nations troops
would expect; at least one Protestant paramilitary leader recently predicted
that if United Nations' peacekeepers replaced a withdrawing British army,
"[e]verybody'd be shooting at the UN then.""8 6 Perhaps. Yet, as the
British constantly reiterate, Ulster's is a propaganda war, one in which
both Catholic and Protestant paramilitarists are fiercely engaged. Toward
winning that war, both sides have in recent months taken steps to reduce
criticism that they target the innocent."8 7 Begin to shoot at United
Nations' soldiers and the propaganda war is surely lost. Whatever else the
paramilitarists' leaders might be, ignorant of the importance of public
spent hurling stones at them.").
881. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 56-57; D. REED, supra note 107,
at 87, 117; see also S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 269-70. See generally P. BEW & H.
PATTERSON, supra note 79, at 148 (although the recruitment of Catholics by the Fair

Employment Agency has risen since 1973, to 30.5%, the higher grades of employment
remain overwhelmingly (80%) Protestant).
882. Rule, Where They Go to School to Learn Not to Hate, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1988,
at A4, col. 3. For a concise overview on the dual, sectarian school systems, see K. BOYLE

& T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 56; see also CAMERON REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
883. See K. BOYLE & T. HADDEN, supra note 14, at 56.

884. Id. at 57.
885.

A recent report revealed the ability of the British to determine where to patrol even

in those urban areas in which Catholics are neither walled in nor out:
The British soldiers who stalk the streets here have little maps on the
stocks of their automatic weapons. They are called "tribal maps," and
are divided in two colors, red for the Protestants and green for the
Catholics. In this way the foreign soldiers can tell which street
belongs to which tribe, and thus gauge their own level of safety.
J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 2.
886. S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 139.
887. See IRA Disbands an Attack Group After 'Unacceptable' Killings, San Francisco
Chron., Jan. 25, 1989, at A16, col. 1; Sinn Fein's Leader Criticizes LR.A. on Killing of
Civilians, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1989, at 8, col. 6 [hereinafter Sinn Fein's Leaderl; Clines,
Its Image Sullied, Ulster Loyalist Force Ousts Chief, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1988, at A3,
col. 1.
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opinion, and of the consequences of attacking United Nations' peacekeepers on public opinion, they are not.
In sum, the available evidence strongly suggests the tasks which a
United Nations peacekeeping force in Northern Ireland would be called
upon to perform are, while imposing, not impracticable. 5 5
3. The Likelihood of Negotiations
No one can predict with anything approaching certainty that replacing
British troops with United Nations' peacekeepers, even if accompanied by
a unilateral IRA ceasefire of the type that recently has been advocated, 8 could guarantee the initiation of negotiations for a political
solution to the War of Ireland. The escalating paramilitary warfare, the
consequences of British policy' and the permeance of ingrained bigotry
have deepened sectarian hatred in recent years, allowing militants on both
sides to remain committed to armed struggle."'
Yet it would be blindly fatalistic to predict automatic failure. For
more than a decade now observers have detected among the "political
groups, clergy, government officials, and citizens of Northern Ireland...
888. One other important task the United Nations would inherit from the security forces
would be patrol of the border with Ireland to prevent paramilitarists and munitions,
primarily republican, from infiltrating into the North, a chore not dissimilar to those
previously performed by United Nations peacekeepers in Cyprus, see, e.g., BLUE
HELMETS, supra note 21, at 270-71; Theodorides, supra note 402, at 780-83, the Congo,
see, e.g., BLUE HELMETS, supra, at 232-33; Miller, supra note 670, at 16-20, and, with
less success, in Lebanon, see, e.g., BLUE HELMETS, supra, at 118-21. This task currently
is performed by the British, RUC and especially the UDR on the Northern side and the
Irish army and police on the Southern. There is also a need to guard against unionist
excursions into the South. For example, in 1976, the UDA infiltrated into the Republic,
set off 50 firebombs in Dublin and then blamed them on the IRA. See Clines, supra note
887, at A3, col. 1.
889. See K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 376-78.

890. "[T]he Provos are a logical reaction to the repressive measures of the British
government. . . . That [any journalist] who spends time in the nationalist communities of
Belfast, would arrive at a position of sympathy with the IRA, even though many of their
methods repel him, will come as no surprise to anyone who has spent time there. The
Diplock courts, dawn raids, discrimination in housing and the work-place, violence and
intimidation are there for all to see. Unfortunately, very few take the time." English,
Americans in the North (Book Review), IR. AM., Mar. 1988, at 49, 50 (reviewing S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30; J. CONROY, supra note 3); see also, e.g., J.L. ANDERSON,
supra note 327, at 20-21, 24-25; S. BELFRAGE, supra, 290-92; J. CONROY, supra, at 14,
103, 120-21; Rule, supra, at 3, col. 1.
891. See J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 8; Whitney, Amid Death
in Ulster, a Man Reflects, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1989, at A3, col. 1; Corry, Irish Issue:
A Look at Both Sides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1986, at C21, col. 4.
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a thread of a possible compromise among the opposing factions which
could eventually lead to progress in devising a solution acceptable to all
That the thread of compromise and dialogue is
parties concerned.""
frayed by war does not mean it has come completely unwoven. The
lesson of recent vain attempts to initiate negotiations is not that they will
never succeed, but rather that they will not succeed in the current climate
Indeed, recent reports and electoral returns reveal a
of violence.'
9
population overwhelmingly desirous of a negotiated peace," but impo-

892. Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at ix.
893. See Rule, supra note 593, at A4, col. 1; Whitney, supra note 593, at 13, col. 1.
894. It cannot be gainsaid that support for a political solution is widespread, even if
agreement on what such a solution might entail is not:
Unionism seems more deeply divided today than 13 years ago, the
current [Democratic Ulster Party-Official Ulster Party] electoral pact
notwithstanding. . . . As is the case on the nationalist side, even some
of the most ardent activists have grown weary of the interminable,
intractable strife. These trends are heading in the direction of creating
cleavages between hard-core loyalists and somewhat softer unionists,
which can then be exploited in the interests of stabilizing a devolved,
power-sharing political structure. . . .[As for Republicans, t]he results
of the January 1986 Westminster by-elections showed plainly that at
least a segment of the [IRA's] constituency seems willing to give
Hillsborough the benefit of the doubt for the time being. Sinn Fein's
candidate, standing on a rejectionist platform, was overwhelmed in the
Newry-Armagh district by SDLP deputy leader Seamus Mallon, whose
slogan urged a 'vote for hope'. In four contested races, the overall
Sinn Fein vote fell by 12,000 from its 1983 level, while the SDLP
share increased by an almost equal amount, with the result that the
social democrats enjoyed a nearly 2-1 margin over the Provos.
K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 370. Despite the violence of 1988-89, or perhaps because of
it, these trends away from the abyss continue. A long-secret communique from Protestant
politicians to British officials, leaked to the press earlier this year, confirmed Kelley's
analysis by revealing that more flexible Protestant leaders favor negotiations. Prokesch,
Leaked UlsterDocument Suggests Divisions in 2 Protestant Parties, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1990, at A6, col. 1. The May 1989 local elections gave the moderate Catholic SDLP the
highest level of support in its 20-year history while Sinn Fdin lost votes. The SDLP
increased its share of the overall vote to 20.8%, a gain of 3%, and won 120 seats, a gain
of 19 since the 1985 local elections. N. Ireland Election, Wash. Post, May 20, 1989, at
A17, col. 2. Sinn Fin's vote dipped slightly, from 11.7% in the last election to 11%, and
the party lost 15 of its previous 59 seats. The mandate for a non-violent solution grew, and
the electorate of the gunmen further declined, in the European Parliament elections the
following month, when the SDLP received 25.5% of the vote and Sinn Fdin a mere 9.1 %.
Prokesch, supra note 132, at 3, col. 1.On the Protestant side support for Paisley's extremist Democratic Unionist Party eroded by a significant 6.3% in the May 1989 elections,
and the more moderate Official party was the primary beneficiary. N. Ireland Election,
supra, at A17, col. 2; see also supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
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s95
tent to achieve it.
Mourned one Catholic priest, at yet another
think we're completely and utterly helpless."'9
"I
political funeral,
Acknowledging voters' preference for negotiation over bloodshed,'
Protestants of the far right have begun advocating dialogue, compromise
and peace, but backed by British guns they will only proceed on their own
terms, and then only if the IRA first lays down its guns.191 Meanwhile,
the IRA rejects negotiations on Protestant terms," 9 and resolutely
refuses to abandon its military campaign for a wholly constitutional
one," in large part because the pressure Sinn Fin is feeling from its
constituency to curtail violent republicanism" is at least partially
relieved by the continuing British armed presence on the island. As Sinn
Fin assemblyman Danny Morrison explained, "I can't go on television
and say the IRA is right. But we will always cover ourselves by saying
we believe that any oppressed people anywhere in the world have the right
to resist foreign occupation."" The message transmitted by both sides
is clear. The Northern Irish want peace, but are unable to obtain it alone.
And, as we have seen, the British are equally unable to deliver it.

VII. EPILOGUE

When the United Nations concludes its crusade in the Gulf,'

it will

895. "[Tlhey seem[] trapped in this impasse: because of their condition wanting to
relieve themselves of some burden, but unable to because of their condition."
S.
BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 268; accord Whitney, supra note 891, at A3, col. 1; see also
Wilson, Poll Shock for Accord, supra note 252, at 6 (when recently asked whether "there
are events that would give you hope for the future here," 68% of the Northern Irish

surveyed could think of nothing at all).
896.

Clines, Priest, Writing Eulogy, Recalls Woman in I.R.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,

1988, at AI0, col. 1.
897. See Rule, supra note 593, at A4, col. I ("Many Protestant voters appear to have
lost faith in the militant unionist resistance to any loosening of Northern Ireland's ties with
London, and many of the younger unionist politicians . . .argue that . . .they have little

alternative but to negotiate about Northern Ireland's status.").
898. J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 6-7; see S. BELFRAGE, supra
note 30, at 11l;
La Guardia, supra note 877, at 14.
899. J. HOLLAND, supra note 7, at 150.
900. See D. REED, supra note 107, at 407.
901.

See Sinn Fein's Leader, supra note 887, at A8, col. 6.

902. J.L. ANDERSON & S. ANDERSON, supra note 327, at 19.
903. Whatever else might be said about the United States-led assault, under United
Nations' mandate, to enforce United Nations resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait, all that need be said here are three comments. First, the United Nations' swift
response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait illustrates once again that the United Nations
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find that throughout most of the world peace remains threatened by
conflicts whose international ramifications are less obvious. This is
certainly true in Northern Ireland, where the constant killing continues
apace. Recent political and diplomatic maneuvers there, heralded as
presaging peace, failed to prevent accelerated expansion of the violence
beyond Ulster's borders.
Margaret Thatcher and her personal war against the IRA exited stage
right in late 1990, following a dizzyingly swift descent from power,'
which raised hopes for a reconsideration of British tactics." Yet shootto-kill operations continue to claim unarmed Catholics in the North and to
exacerbate tensions,' emboldening the IRA to undertake a daylight
mortar assault on Thatcher's successor, John Major, and his cabinet.? 7
Major, like Theatcher before him, seems less likely after an IRA attack
on his life to look favorably on any settlement that allows the IRA to
claim even partial victory.
Prior to Thatcher's fall, the British secretary of state for Northern
Ireland, Peter Brooke, conceded a military solution is impossible and
offered direct negotiations with Sinn Fain if the IRA first declares a
ceasefire."' Britain also announced that several of Ulster's political
remains most comfortable addressing interstate conflict, to the detriment of the vast
majority of oppressed peoples, who suffer as a consequence of intrastate violence. See
supra notes 338-39, 343-59 & 391-99. Second, the multinational coalition enforcing Iraqi
compliance with United Nations resolutions has not been, and cannot be, described as a
.peacekeeping force" in any sense of that phrase. See supra notes 345 & 619-24 and
accompanying text ("peacekeeping" is not an enforcement measure and does not entail
offensive operations). Third, the premature resort to force in the current campaign, when
sanctions and negotiations remained viable options, perhaps indicates that the failure of the
United Nations to raise its own army under article 42 of the Charter was no tragedy. See
supra notes 619-20 and accompanying text.
Years as Prime Minister Ended by
904. See Whitney, Thatcher Says She'll Quit; 11
Party Challenge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 6. Within the week, Thatcher
protege John Major defeated two rivals to succeed to the prime minister's post. Whitney,
Thatcher Loyalist Chosen as Successor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
905. Thatcher's vendetta against the IRA, though certainly understandable considering
that the IRA assassinated her foremost allies and nearly killed her, too, clearly posed a
formidable obstacle to constructive resolution of the conflict. See supra notes 534 & 684
and accompanying text.
906. See McKittrick, supra note 39, at 3, col. I (Archbishop of Armagh, the leader of
the Catholic Church in Ireland, calling for an independent inquiry into army killing of an
unarmed Catholic man in late 1990, the tenth victim of army shootings during the year);
Victor, supra note 39, at 3, col. I (Irish government expressing concern over army
killings).
907.

See Whitney, supra note 284, at AI, col. 3.

908. High British Aide Suggest Talks With LR.A. Political Wing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
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parties appeared on the brink of negotiations intended to terminate direct
British governance of the province in favor of a return to self-rule.'
But Protestant intransigence, solidified by the presence of British troops
to safeguard the majority position in the North, sabotaged both initiatives.910 Meanwhile, the IRA refused to assent to a ceasefire 9 " and
escalated its campaign outside Ulster, deliberately targeting British
civilians for the first time in eight years, killing one commuter and
injuring 40 in bomb attacks on two rail terminals in central London.9 12
Such incidents-politically possible only because the IRA remains
immunized from losing its foundational communal support, despite
Catholic revulsion at such repugnant republican antics, by Catholics' evengreater hatred of British troops and their repressive tactics 913 -seem
certain to fan the flames of prejudice among the British public and press,
already criticized for heavy anti-Irish bias.9 '4 This, in turn, seems likely
to perpetuate an atmosphere much more conducive to prolonging the war
than to conducting negotiations to end it.
1989, at A5, col. 1 [hereinafter High British Aide Suggest Talks].
909. Prokesch, British Hope for Talks on Ulster Rule, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1990, at
A3, col. 1.
910. Brooke's unofficial offer to Sinn Fdin was stillborn, assailed by leaders of both
major Protestant political parties and from both sides in the British House of Commons.
See High British Aide Suggests Talks, supra note 908, at A5, col. I. A formal proposal
has yet to be made. Similarly, negotiations among Ulster's political parties are yet to
begin, as Protestant leaders refuse to allow representatives from the Republic of Ireland to
join the discussions. Prokesch, Ulster Negotiations Delayed As Dublin Considers Its Role,
N.Y. Times, July 6, 1990, at A3, col. 3.
911.

See High British Aide Suggests Talks, supra note 908, at A5, col. I.

912. Schmidt, supra note 284, at Al, col. 3.
913. The New York Thmes earlier this year found continued "[e]nmity toward British
troops," among Ulster Catholics. Prokesch, supra note 148, at Al, col. 4. "Not many
Catholics see the soldiers as necessary peacekeepers," the Times reported. Id. "Most
resent them, and that resentment is sometimes turned into hatred by the soldiers' actions
on patrol, which are heavy-handed at times." Id. To take a concrete example, after the
IRA forced civilian army employees to act as "human bombs" in attacks on British
soldiers, many Catholics publicly condemned the IRA. See Prokesch, supra note 593, at
15, col. 1. However, most Catholics "were skeptical that it would result in a significant
erosion of support for the I.R.A. or its political arm, Sinn F6in." Id. "'All the British
have to do is raid 20 or 30 houses and start coming down heavy again,' on republican areas
and support for the IRA will bounce back, said Patrick McArt, editor of the Derry Journal,
a twice-weekly newspaper." Id.
914. To cite just one recent example, in October Britain's own attorney general
criticized the considerable anti-Irish slant among the British media. See British Press
Slammed, IR. AM., Dec. 1990, at 9. As might be expected, IRA bomb sorties onto the
mainland aggravate anti-Irish sentiments. See, e.g., C. MULLIN, supra note 181, at 7-8
(describing violence against Irish residents in Britain following 1974 pub bombings).
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The disclosure during 1990 of covert governmental misdeeds against
Ulster republicans heightened the atmosphere of distrust and antagonism
that doomed the government's peace proposals and, concomitantly,
strengthened the perception that Britain is incapable of neutrality in
Northern Ireland. 915 A report by government-appointed police investigators revealed that British security forces passed information about
suspected IRA members to outlawed Protestant paramilitary organizations," who used the data to assassinate Catholics.9 17 The government also confessed that its security forces engaged in a deliberate
campaign of disinformation about Irish republicans. 98
As Lord Caradon's proclamation of British neutrality rings more
hollow by the year, the bell continues to toll for scores of innocent
Northern Irish and British citizens. Hopes for peace in Northern Ireland
burn bright but briefly, then dim again, 9'9 illuminating only the bitter
915. Even absent these damaging revelations, the terms of the government's proposed
negotiaions were sufficient, alone, to ensure that the initiative could not succeed. By
expressly excluding Sinn Fdin from the contemplated discussions regarding the governance
of Northern Ireland, see Prokesch, supra note 909, at A3, cot. 1, British ministers
informed 35-42% of the Northern Irish Catholic community-that percentage which
consistently votes Sinn Fdin, see supra note 200 and accompanying text-that it would have
no say in the future of the province. It is painfully obvious that no political solution can
be negotiated without full participation of this critical element of Ulster's population, for
if this sizable minority is excised from political dialogue it will see no alternative means
to voice its concerns but through continued violence. See, e.g., Drexler, supra note 259,
at 19. Equally clear to the Catholic minority is the partisan nature of Britain's terms.
Britain's stated ground for excluding Sinn Fein is the latter's refusal to renounce IRA
violence. Prokesch, supra note 909, at A3, col. 1. However, the British plans included
both major unionist political parties-the UUP and the DUP, id.,-although neither party
has explicitly rejected violence perpetrated by Protestant paramilitarists.
916. Rule, Study Finds Leaks of Data on I.R.A., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1990, at Al 1,
col. 1. The report was issued by John Stevens, deputy chief constable of Cambridgeshire,
England, who was appointed to conduct the investigation by Northern Ireland's chief of
police. Id.
917. Rule, Ulster Group Says It Has Police Files, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at A6,
col. 1. Irish republicans claimed the leak of information provided further evidence of
collusion between British security forces and Protestant paramilitarists. Id.
918. Prokesch, Anti-L.R.A. Drive of 1970's Stirs Fervor in Britain, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1990, at A7, col. 1. The government denied that the campaign involved smear tactics
against Northern Irish and British politicians seen as sympathetic to the republican cause,
id., but the former British army officer who originally disclosed the disinformation
campaign maintains that the operation targeted politicians as well as the IRA. Id.
919. Compare, for example, the following articles. In February, the New York imes
reported that Protestants and Catholics in Derry were attempting to put their differences
behind them. Prokesch, Londonderry, Burying Strife, Starts to Rebuild, N.Y. Times, Feb.
19, 1990, at Al, col. 1. By November, the news was far less sanguine, as "optimism has
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truth, for those who care to see it, that the war will continue at least until
British troops withdraw and the dominant policy in Northern Ireland
becomes something other than Britain's current strategy of suppression.2 0 Injustice, perceived or real, sows hatred and then violence,
which reaps hatred and violence in response, and greater injustice, which
in turn sows more hatred and violence. A tragic cycle continues.
"The latest phase of the longest war [is now more than] 20 years old,
and the question must be posed: is that not long enough?"" 1 The
urgency of this question was never more apparent:
The decrepitude of the physical surroundings is reflected by the
despair in many residents' hearts. Morale has not evaporated so
much as it has been drained by the prospect of unchanging,
unending desolation. Too much death has caused life to resemble
a condition of numbness. Is the capacity to respond to loss
forever undiminished? Will tears shed in the 20th century be
heartfelt as on the first day? When wars go on too long, killing
becomes an ordinary event, as steeped in ritual as the funeral
processions that follow with dreary regularity. 2
Despite these clear consequences of a war without end, concerned
authorities both within and without the British government remain
paralyzed by fears of greater calamity if the army withdraws. As an
American congressional delegation concluded more than a year ago, "[a]
paramount concern and a roadblock to a political solution is the prospect
of bloodshed and violence following the withdrawal of British
troops."'
Thus are the Northern Irish trapped by the limitations of
orthodox wisdom on, and conventional remedies for, the troubles. It is
time to apply new remedies. "As the body count nears 3,000 people,
consideration needs to be given to possible alternatives. Simply plodding
on, soldier-like, in a 20-year-old direction may not be the same thing as
moving forward."'
Whether the intervention of a United Nations peacekeeping force, the
withdrawal of the British army and the restructuring of the Northern Irish
police force can initiate a process towards peace cannot be predicted with
given way to foreboding" in the wake of the latest round of violence. See Prokesch, Peace
Hopes Dim in Londonderry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1990, at Al5, col. I.
920. See S. BELFRAGE,
accompanying text.
921.

supra note 30, at 17-18; see supra notes 130-285

K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 376.

922. Id.
923.

Northern Ireland Report, supra note 227, at 220-21.

924. K. KELL EY, supra note *, at 376.

and
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any precision. Yet this much is clear: the Northern Irish have very little
to lose from the trying.' "It is simply too pat-and maybe even a bit
immoral-to dismiss such a proposal before it has even been tested. Many
of the objections in fact lose their persuasiveness when weighed against
the alternative of piling on more of the same.'

925. "Personally, I think the Brits are very blind," a Sinn Fdin worker told Sally
Belfrage:
How long are they going to stay here and try to keep this thing going? The
longer they stay the worse the whole damn thing is for everybody. I mean let's
get it over with once and for all. Do they want another 800 years? . . . They're
just prolonging the whole thing, for the Protestants as well as Catholics. I'd
rather have it all over with. And if I die I die.'
'What about your kids?'
'If they die they die.'

S. BELFRAGE, supra note 30, at 19 (quoting Chrissie MeAuley) (emphasis in original).
926. K. KELLEY, supra note *, at 378 (arguing for the IRA to declare a unilateral
ceasefire as a means to break the deadly stalemate in the North). Ulster's desperate
condition has long produced such sentiments, and, with respect to the proposals put forward
in this Article, I admit to sharing the attitude once expressed by James Prior, former
secretary of state for Northern Ireland: "'In a way I have rather a fatalistic approach. I
doubt if I can make a bigger bloody mess of the thing than it's in right now, so I may as
well have a go. I might fail, but I reckon trying and failing isn't going to make things much
worse.'" P. O'MALLEY, supra note 43, at 367 (quoting Prior's statement of April 2, 1982
in support of his ultimately unsuccessful plan for devolved government in Northern
Ireland).

